As far as the law of preservation of matter and the existence of ether are concerned, Kant, Lomonossow and Lavoisier had very similar views. Nevertheless, according to historical evidence they worked out their theories never taking each other's results for granted. Whereas it is well known that Lavoisier did not base his experiments on the former ones by Lomonossow, it has been argued that Kant based his philosophy of nature on Lavoisier's experiments. I try to show here, that Kant had (...) his philosophy of nature done, prior to Lavoisier's Elements of Chemistry. Further that the only one to have been able to influence Kant was not Lavoisier but Lomonossow. But Kant never mentioned Lomonossow. There is strong evidence that the similarity of views in Kant, Lomonossow and Lavoisier is not due to any kind of interaction between them. This also holds of the mistakes, which Kant and Lomonossow made. The only substantial difference is that Kant thought, that some laws of nature may be logically inferred without experiments. (shrink)

The evolution of the equation of mass conservation in fluid mechanics is studied. Following early hydraulic approximations, and progress by Daniel and Johann Bernoulli, its first expression as a partial differential equation was achieved by d’Alembert, and soon given definitive form by Euler. Later reworkings by Lagrange, Laplace, Poisson and others advanced the subject, but all based their derivations on the conserved mass of a moving fluid particle. Later, Duhamel and Thomson gave a simpler derivation, by considering mass flow into (...) and out of a fixed portion of space. The later propagation of these derivations in nineteenth-century British textbooks and treatises is also examined, including Maxwell’s on the kinetic theory of gases. (shrink)

Through an in-depth analysis of the notes that Leibniz made while reading Pascal’s manuscript treatise on conic sections, we aim to show the real extension of what he called “hexagrammum mysticum”, and to highlight the main results he achieved in this field, as well as proposing plausible proofs of them according to the methods he seems to have developed.

In this paper we discuss in some depth the main theorems pertaining to Carnot’s theory of transversals, their initial reception by Servois, and the applications that Brianchon made of them to the theory of conic sections. The contributions of these authors brought the long-forgotten theorems of Desargues and Pascal fully to light, renewed the interest in synthetic geometry in France, and prepared the ground from which projective geometry later developed.

In the course of the history of science, some concepts have forged theoretical foundations, constituting paradigms that hold sway for substantial periods of time. Research on the history of explanations of the action of one body on another is a testament to the periodic revival of one theory in particular, namely, the theory of ether. Even after the foundation of modern Physics, the notion of ether has directly and indirectly withstood the test of time. Through a spontaneous physics philosophical analysis, (...) this article will explore how certain aspects of the concept of ether have appeared in different branches of the history of science. (shrink)

Analogies between hearing and seeing already existed in ancient Greek theories of perception. The present paper follows the evolution of such analogies until the rise of 17th century optics, with due regard to the diversity of their origins and nature but with particular emphasis on their bearing on the physical concepts of light and sound. Whereas the old Greek analogies were only side effects of the unifying concepts of perception, the analogies of the 17th century played an important role in (...) constructing optical theories by imitation of acoustic theories, or vice versa. This transition depended on several factors including the changing relations between optics, music, mathematics, and physics, the diversity of early modern concepts of sound, and the rise of a new physics based on experimentation and mechanical explanation. (shrink)

Analogies between hearing and seeing already existed in ancient Greek theories of perception. The present paper follows the evolution of such analogies until the rise of 17th century optics, with due regard to the diversity of their origins and nature but with particular emphasis on their bearing on the physical concepts of light and sound. Whereas the old Greek analogies were only side effects of the unifying concepts of perception, the analogies of the 17th century played an important role in (...) constructing optical theories by imitation of acoustic theories, or vice versa. This transition depended on several factors including the changing relations between optics, music, mathematics, and physics, the diversity of early modern concepts of sound, and the rise of a new physics based on experimentation and mechanical explanation. (shrink)

Euclidean geometry, statics, and classical mechanics, being in some sense the simplest physical theories based on a full-fledged mathematical apparatus, are well suited to a historico-philosophical analysis of the way in which a physical theory differs from a purely mathematical theory. Through a series of examples including Newton’s Principia and later forms of mechanics, we will identify the interpretive substructure that connects the mathematical apparatus of the theory to the world of experience. This substructure includes models of experiments, models of (...) measurement, and modular connections with partial theories. It evolves during the life of a theory as physicists learn how to apply it in various contexts. It should nevertheless be regarded as an integral part of a genuine physical theory since the theory would otherwise degenerate into pure mathematics. (shrink)

