How can a business institution function as an ethical institution within a wider system if the context of the wider system is inherently unethical? If the primary goal of an institution, no matter how ethical it sets out to be, is to function successfully within a market system, how can it reconcile making a profit and keeping its ethical goals intact? While it has been argued that some ethical businesses do exist, e.g., Johnson and Johnson, the argument I would like (...) to put forth is that no matter how ethical a business institution is, or how ethical its goals are, its capacity to act in an ethical manner is restricted by the wider system in which it must operate, the market system. Unless there is a fundamental change in the notion of the market system itself, the capacity for individual businesses to act in an ethical manner will always be restricted. My argument is divided into two parts. The first part is to show the inherent bias towards unethical outcomes that is inherent in the market system. The second part is to suggest how to reorient the general economic framework in order to make ethical institutions more possible. The question then becomes, how to define economic behavior in terms other than competition for profit. (shrink)

This paper describes and discusses the Enron Corporation debacle. The paper presents the business ethics background and leadership mechanisms affecting Enron''s collapse and eventual bankruptcy. Through a systematic analysis of the organizational culture at Enron (following Schein''s frame of reference) the paper demonstrates how the company''s culture had profound effects on the ethics of its employees.

Abstract:The problem this paper is concerned with is the politics of reforming embedded, parasitic, sometimes predatory, network-based, corruption subsystems. The politics of corruption subsystems is often embedded in social structures sustained by the collective action of interest groups who benefit from the corruption. Therefore, the long-term effectiveness of approaches that focus solely on isolated, individual acts of corruption are limited. The politics of long-term corruption reform can benefit from a combined action-learning and social movement–based collective approach.

Abstract:The problem this paper is concerned with is the politics of reforming embedded, parasitic, sometimes predatory, network-based, corruption subsystems. The politics of corruption subsystems is often embedded in social structures sustained by the collective action of interest groups who benefit from the corruption. Therefore, the long-term effectiveness of approaches that focus solely on isolated, individual acts of corruption are limited. The politics of long-term corruption reform can benefit from a combined action-learning and social movement–based collective approach.

This study expands theoretical understanding of organizational misconduct through qualitative analysis of widespread deceptive sales practices at a large U.S. life insurance company. Adopting a symbolic interactionist perspective, this research describes how a set of taken-for-granted interpretive frames located in the organization’s culture created a worldview through which deceptive sales practices were seen as normal, acceptable, routine operating procedure. The findings from this study extend and modify the dominant theoretical ‘pressure/opportunity’ model of organizational misconduct by proposing that the process engine (...) driving misconduct is not amorally rational organization members, but rather is organizational members acting on socially constructed views of the organization that normalize misconduct. (shrink)

Are we really in need of (new) ethical institutions that regulate and control the ethical quality of corporate behavior? The various scandals (Enron, WorldOnline, Ahold) prove that ethical institutions, as well as deontological codes, public social commitments, social annual reports directly linked to financial overviews, are not enough to prevent fraud, corruption or bribery. Does the existence of those institutions partly provoke and legitimize the unbridled and immense power of organizational and CEO-(non-ethical) behavior and window-dressing? Do we need more separate (...) ethical institutions? Is it possible to outsource the competence of an ethical corporate and personal moral responsibility to another, separate institution? Do people and corporations still feel the confrontation with moral dilemmas with the institutionalizing of a part of that responsibility to an anonymous body? And won't this ethical control lead to a further alienation of the micro level personal responsibility to the macro performance of the market and organizations? This article focuses on the counterpart of the institution: tomorrow's stakeholder. The stakeholder of tomorrow (the manager, the CEO, the consumer, the employee, the civil servant...) embodies the complexity of the multi-paradigmatic business ethics debate. Two aspects of tomorrow's stakeholders' presence will be discussed: their moral attitude and emancipative communication. (shrink)

Can ethical character be stimulated and enabled? Cognitive understanding of organizational ethics issues is important and necessary, but not sufficient. Ethical behavior does not emerge automatically. Effective political method is necessary. While it may be difficult to teach ethical character, nonetheless, skill development with respect to joined ethics understanding and action-learning methods can help us develop the skills and confidence we need to actualize our ethical characters and social concerns. An action-learning approach to organizational ethics can help stimulate and enable (...) ethical character. (shrink)