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  1. A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford,: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.
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  • Two modellings for theory change.Adam Grove - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.
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  • (1 other version)On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions.Carlos E. Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors & David Makinson - 1985 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (2):510-530.
    This paper extends earlier work by its authors on formal aspects of the processes of contracting a theory to eliminate a proposition and revising a theory to introduce a proposition. In the course of the earlier work, Gardenfors developed general postulates of a more or less equational nature for such processes, whilst Alchourron and Makinson studied the particular case of contraction functions that are maximal, in the sense of yielding a maximal subset of the theory (or alternatively, of one of (...)
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  • Two Dogmas of Belief Revision.Hans Rott - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (9):503.
    The paper attacks the widely held view that belief revision theories, as they have been studied in the past two decades, are founded on the Principle of Informational Economy. The principle comes in two versions. According to the first, an agent should, when accepting a new piece of information, aim at a minimal change of his previously held beliefs. If there are different ways to effect the belief change, then the agent should, according to he second version, give up those (...)
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  • A counterexample to six fundamental principles of belief formation.Hans Rott - 2004 - Synthese 139 (2):225 - 240.
    In recent years there has been a growing consensus that ordinary reasoning does not conform to the laws of classical logic, but is rather nonmonotonic in the sense that conclusions previously drawn may well be removed upon acquiring further information. Even so, rational belief formation has up to now been modelled as conforming to some fundamental principles that are classically valid. The counterexample described in this paper suggests that a number of the most cherished of these principles should not be (...)
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  • Belief revisions and the Ramsey test for conditionals.Peter Gärdenfors - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (1):81-93.
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  • Iteration of conditionals and the Ramsey test.Isaac Levi - 1988 - Synthese 76 (1):49 - 81.
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  • Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics.Sarit Kraus, Daniel Lehmann & Menachem Magidor - 1990 - Artificial Intelligence 44 (1-2):167-207.
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  • Dynamic logic for belief revision.Johan van Benthem - 2007 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17 (2):129-155.
    We show how belief revision can be treated systematically in the format of dynamicepistemic logic, when operators of conditional belief are added. The core engine consists of definable update rules for changing plausibility relations between worlds, which have been proposed independently in the dynamic-epistemic literature on preference change. Our analysis yields two new types of modal result. First, we obtain complete logics for concrete mechanisms of belief revision, based on compositional reduction axioms. Next, we show how various abstract postulates for (...)
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  • A note on an impossibility theorem of Gardenfors.Krister Segerberg - 1989 - Noûs 23 (3):351-354.
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  • Beliefs in conditionals vs. conditional beliefs.Hannes Leitgeb - 2007 - Topoi 26 (1):115-132.
    On the basis of impossibility results on probability, belief revision, and conditionals, it is argued that conditional beliefs differ from beliefs in conditionals qua mental states. Once this is established, it will be pointed out in what sense conditional beliefs are still conditional, even though they may lack conditional contents, and why it is permissible to still regard them as beliefs, although they are not beliefs in conditionals. Along the way, the main logical, dispositional, representational, and normative properties of conditional (...)
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  • (1 other version)What does a conditional knowledge base entail?Daniel Lehmann & Menachem Magidor - 1992 - Artificial Intelligence 55 (1):1-60.
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  • The Ramsey test revisited.Sten Lindström & Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz - 1992 - Theoria 58 (2-3):131-182.
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