In French mechanical treatises of the nineteenth century, Newton’s second law of motion was frequently derived from a relativity principle. The origin of this trend is found in ingenious arguments by Huygens and Laplace, with intermediate contributions by Euler and d’Alembert. The derivations initially relied on Galilean relativity and impulsive forces. After Bélanger’s Cours de mécanique of 1847, they employed continuous forces and a stronger relativity with respect to any commonly impressed motion. The name “principle of relative motions” and the (...) very idea of using this principle as a constructive tool were born in this context. The consequences of Poincaré’s and Einstein’s awareness of this approach are analyzed. Lastly, the legitimacy and significance of a relativity-based derivation of Newton’s second law are briefly discussed in a more philosophical vein. (shrink)

I argue that, contrary to the recent claims of physicists and philosophers of physics, general relativity requires no interpretation in any substantive sense of the term. I canvass the common reasons given in favor of the alleged need for an interpretation, including the difficulty in coming to grips with the physical significance of diffeomorphism invariance and of singular structure, and the problems faced in the search for a theory of quantum gravity. I find that none of them shows any defect (...) in our comprehension of general relativity as a physical theory. I conclude by comparing general relativity with quantum mechanics, a theory that manifestly does stand in need of an interpretation in an important sense. Although many aspects of the conceptual structure of general relativity remain poorly understood, it suffers no incoherence in its formulation as a physical theory that only an ‘interpretation’ could resolve. *Received November 2007; revised February 2009. †To contact the author, please write to: Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 817 Cathedral of Learning, Pittsburgh, PA 15260; e‐mail: [email protected] . When science starts to be interpretive it is more unscientific even than mysticism. (D. H. Lawrence, “Self‐Protection”). (shrink)

The analysis of theory-confirmation generally takes the deductive form: show that a theory in conjunction with physical data and auxiliary hypotheses yield a prediction about phenomena; verify the prediction; provide a quantitative measure of the degree of theory-confirmation this yields. The issue of confirmation for an entire framework either does not arise, or is dismissed in so far as frameworks are thought not to be the kind of thing that admits scientific confirmation. I argue that there is another form of (...) scientific reasoning that has not received philosophical attention, what I call Newtonian abduction, that does provide confirmation for frameworks as a whole, and does so in two novel ways. I further argue that Newtonian abduction is at least as important a form of reasoning in science as standard deductive and inductive forms. The form is beautifully summed up by Maxwell : “The true method of physical reasoning is to begin with the phenomena and to deduce the forces from them by a direct application of the equations of motion.”. (shrink)

One can (for the most part) formulate a model of a classical system in either the Lagrangian or the Hamiltonian framework. Though it is often thought that those two formulations are equivalent in all important ways, this is not true: the underlying geometrical structures one uses to formulate each theory are not isomorphic. This raises the question of whether one of the two is a more natural framework for the representation of classical systems. In the event, the answer is yes: (...) I state and sketch proofs of two technical results—inspired by simple physical arguments about the generic properties of classical systems—to the effect that, in a precise sense, classical systems evince exactly the geometric structure Lagrangian mechanics provides for the representation of systems, and none provided by Hamiltonian. The argument not only clarifies the conceptual structure of the two systems of mechanics, but also their relations to each other and their respective mechanisms for representing physical systems. It also shows why naïvely structural approaches to the representational content of physical theories cannot work. [Lagrange] grasped that he had gained a method of stating dynamical truths in a way, which is perfectly indifferent to the particular methods of measurement employed in fixing the positions of the various parts of the system. Accordingly, he went on to deduce equations of motion, which are equally applicable whatever quantitative measurements have been made, provided that they are adequate to fix positions. The beauty and almost divine simplicity of these equations is such that these formulae are worthy to rank with those mysterious symbols which in ancient times were held directly to indicate the Supreme Reason at the base of all things. (Whitehead [1948], p. 63)1. Introduction2.Classical Systems3. The Possible Interactions of a Classical System and the Structure of Its Space of States4. Classical Systems Are Lagrangian5. Classical Systems Are Not Hamiltonian6. How Lagrangian and Hamiltonian Mechanics Represent Classical Systems7. The Conceptual Structure of Classical Mechanics. (shrink)

