Scientific results are often presented as ‘surprising’ as if that is a good thing. Is it? And if so, why? What is the value of surprise in science? Discussions of surprise in science have been limited, but surprise has been used as a way of defending the epistemic privilege of experiments over simulations. The argument is that while experiments can ‘confound’, simulations can merely surprise (Morgan, 2005). Our aim in this paper is to show that the discussion of surprise can (...) be usefully extended to thought experiments and theoretical derivations. We argue that in focusing on these features of scientific practice, we can see that the surprise-confoundment distinction does not fully capture surprise in science. We set out how thought experiments and theoretical derivations can bring about surprises that can be disruptive in a productive way, and we end by exploring how this links with their future fertility. (shrink)

The article shows how two domains of Neurath’s broad and multifaceted work are related to each other: the concepts and methods he wanted to implement in political economics, on the one hand, and the methods of visualization that he and his interdisciplinary team developed at the Social and Economic Museum of Vienna, on the other. Some of Neurath’s suggestions in both domains are surprisingly modern even today.

Philosophical interest in thought experiments has grown over the last couple of decades. Several positions have emerged, defined largely by their differing responses to a perceived epistemological challenge: how do thought experiments yield justified belief revision, even in science, when they provide no new empirical data? Attitudes towards this supposed explanandum differ. Many philosophers accept that it poses a genuine puzzle and hence seek to provide a substantive explanation. Others reject or deflate the epistemic claims made for thought experiments.In this (...) paper I present a model for many thought experiments in philosophy and science. The model doesn't assume that thought experiments in fact manage to achieve epistemic justifi cation, but it allows us to see how they aspire to do so. It also emphasises both the parallels and the discrepancies between thought experiments and ordinary scientific experiments. (shrink)

Thought experiments in science are merely picturesque argumentation. I support this view in various ways, including the claim that it follows from the fact that thought experiments can err but can still be used reliably. The view is defended against alternatives proposed by my cosymposiasts.

Logical empiricism and the Austrian School of economics are two of the internationally most influential intellectual movements with Viennese roots. By and large independently of each other, both have been subject to detailed historical and philosophical investigations for the last two dec-ades. However, in spite of numerous connections and interactions be-tween the two groups, their relationship has captured surprisingly sparse attention. My dissertation focuses on the many-faceted juxtaposition of two supposedly antagonistic championsof Viennese Late Enlightenment: logical empiricist Otto Neurath and (...) Austrian economist Ludwig Mises. I rationally reconstruct and critically compare their epistemological, meth-odological, and economic positions and demonstrate that a closer look reveals more compatibilities and similarities than acknowledged by the received view and by the protagonists themselves. Over and above the historiographic task of challenging and amending this received view, the analytic components of my thesis inform contemporary debates in phi-losophy, politics, economics, and other sciences. (shrink)

Four distinguished authors have been brought together to produce this elegant study of a much-neglected figure. The book is divided into three sections: Neurath's biographical background and the economic and social context of his ideas; his theory of science; and the development of his role in debates on Marxist concepts of history and his own conception of science. Coinciding with the emerging serious interest in logical positivism, this timely publication will redress a current imbalance in the history and philosophy of (...) science. (shrink)

John D. Norton defends an empiricist epistemology of thought experiments, the central thesis of which is that thought experiments are nothing more than arguments. Philosophers have attempted to provide counterexamples to this claim, but they haven’t convinced Norton. I will point out a more fundamental reason for reformulation that criticizes Norton’s claim that a thought experiment is a good one when its underlying logical form possesses certain desirable properties. I argue that by Norton’s empiricist standards, no thought experiment is ever (...) justified in any deep sense due to the properties of its logical form. Instead, empiricists should consider again the merits of evaluating thought experiments more like laboratory experiments, and less like arguments. (shrink)

