Cet article examine la place du concept d’impartialité dans les théories délibératives de la démocratie. C’est à partir de certaines critiques féministes que sont discutés deux défis lancés à la théorie délibérative et qui sont étroitement liés : le premier porte essentiellement sur le critère du raisonnable et l’idée d’offre de raisons ; le second concerne les circonstances sociales et politiques contingentes dans lesquelles les perspectives des groupes marginalisés peuvent influencer le jugement des autres citoyens. Certains des changements qui devraient (...) être apportés à la théorie délibérative afin qu’elle puisse tenir compte de ces préoccupations sont ensuite proposés. Finalement, les implications de tels changements pour nos notions plus générales de vertu et de responsabilité de la citoyenneté sont examinées.This article examines the place of the concept of impartiality in theories of deliberative democracy. Drawing on and extending recent feminist critiques of deliberative democracy, it explores two interrelated challenges to deliberative theory, one focused on the standard of reasonableness and the idea of reason-giving and the other on the contingent social and political circumstances under which marginalized-groups perspectives may sway the judgment of other citizens. Finally, some of the changes required of deliberative theory to address these concerns are discussed, and the implications of these changes for our more general notions of the virtues and responsibilities of citizenship are explored. (shrink)

La recherche de la sécurité comme objet de politique publique exige que des compromis soient faits avec d’autres buts légitimes de politique publique , et que des limites soient imposées à certains droits individuels. Comment penser de manière systématique au type de compromis que les membres d’une démocratie seraient disposés à effectuer, et aux coûts qu’ils seraient prêts à assumer en termes de droits ? Adaptant une proposition faite par Ronald Dworkin pour penser ce type de question dans le cas (...) de la santé, je définis une situation hypothétique de choix qui, à travers les conditions épistémiques et conatives qu’elle impose aux participants, est susceptible de nous guider sur ces deux questions.The adoption of security as a goal of public policy requires that compromises be made with other legitimate goals of policy , and that limits be imposed upon certain individual rights. How can we think in a principled manner about the kinds of compromises that citizens in a democracy would be ready to accept, and about the costs they would be ready to bear in terms of rights? A proposal made by Ronald Dworkin to address analogous questions in the case of health-care is adapted to the case of security: I define a hypothetical choice situation that imposes the kinds of epistemic and motivational constraints upon participants that are required to address these questions. (shrink)

I would like to present a two part response to the following question that Seyla Benhabib posed at a conference at Harvard University in 1999: “Is there a Transition from Distribution to Recognition?” The first part proposes that issues of distribution and recognition should be seen as aspects of political struggles, rather than distinct types of struggle, and thus a form of analysis is required that has the capacity to study political struggles under both aspects. The second part suggests that (...) struggles over multicultural and multinational recognition are undergoing an important change in practice which requires a corresponding change in the prevailing forms of analysis. These two recommendations rest on and follow from an underlying orientation. The primary but not exclusive orientation would be practices of freedom rather than theories of justice. The aim of such an aspectival political philosophy and corresponding democratic political practice would not be to discover and constitutionalize thejust and definitive form of recognition and distribution, but to ensure that ineliminable, agonic democratic games over recognition and distribution, with their rival theories of distribution and recognition, can be played freely, with a minimum of domination. (shrink)

Abstract If voters do not understand the programs of rival candidates or their likely consequences, they cannot rationally exercise control over government. An ignorant electorate cannot achieve true democratic control over public policy. The immense size and scope of modern government makes it virtually impossible for voters to acquire sufficient knowledge to exercise such control. The problem is exacerbated by voters? strong incentive to be ?rationally ignorant? of politics. This danger to democracy cannot readily be circumvented through ?shortcut? methods of (...) economizing on voter knowledge costs. A truly democratic government must, therefore, be strictly limited in scope. (shrink)