I Primi princìpi metafisici della scienza della natura di Kant sono stati approfonditamente letti dai filosofi dell’età kantiana, dai cosiddetti minori e dai grandi, spesso in dialogo tra loro, come Hegel e Schelling. Hegel, in particolare, cerca di mostrare come possano contribuire alla formazione del concetto di assoluto, di totalità e, nello stesso tempo, come possano salvaguardare l’individualità specifica degli enti. Nella Differenza dei sistemi filosofici di Fichte e Schelling, l’interpretazione dei Primi princìpi metafisici conduce a una nozione discorsiva di (...) assoluto, inteso come totalità immanente delle condizioni intellettuali dell’esperienza. (shrink)

In their paper, ‘When are thought experiments poor ones?’ (Peijnenburg and David Atkinson, 2003, Journal of General Philosophy of Science 34, 305-322.), Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson argue that most, if not all, philosophical thought experiments are “poor” ones with “disastrous consequences” and that they share the property of being poor with some (but not all) scientific thought experiments. Noting that unlike philosophy, the sciences have the resources to avoid the disastrous consequences, Peijnenburg and Atkinson come to the conclusion that (...) the use of thought experiments in science is in general more successful than in philosophy and that instead of concocting more “recherché” thought experiments, philosophy should try to be more empirical. In this comment I will argue that Peijnenburg’s and Atkinson’s view on thought experiments is based on a misleading characterization of both, the dialectical situation in philosophy as well as the history of physics. By giving an adequate account of what the discussion in contemporary philosophy is about, we will arrive at a considerably different evaluation of philosophical thought experiments. For I am convinced that we now find ourselves at an altogether decisive turning point in philosophy, and that we are objectively justified in considering that an end has come to the fruitless conflict of systems. We are already at the present time, in my opinion, in possession of methods which make any such conflict in principle unnecessary. What is now required is their resolute application. (Schlick, ‘The Turning Point in Philosophy’, 1930/1959, p. 54). (shrink)

This paper offers a solution to a problem in Herschel studies by drawing on the dynamic frame model for concept representation offered by cognitive psychology. Applying the frame model to represent the conceptual frameworks of the particle and wave theories, this paper shows that discontinuity between the particle and wave frameworks consists mainly in the transition from a particle notion ‘side’ to a wave notion ‘phase difference’. By illustrating intraconceptual relations within concepts, the frame representations reveal the ontological differences between (...) these two concepts. ‘Side’ is an object concept built on spatial relations, but ‘phase difference’ is an event concept built on temporal relations. The conceptual analyses display a possible cognitive source of Herschel’s misconception of polarization. Limited by his experimental works and his philosophical beliefs, Herschel comprehended polarization solely in terms of spatial relations, which prevented him from replacing the object concept ‘side’ with the event concept ‘phase difference’, and eventually resulted in his failure to understand the wave account of polarization.Author Keywords: Herschel; Polarization; Object concept; Event concept; Frame; Cognitive psychology. (shrink)

A generous postdoctoral grant from the Cohn Institute for History and Philosophy of Science and Ideas at Tel Aviv University enabled this research. I conducted the very earliest stage of the work while holding a postdoctoral position at the Minerva Humanities Center and the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics at TAU, which I would also like very much to thank. Participants in the workshop of the School of Philosophy, Linguistics and Science Studies in TAU under the direction of Professor (...) Yossef Schwartz provided useful comments on an early draft. I reserve special thanks to Daniel Dovrat, Yiftah Elazar, Ori Belkind, Eyal Chowers, and Shaul Katzir for their perspicacious remarks and ongoing encouragement.When... (shrink)

According to Bernard Williams, philosophy is a humanistic discipline essentially different from the sciences. While the sciences describe the world as it is in itself, independent of perspective, philosophy tries to make sense of ourselves and of our activities. Only the humanistic disciplines, in particular philosophy, can do this, the sciences have nothing to say about it. In this note I point out some limitations of Williams’ view and outline an alternative view.

The aim of this paper is to analyze Leibniz and Newton’s conception of space, and to point out where their agreements and disagreements lie with respect to its mode of existence. I shall offer a definite characterization of Leibniz and Newton’s conceptions of space. I will show that, according to their own concepts of substance, both Newtonian and Leibnizian spaces are not substantiva!. The reason of that consists in the fact that space is not capable of action. Moreover, there is (...) a sense in which space is relational, because their parts are individuated only by means of their mutual relations. (shrink)

En los Discorsi Galileo afirma haber realizado un experimento, cuyo resultado fue negativo, para determinar si la luz tarda tiempo en propagarse. En este trabajo analizo ese experimento como crucial entre las hipótesis rivales según las cuales la luz se propaga con velocidad infinita o con velocidad finita. Procuro determinar las hipótesis auxiliares y la carga teórica que presupone el diseño experimental. Argumento que las hipótesis presupuestas son razonables y que la carga teórica es muy baja. Sostengo que en principio (...) es posible un experimento crucial exitoso, esto es, con resultado positivo, como el concebido por Galileo. Concluyo que la hipótesis de que la luz se propaga con velocidad finita no es refutable mediante un experimento de esta clase, por lo cual cualquier resultado negativo es compatible con ambas hipótesis rivales. Como consecuencia de ello, la hipótesis de que la luz, o cualquier otra interacción física, se propagan con velocidad infinita resulta inverificable. (shrink)

Making a history of the principle of inertia, as of any other principle or concept, is a complex but still possible operation. In this work it has been chosen to make a back story which seemed the most natural way for a reconstruction. On the way back, it has been decided to stop at the 6th century CE with the contribution of Ioannes Philoponus. The principle he stated, although very different from the modern one, is certainly associated with it. Going (...) back in time it is still possible and of course one could proceed to the origins of the homo sapiens who perhaps posed the problem of why a club thrown with his hand could go so far from him. But the similarities that one can find with the modern principle are very vague, too perhaps. Without going so far one could see an embryonic idea of the principle of inertia in the atomistic theory of Democritus in the 5th century BCE. The motion of atoms whirling with no apparent reason can suggest the idea that a body can also move with no reason. But the transition from the atom, a metaphysical being, to the body, an empirical being, is far from immediate. (shrink)

In Philosophy of Biology, but also in Philosophy of Mind, in Ethics, in Epistemology, and even in Aesthetics, the term naturalization is usually used in two different ways. It is often used in a meta-philosophical sense to indicate a way for doing philosophy that, in some way, would approximate this reflection to scientific research. But it is also often used in a meta-theoretical sense. In that case, it is used to characterize an explanatory operation proper to science. Sometimes, this scientific (...) operation consists of explaining, in natural science terms, what was previously explained by recourse to the supernatural. Other times, this explanatory operation would result in a biological explanation of what, up to that moment, was explained above in terms of the Social Sciences. In the first situation, the natural is understood as the opposite of the supernatural; and science seeks to advance on that domain, producing cognitive progress. In the second situation, the natural is understood as the opposite of the secular; and Biology advances on that sphere, but not without running the risk of operating as an ideology capable of legitimating unjust and avoidable inequalities. This does not necessarily have to be so, but thought must guard against that risk. (shrink)

In this paper we examine theoretical utility arguments in metaphysics. While philosophers claim a procedural continuity with science when using such arguments, we argue that examining famous instances from the history of science expose their fundamental flaws. We find that arguments from theoretical utility invoke considerations that are not truth conducive and that justifications for claims that a theory possesses theoretical virtues often assume the truth of the theory such virtues are supposed to support. We conclude that theoretical utility arguments (...) provide no epistemic grounds for metaphysical inquiry. (shrink)

In his later writings Kuhn reconsidered his earlier account of incommensurability, clarifying some aspects, modifying others, and explicitly rejecting some of his earlier claims. In Kuhn’s new account incommensurability does not pose a problem for the rational evaluation of competing scientific theories, but does pose a problem for certain forms of realism. Kuhn maintains that, because of incommensurability, the notion that science might seek to learn the nature of things as they are in themselves is incoherent. I develop Kuhn’s new (...) account of incommensurability, respond to his anti-realist argument, and sketch a form of realism in which the realist aim is a pursuable goal.Keywords: Incommensurability; Thomas Kuhn; Rationality; Skill; Theory choice; Translation. (shrink)

Contrary to the received opinion, the fundamentals of Newton's dynamics can be set forth quite simply. In the first edition of the Principia, Newton employs a device that relates to Galileo's analysis of uniform rectilinear motion. In the second and third editions, Newton introduces an alternate device that relates to Huygens's analysis of uniform circular motion. A third device is also introduced but is hidden away as a corollary to a problem rather than set forth clearly as a theorem. Following (...) the appearance of the first edition, Newton proposed, but never published, a grand new scheme for revising his dynamics in which he clearly set forth each dynamics ratio with a complementary set of solutions to the problems. As published, however, the alternate methods are not clear and are a source more of confusion than of clarification. (shrink)

In this paper a unified theory of models and thought experiments is proposed by considering them as fictions, la Vaihinger. In order to reach this aim, the Hertzian and Botzmannian interpretation of theories as Bilder is reconsidered.