Les idées de démocratie délibérative et de politique de la reconnaissance ont été forgées en vue de répondre aux insuffisances du libéralisme politique. Les implications normatives de ces deux idées ne sont pas, ainsi qu’on le croit parfois, conflictuelles. En effet, le principe normatif sous-jacent aux demandes politiques de reconnaissance, l’éradication des sources sociales de mésestime, ne peut être honoré que par la délibération publique. Toutefois l’aptitude et la disposition des citoyens à entrer dans le processus délibératif présuppose des formes (...) de reconnaissance prédélibératives dans le cadre de la division sociale du travail et un usage public de la raison attentif aux effets de mésestime qu’il peut engendrer.The ideas of a deliberative democracy and of a politics of recognition were designed to overcome some difficulties inherent to political liberalism. The normative implications of one is not opposed to those of the other, because the normative principle underlying the political struggles for recognition — the elimination of social sources of misrecognition — has to be implemented through public deliberation. Nevertheless, the citizens’ ability and motivation to take part in public deliberation depend on predeliberative forms of recognition, especially their inclusion in the social division of work. They require also that citizens pay close attention to the effects of misrecognition brought about by their public use of reason. (shrink)

Taken as a model for how groups should make collective judgments and decisions, the ideal of deliberative democracy is inherently ambiguous. Consider the idealised case where it is agreed on all sides that a certain conclusion should be endorsed if and only if certain premises are admitted. Does deliberative democracy recommend that members of the group debate the premises and then individually vote, in the light of that debate, on whether or not to support the conclusion? Or does it recommend (...) that members individually vote on the premises, and then let their commitment to the conclusion be settled by whether or not the group endorses the required premises? Is deliberative democracy to enforce the discipline of reason at the individual level, as in the first possibility, or at the collective level, as in the second? (shrink)

Taken as a model for how groups should make collective judgments and decisions, the ideal of deliberative democracy is inherently ambiguous. Consider the idealised case where it is agreed on all sides that a certain conclusion should be endorsed if and only if certain premises are admitted. Does deliberative democracy recommend that members of the group debate the premises and then individually vote, in the light of that debate, on whether or not to support the conclusion? Or does it recommend (...) that members individually vote on the premises, and then let their commitment to the conclusion be settled by whether or not the group endorses the required premises? Deliberative-democratic theory has not addressed this issue, and this is a problem. The discursive dilemma of my title--a generalisation of the doctrinal paradox from analytical jurisprudence--shows that the procedures distinguished can come apart. Thus deliberative democrats must make up their minds on where they stand in relation to the issue; they cannot sit on the fence. This paper is an attempt to address the issue and look at the grounds on which it may be resolved. (shrink)

Les théoriciens de la démocratie s’appuient, implicitement ou explicitement, sur des ontologies sociales, c’est-à-dire sur une conception de la relation constitutive entre individus et groupes sociaux. Cet article met en évidence l’ontologie sociale « individualiste » implicite dans les sondages d’opinion délibératifs de James Fishkin pour ensuite proposer une alternative : l’ontologie sociale « relationnelle ». L’article examine la façon dont ce second type d’ontologie sociale modifierait les principes et les mécanismes délibératifs, de même que les coûts en légitimité qu’impliquerait (...) la mise en question de l’individualisme normatif. En particulier, le passage d’une ontologie sociale individualiste à une ontologie sociale relationnelle place au centre des théories de la démocratie des analyses controversées du pouvoir et de l’oppression. Je suggère que cette politisation est nécessaire pour que les approches délibératives soient adéquates tant au type d’êtres que nous sommes qu’aux rapports de force sociaux dans lesquels nous nous mouvons. Sans cette politisation, la démocratie délibérative ne pourrait pas davantage répondre aux exigences de la justice démocratique.Democratic theorists rely on social ontologies, i.e., accounts of the constitutive relationship between individuals and social groups. This article draws out the “individualist” social ontology implicit in James Fishkin’s “deliberative opinion polls”, then argues for a rival, “relational” social ontology. The article explores how a relational social ontology would change deliberative principles and mechanisms, as well as the legitimacy costs of this move away from normative individualism. In particular, the move from an individualist to a relational social ontology brings controversial analyses of power and oppression to the center of deliberative democratic theories; I suggest that this politicization is necessary if deliberative approaches are to be adequate to the kinds of beings we are, the power-laden social relations within which we move, and the demands of democratic justice. (shrink)