This article discusses a familiar version of trope theory as opposed to a familiar version of the theory of universals, examining how these two rivals address the problem of “attribute agreement”—a problem that has been at the root of the very reason for developing these theories in the first place. The article shows that there is not much of a difference between the ways these two theories handle the problem, and in a more general way it argues that there is (...) little reason for preferring one theory over the other. It is not interested in this claim only for the sake of the debate between trope theory and the theory of universals. Indeed, the reasons why it claims that it is so difficult to choose one theory over the other can be applied to other cases as well (where they might lead to claims of metaphysical equivalence). (shrink)

: We question the claim, common since Duhem, that sixteenth century astronomy, and especially the Wittenberg interpretation of Copernicus, was instrumentalistic rather than realistic. We identify a previously unrecognized Wittenberg astronomer, Edo Hildericus (Hilderich von Varel), who presents a detailed exposition of Copernicus's cosmology that is incompatible with instrumentalism. Quotations from other sixteenth century astronomers show that knowledge of the real configuration of the heavens was unattainable practically, rather than in principle. Astronomy was limited to quia demonstrations, although demonstration propter (...) quid remained the ideal. We suggest that Osiander's notorious preface to Copernicus expresses these sixteenth century commonplaces rather than twentieth century instrumentalism, and that neither `realism', nor `instrumentalism', in their modern meanings, apply to sixteenth century astronomy. (shrink)

An infinite number of elastically colliding balls is considered in a classical, and then in a relativistic setting. Energy and momentum are not necessarily conserved globally, even though each collision does separately conserve them. This result holds in particular when the total mass of all the balls is finite, and even when the spatial extent and temporal duration of the process are also finite. Further, the process is shown to be indeterministic: there is an arbitrary parameter in the general solution (...) that corresponds to the injection of an arbitrary amount of energy (classically), or energy-momentum (relativistically), into the system at the point of accumulation of the locations of the balls. Specific examples are given that illustrate these counter-intuitive results, including one in which all the balls move with the same velocity after every collision has taken place. (shrink)

An infinite number of elastically colliding balls is considered in a classical, and then in a relativistic setting. Energy and momentum are not necessarily conserved globally, even though each collision does separately conserve them. This result holds in particular when the total mass of all the balls is finite, and even when the spatial extent and temporal duration of the process are also finite. Further, the process is shown to be indeterministic: there is an arbitrary parameter in the general solution (...) that corresponds to the injection of an arbitrary amount of energy (classically), or energy-momentum (relativistically), into the system at the point of accumulation of the locations of the balls. Specific examples are given that illustrate these counter-intuitive results, including one in which all the balls move with the same velocity after every collision has taken place. (shrink)

The causes of tidal motions were widely debated from antiquity up to the eighteenth century. These discussions got a second wind in the early modern period, in the wake of a growing number of cosmological alternatives that challenged the dominant Aristotelian-Ptolemaic stance. The 1687 publication of Isaac Newton’s Principia Mathematica was a defining moment in the discussions and consequently made universal gravitation the most credible and generally accepted explanation. This paper investigates the aftermath of Newton’s discovery and demonstrates how his (...) understanding of tidal motion crowded out competing theories within a broader European context. My main point of reference is Roger Boscovich’s De aestu maris (1747). In his work, the leading Jesuit scholar of the time contrasted Newton’s interpretation to those of other major authorities, namely Johannes Kepler, Galileo Galilei, and René Descartes, and went on to claim the superiority of the British scientist’s achievements over anything written prior to the Principia. As this essay argues, alongside a significant body of literature produced under the umbrella of the Jesuit order, Boscovich’s De aestu maris subsequently contributed to the formation of the popular image of Newton as a “scientific hero.”. (shrink)

We compare two approaches given to the parallelogram law as a fundamental notion in eighteenth century mechanics. The authors we study are Kant and d’Alembert and we use the context created by Newton’s Principia as our point of departure.En este artículo comparamos dos caminos seguidos en el tratamiento de la ley del paralelogramo como noción fundamental en la mecánica del siglo XVIII. Los autores que estudiamos son Kant y d’Alembert y utilizamos el contexto creado por los Principia de Newton como (...) nuestro punto de partida. (shrink)

This paper investigates some classical oppositional categories, like synthetic vs. analytic, posterior vs. prior, imagination vs. grammar, metaphor vs. hermeneutics, metaphysics vs. observation, innovation vs. routine, and image vs. sound, and the role they play in epistemology and philosophy of science. The epistemological framework of objective cognitive constructivism is of special interest in these investigations. Oppositional relations are formally represented using algebraic lattice structures like the cube and the hexagon of opposition, with applications in the contexts of modern color theory, (...) Kantian philosophy, Jungian psychology, and linguistics. (shrink)

Se buscará mostrar que las críticas de Berkeley son pertinentes al mostrar que Newton utiliza una justificación que se bása en: 1) La experiecia sensible y 2)En una noción de Dios como poder activo. Con respecto a 1) si bien se puede justificar un método con la experiencia sensible, este no dejara este ámbito y no es posible pasar a las matemáticas con este metodo. Con respecto a 2) Dios es una fuente de justificación posbile para la época, sin embargo (...) en Newton se convierte en un poder activo que se contrapone a otras fomas de entender a Dios como garante de las leyes, más no como un poder que intervenga en el mundo. (shrink)

An energy condition, in the context of a wide class of spacetime theories, is, crudely speaking, a relation one demands the stress-energy tensor of matter satisfy in order to try to capture the idea that "energy should be positive". The remarkable fact I will discuss in this paper is that such simple, general, almost trivial seeming propositions have profound and far-reaching import for our understanding of the structure of relativistic spacetimes. It is therefore especially surprising when one also learns that (...) we have no clear understanding of the nature of these conditions, what theoretical status they have with respect to fundamental physics, what epistemic status they may have, when we should and should not expect them to be satisfied, and even in many cases how they and their consequences should be interpreted physically. Or so I shall argue, by a detailed analysis of the technical and conceptual character of all the standard conditions used in physics today, including examination of their consequences and the circumstances in which they are believed to be violated. (shrink)

Arguments from perceptual variation challenge the view that colors are objective properties of objects, properties that objects have independent of how they are perceived. This paper attempts, first, to diagnose one central reason why arguments from perceptual variation seem especially challenging for objectivists about color. Second, we offer a response to this challenge, claiming that once we focus on determinate colors rather than the determinables they determine, a response to arguments from perceptual variation becomes apparent. Third, our nominal opponents are (...) relationalist (like Cohen in The red and the real: an essay on color ontology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) and we will argue that the main argument for rejecting objectivism commits the relationalist to a position that is more radical than the one he would wish to endorse. Fourth, we suggest that insight into which properties could be relational may be found by looking to our best scientific theories. (shrink)

The paper presents a metaphysical characterization of spatiotemporal backgrounds from a realist perspective. The conceptual analysis is based on a heuristic sketch that encompasses the common formal traits of the major spacetime theories, such as Newtonian mechanics and general relativity. It is shown how this framework can be interpreted in a fully realist fashion, and what is the role of background structures in such a picture. In the end it is argued that, although backgrounds are a source of metaphysical discomfort, (...) still they make a spacetime theory easy to interpret. It is also suggested that this conclusion partially explains why the notion of background independence carries a lot of conceptual difficulties. (shrink)

This article considers distinct ways of understanding the world, referred to in psychology as functions of consciousness or as cognitive modes, having as the scope of interest epistemology and natural sciences. Inspired by C.G. Jung’s simile of the spectrum, we consider three basic cognitive modes associated to: (R) embodied instinct, experience, and action; (G) reality perception and learning; and (B) concept abstraction, rational thinking, and language. RGB stand for the primary colors: red, green, and blue. Accordingly, a conceptual map between (...) cognitive modes and primary and secondary colors is built based on the physics and physiology of color perception and epistemological characteristics of the aforementioned cognitive modes, leading to logical relations structured as an hexagon of opposition. Finally, this model of cognitive modes is applied to the analysis and interpretation of some important episodes in the historical development of physics and technology. (shrink)

Much scholarship has claimed the physics of Emilie du Châtelet’s treatise, Institutions de physique, is Newtonian. I argue against that idea. To do so, I distinguish three strands of meaning for the category ‘Newtonian science,’ and I examine her book against them. I conclude that her physics is not Newtonian in any useful or informative sense. To capture what is specific about it, we need better interpretive categories.