Tous les théoriciens de la démocratie ont à confronter le problème fondamental qui consiste à trouver une façon moralement justifiable de prendre des décisions collectives contraignantes face à des désaccords moraux persistants. Une théorie délibérative de la démocratie nous fournit l’approche la mieux défendable de ce problème parce qu’elle laisse ouverte la possibilité que les valeurs morales exprimées par un large éventail de théories puissent être justifiables. Le principe fondamental de notre théorie délibérative est que les citoyens doivent se justifier (...) réciproquement les lois qu’ils s’imposent mutuellement. Les citoyens ou leurs représentants offrent des raisons les uns aux autres dans un processus permanent de justification mutuelle. Les principes qui guident ce processus sont provisoires moralement et politiquement et permettent donc la persistance du désaccord moral à propos de lois, de politiques et d’institutions tout en ouvrant la possibilité de l’accord moral sur les lois, politiques et institutions qui sont mutuellement justifiables.All democratic theorists confront the fundamental problem of finding a morally justifiable way of making binding collective decisions in the face of continuing moral disagreement. A deliberative theory of democracy provides the most defensible approach to this problem because it leaves open the possibility that the moral values expressed by a wide range of theories may be justifiable. The fundamental principle of our deliberative theory is that citizens owe one another justifications for the laws they collectively impose on one another. Citizens or their accountable representatives offer reasons to one another in an ongoing process of mutual justification. The principles that guide this process are morally and politically provisional, and thus allow for the persistence of moral disagreement about laws, policies, and institutions, and at the same time for the possibility of moral agreement about those that are mutually justifiable. (shrink)

Moral disagreement about public policies—issues such as abortion, affirmative action, and health care—is a prominent feature of contemporary American democracy. Yet it is not a central concern of the leading theories of democracy. The two dominant democratic approaches in our time—procedural democracy and constitutional democracy—fail to offer adequate responses to the problem of moral disagreement. Both suggest some elements that are necessary in any adequate response, but neither one alone nor both together are sufficient. We argue here that an adequate (...) conception of democracy must make moral deliberation an essential part of the political process. What we call “deliberative democracy” adds an important dimension to the theory and practice of politics that the leading conceptions of democracy neglect. (shrink)

La démocratie délibérative s’oppose fréquemment à une conception rationnelle du citoyen qui, selon ses théoriciens, ne permet pas d’atteindre une authentique démocratie. Pourtant, la démocratie délibérative souffre elle-même de difficultés théoriques importantes dont une partie des solutions a déjà été abordée dans la théorie du choix rationnel. Nous voulons montrer que le choix rationnel, dans sa version « étendue », peut servir à améliorer la démocratie délibérative sans pour autant en ébranler ses fondements. Nous effectuerons d’abord un survol de la (...) démocratie délibérative, en insistant sur les questions de formation et d’expression des préférences des citoyens dans l’agora. Nous y découvrirons certaines difficultés théoriques que nous tenterons par la suite de résoudre par un ensemble de mécanismes issus de la théorie du choix rationnel. Parallèlement, nous verrons que la délibération raisonnable est possible dans un paradigme rationnel, que nous appelons la « délibération circonstancielle ».Deliberative democracy frequently rejects the rational citizen model since, according to its proponents, it would not yield a proper democracy. And yet, deliberative democracy contains important theoretical difficulties, some of which have been dealt with by rational-choice theory. We intend to show that a “broad” version of rational-choice theory can actually improve deliberative democracy without condemning its foundations. First, we will briefly examine deliberative democracy, focusing on the formation and expression of citizens’preferences in the agora. Some theoretical problems will be identified; several mechanisms drawn from rational-choice theory will be used to try to solve them. Simultaneously, we will see that reasonable deliberation is possible in a rational-choice paradigm, in a model I call “circumstantial deliberation”. (shrink)

People around the world are agitating for democracy and individual rights, but there is no consensus on a theory of liberal democracy that might guide them. What are the first principles of a just society? What political theory should shape public policy in such a society? In this book, James S. Fishkin offers a new basis for answering these questions by proposing the ideal of a "self-reflective society"—a political culture in which citizens are able to decide their own fate through (...) unconstrained dialogue. Fishkin offers a comprehensive critique of liberal political theories that do not satisfy the requirements for a self-reflective society. He then explains his own theory of liberalism, showing that the freely self-examining society he advocates can provide the key to issues of political legitimacy and social justice. Fishkin proposes practical applications of his theory that would lead to more participatory democracy. Among these are deliberative opinion polls that would allow ordinary citizens to explore issues directly with candidates before elections, and vouchers that would allow them to organize representation for their interests. Fishkin examines a broad range of topics from the fresh perspective of a self-reflective society: utility and its limits, justice between generations, conflicting ideals of democracy, equal opportunity, the connections between theory and public policy, the notion of moral progress, and the bases for political obligation. His book makes a new contribution to central debates in moral, political, and legal philosophy. (shrink)