This volume examines the limitations of mathematical logic and proposes a new approach to logic intended to overcome them. To this end, the book compares mathematical logic with earlier views of logic, both in the ancient and in the modern age, including those of Plato, Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant. From the comparison it is apparent that a basic limitation of mathematical logic is that it narrows down the scope of logic confining it to the study of deduction, without (...) providing tools for discovering anything new. As a result, mathematical logic has had little impact on scientific practice. Therefore, this volume proposes a view of logic according to which logic is intended, first of all, to provide rules of discovery, that is, non-deductive rules for finding hypotheses to solve problems. This is essential if logic is to play any relevant role in mathematics, science and even philosophy. To comply with this view of logic, this volume formulates several rules of discovery, such as induction, analogy, generalization, specialization, metaphor, metonymy, definition, and diagrams. A logic based on such rules is basically a logic of discovery, and involves a new view of the relation of logic to evolution, language, reason, method and knowledge, particularly mathematical knowledge. It also involves a new view of the relation of philosophy to knowledge. This book puts forward such new views, trying to open again many doors that the founding fathers of mathematical logic had closed historically. (shrink)

This volume, The Brazilian Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, is the first attempt to present to a general audience, works from Brazil on this subject. The included papers are original, covering a remarkable number of relevant topics of philosophy of science, logic and on the history of science. The Brazilian community has increased in the last years in quantity and in quality of the works, most of them being published in respectable international journals on the subject. The (...) chapters of this volume are forwarded by a general introduction, which aims to sketch not only the contents of the chapters, but it is conceived as a historical and conceptual guide to the development of the field in Brazil. The introduction intends to be useful to the reader, and not only to the specialist, helping them to evaluate the increase in production of this country within the international context. (shrink)

This book addresses how our revisionary practices account for relations between texts and how they are read. It offers an overarching philosophy of revision concerning works of fiction, fact, and faith, revealing unexpected insights about the philosophy of language, the metaphysics of fact and fiction, and the history and philosophy of science and religion. It will be of interest to a wide range of scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of language, metaphysics, philosophy of literature, literary theory and criticism, (...) and history and philosophy of science and religion. (shrink)

В монографии представлены несколько смысловых блоков, связанных с восприятием и интерпретацией человеком исторического бытия. Ранние греческие мыслители пытались получить доступ к исходникам (началам) бытия, и эти интенции легли в основу научного знания, а также привели к появлению метафизики. В классической (и в неклассической) метафизике за основу была принята догма Пифагора и Платона о неизменности подлинной реальности, из чего следовало отрицание бытийного характера времени. Автор монографии отказывается от этой догмы и предлагает стратегию обновления метафизики и перехода ее к новому — постнеклассическому (...) — этапу. Поскольку трансформационный потенциал реальности наиболее явно представлен в историческом становлении, авторская стратегия реализуется в метафизике истории. При этом выявляются начала истории, в каком качестве выступают «дух», «культурно-историческая матрица» и «метафизический проект организации бытия» («онтологический проект»). Исследуются формы и механизмы «работы» человека с прошлым, обсуждаются вопросы, связанные с постижением логики исторического процесса, а также с ролью (творческой) личности в истории. Анализируются причины цивилизационных кризисов и очерчиваются возможные пути их разрешения, предлагается метафизическая интерпретация социальных и военных конфликтов. Завершает исследование рассмотрение трансформации человеческого естества под влиянием информационных, био- и нанотехнологий. (shrink)

The ArgumentThe societal context within which science is pursued generally acts as a productive force in the generation of knowledge. To analyze this action it is helpful to consider particular modes of mediation through which societal concerns are projected into the very local and esoteric concerns of a particular domain of research. One such mode of mediation occurs through material systems. Here I treat two such systems – the steam engine and the electric telegraph – in the natural philosophy of (...) William Thomson (Lord Kelvin).The steam engine illustratesconceptualmediation. It simultaneously instantiates “labor value” in political economy and “work” in engineering mechanics, thereby identifying the two concepts in the region of their common reference. The partial identification carries with it a structural analogy between a network of concepts from political economy and a similar network in natural philosophy, providing a potent heuristic for the reformulation and further development of dynamics.The electric telegraph illustratesmethodologicalmediation. It projects the interests of engineering and industry into the interests of electromagnetic theory and vice versa, thereby establishing, in Thomson's view, a Baconian unity of truth and utility. As the common reference of theory and practice, the telegraph locates the truth of theoretical knowledge in its utility and the utility of practical knowledge in its truth.These particular cases of conceptual and methodological mediation indicate how the local practices, concepts, and interests of a research specialty, or subculture, draw on and are adapted to those of the larger culture within which they develop. Thus the analysis of mediation leads to an ecological model of the social construction of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason contains an original and powerful semantics of singular cognitive reference which has important implications for epistemology and for philosophy of science. Here I argue that Kant’s semantics directly and strongly supports Newton’s Rule 4 of Philosophy in ways which support Newton’s realism about gravitational force. I begin with Newton’s Rule 4 of Philosophy and its role in Newton’s justification of realism about gravitational force (§2). Next I briefly summarize Kant’s semantics of singular cognitive reference (§3), (...) and then show that it is embedded in and strongly supports Newton’s Rule 4, and that it rules out not only Cartesian physics (per Harper) but also Cartesian, infallibilist presumptions about empirical justification generally (§4). This result exposes a key fallacy in Bas van Fraassen’s original argument for his anti-realist Constructive Empiricism (§5). (shrink)

A philosophical position may be characterized in different ways. Here we try to say how the naturalist answers certain . The questions come from very different areas; the spectrum of subjects is therefore quite mixed. There are, however, aspects of order: We start with (questions about) abstract subjects like logic, mathematics, metaphysics, then turn to problems of realism. And since in general naturalists are realists, the following questions on truth, laws of nature, origin of the universe, cosmology, evolution, body-mind-problem, freedom (...) of the will, religion, moral, and pseudoscience, are answered against a realistic background. German Eine philosophische Haltung kann man auf verschiedene Weisen charakterisieren. Hier versuchen wir zu sagen, wie der Naturalist auf bestimmte Kernfragen antwortet. Die Fragen stammen aus sehr verschiedenen Gebieten; das Themenspektrum ist deshalb recht bunt. Es gibt aber durchaus Ordnungsgesichtspunkte: Wir beginnen mit (Fragen zu) eher abstrakten Gegenständen wie Logik, Mathematik, Metaphysik, kommen dann zu Problemen des Realismus. Und da Naturalisten im Allgemeinen Realisten sind, werden die anschließenden Fragen über Wahrheit, Naturgesetze, Weltentstehung, Kosmologie, Evolution, Leib-Seele-Problem, Willensfreiheit, Religion, Moral und Pseudowissenschaften vor einem realistischen Hintergrund beantwortet. (shrink)

The analysis of unpublished manuscripts and of the published textbook on mechanics written between about 1730 and 1744 by Euler reveals the invention, application, and establishment of important physical and mathematical principles and procedures. They became central ingredients of an “embryonic” lunar theory that he developed in 1744/1745. The increasing use of equations of motion, although still parametrized by length, became a standard procedure. The principle of the transference of forces was established to set up such equations. Trigonometric series expansions (...) together with the method of undetermined coefficients were introduced to solve these equations approximatively. These insights constitute the milestones achieved in this phase of research, which thus may be characterized as “developing the methods”. The documents reveal the problems Euler was confronted with when setting up the equations of motion. They show why and where he was forced to introduce trigonometric functions and their series expansions into lunar theory. Furthermore, they prove Euler’s early recognition and formulation of the variability of the orbital elements by differential equations, which he previously anticipated with the concept of the osculating ellipse. One may conclude that by 1744 almost all components needed for a technically mature and successful lunar theory were available to Euler. (shrink)

Leonhard Euler (1707–1783) published two lunar theories in 1753 and 1772. He also published lunar tables in 1745, 1746, and—anonymously—in 1750. There are notebook records, unpublished manuscripts, and manuscript fragments by Euler reflecting the development of his lunar theories between about 1725 until about 1752. These documents might be used to reconstruct Euler’s theory on which he based his calculations of those lunar tables and to analyze the development of his lunar theories within this time span. The results of this (...) analysis will be published here in three parts representing three stages of Euler’s research on this topic: First approaches (about 1725–1730), developing the methods (about 1730–1744), and the breakthrough (about 1744–1752). In this part, I analyze Euler’s manuscripts and, predominantly, Euler’s records of his first two notebooks written between 1725 and 1730. I found that his early theoretical approach is coined by his development of analytical (rational) mechanics of punctiform bodies moved by central forces. He tried to describe the Moon’s motion in terms of two simultaneously acting centripetal forces, Huygens’ centrifugal theorem, and associated osculating radii. (shrink)