Philosophers often call emotions appropriate or inappropriate. What is meant by such talk? In one sense, explicated in this paper, to call an emotion appropriate is to say that the emotion is fitting: it accurately presents its object as having certain evaluative features. For instance, envy might be thought appropriate when one's rival has something good which one lacks. But someone might grant that a circumstance has these features, yet deny that envy is appropriate, on the grounds that it is (...) wrong to be envious. These two senses of `appropriate' have much less in common than philosophers have supposed. Indeed, the distinction between propriety and correctness is crucial to understanding the distinctive role of the emotions in ethics. We argue here that an emotion can be fitting despite being wrong to feel, and that various philosophical arguments are guilty of a systematic error which we term the moralistic fallacy. (shrink)

Cet article examine quelques idées concernant ce que j’appelle une éthique de la mémoire publique. Plus exactement, il considère comment les citoyens devraient apprendre à se souvenir du mal politique commis et subi dans des sociétés marquées par les circonstances de la réconciliation, dans lesquelles la stabilité politique et les pratiques démocratiques sont mises en péril par des souvenirs collectifs qui alimentent l’antipathie mutuelle et le ressentiment entre les citoyens d’un même État. Comment des communautés démocratiques fonctionnelles peuvent-elles être réparées (...) ou créées à nouveau lorsqu’elles ont été fracturées par des hostilités historiques ? Cet article examine un certain nombre de réponses possibles à cette question en utilisant une conception délibérative de ce qu’une communauté démocratique fonctionnelle devrait être. Cette conception s’incarne en gros dans deux normes démocratiques : l’impartialité et l’inclusion. C’est en référence à ces deux normes que l’article discute différentes tentatives actuelles de remplacer les anciennes histoires nationales, qui s’appuyaient sur les mythes civiques, par des histoires multiculturelles qui les refusent.This article examines some ideas about what I call the ethics of public memory. More exactly, it considers how citizens should learn to remember political evil done and endured in societies marked by the circumstances of reconciliation in which political stability and democratic practices are thwarted by collective memories that fuel mutual antipathy and resentment among citizens of a common state. How democratically functional national communities can be repaired or created anew when they have been fractured by historical enmities? The article examines a number of possible answers using a deliberative conception of what a functional democratic community should be. This conception is roughly embodied in two democratic norms : impartiality and inclusion. It is in reference to those two norms that the article discusses current attempts at replacing the old national histories, which relied on civic myths, by multicultural histories, which eschew them. (shrink)

Dans quelle mesure les caractéristiques fondamentales des êtres humains, telles que leur capacité de penser, de raisonner, de vouloir et de communiquer, peuvent-elles être complètement expliquées à l'aide des seules ressources des sciences naturelles? En s'appuyant sur l'analyse rigoureuse de quelques-uns des travaux les plus significatifs de la philosophie de l'esprit, en particulier ceux de R. Millikan, F. Dretske, W. Quine et D. Davidson, Daniel Laurier révèle les limites d'un tel programme de naturalisation de l'esprit et soutient qu'il n'y a (...) pas de position stable entre le naturalisme radical et ce qu'il faut bien appeler le surnaturalisme. Ce livre s'adresse principalement aux philosophes professionnels et aux chercheurs et étudiants en sciences humaines qui s'intéressent à l'épistémologie et aux fondements philosophiques des sciences cognitives. (shrink)

Une vie sans examen n'est pas une vie vraiment vécue, disait Socrate. Le présent essai veut renouer avec la tâche la plus ancienne de la philosophie, qui est de penser la vie humaine. En quoi consiste l'examen d'une vie? Est-il menacé par l'absurdité? Comment la réflexion sur l'existence intègre-t-elle la singularité humaine, la contingence des événements, la certitude de la mort, l'obsédante présence du passé on l'irréversibilité du temps? L'Inquiétude morale et la vie humaine est un plaidoyer pour la philosophie (...) morale et la réflexion éthique, appliquées à la vie humaine et au monde où nous vivons. L'engouement dont l'éthique est aujourd'hui l'objet ne doit pas faire oublier que, sans philosophie morale, il n'y a pas de réflexion éthique et que, sans réflexion éthique, il n'y a pas d'éthique qui vaille. (shrink)