Jonathan Bennett (1974) maintains that Huckleberry Finn’s deliberations about whether to return Jim to slavery afford insight into the tension between sympathy and moral judgment; Miranda Fricker (2007) argues that the trial scene in To Kill a Mockingbird affords insight into the nature of testimonial injustice. Neither claims merely that the works prompt an attentive reader to think something new or to change her mind. Rather, they consider the reader cognitively better off for her encounters with the novels. Nor is (...) her cognitive improvement restricted to acquiring new justified true beliefs about the works themselves. What the reader gleans is supposed to enhance her knowledge or understanding of the .. (shrink)

Thought experiments are ordinary argumentation disguised in a vivid pictorial or narrative form. This account of their nature will allow me to show that empiricism has nothing to fear from thought experiments. They perform no epistemic magic. In so far as they tell us about the world, thought experiments draw upon what we already know of it, either explicitly or tacitly; they then transform that knowledge by disguised argumentation. They can do nothing more epistemically than can argumentation. I defend my (...) account of thought experiments in Section 3 by urging that the epistemic reach of thought experiments turns out to coincide with that of argumentation and that this coincidence is best explained by the simple view that thought experiments just are arguments. Thought experiments can err—-a fact to be displayed by the thought experiment - anti thought experiment pairs of Section 2. Nonetheless thought experiments can be used reliably and, I urge in Section 4., this is only possible if they are governed by some very generalized logic. I will suggest on evolutionary considerations that their logics are most likely the familiar logics of induction and deduction, recovering the view that thought experiment is argumentation. Finally in Section 5 I defend this argument based epistemology of thought experiments against competing accounts. I suggest that these other accounts can offer a viable epistemology only insofar as they already incorporate the notion that thought experimentation is governed by a logic, possibly of very generalized form. (shrink)

Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 26, pp. 333-66. 1996.

This paper presents some proposals for social science advanced by Otto Neurath, focusing on scientific utopianism. Neurath suggests that social scientists should formulate ideals of social arrangements in utopian style, aiming at discussing scientific proposals with a community. Utopias are deemed as models of social science, in the sense proposed by Nancy Cartwright. This view is contrasted with the claim that scientism might lead to dystopian consequences in social planning, drawn from Aldous Huxley’s fiction and from Paul Feyerabend’s philosophy of (...) science. Thus, social science displays a unusual feature: sometimes a model has to be called off, in spite of its perfect functioning, because it brings about unwanted consequences. In the planning of a free democratic society, this ambiguity of utopia and dystopia is highly desirable, for it stimulates essential debates. Social science, therefore, is to be regarded from a plural and fallibilist standpoint. (shrink)

Why concern oneself with Otto Neurath’s economic thought in its historical context? Could anything be more out of fashion than a theory proposing a centrally managed planned economy? Than the views of a theorist whose ideas on in-kind economic planning drove the notion of economic planning to its utmost extreme ? Indeed, Neurath’s ideas appeared too radical and utopian even for the social democrats of the 1920s. So why give even a second thought to them today? Would it not be (...) better to follow the advice a colleague gave me in the 1980s and to pass over Neurath’s “youthful sins” silently so as not to tarnish the reputation that – finally, after a lengthy delay – has been accredited to Neurath for his impressive philosophical achievements within the framework of logical empiricism?In the years since the 1980s, however, Neurath’s economic writings have attracted much more interest than anyone would previously have suspected. Today we are aware of the fact that Neurath formulated ideas at an unexpectedly early stage that are currently relevant in ecological economy, social choice theory and developmental economy. And that his reflections vis-à-vis “associational socialism” could provide interesting impulses for a new theory of socialism. Viewed from this perspective, Neurath’s status is secure as a precursor of theoretical developments and debates that are in full swing today. But is that enough? After all, if the role of the precursor is an endearing one, isn’t it also quite thankless? For even in the areas in which Neurath can be regarded as a precursor, the relevant questions are posed today with far greater precision and with reference to current facts – so why should anyone concern oneself with a precursor whose fundamental assumptions differ so greatly from those of the overwhelming majority of economists working today? (shrink)

I address options for providing scientific policy advice and explore the relation between scientific knowledge and political, economic and moral values. I argue that such nonepistemic values are essential for establishing the significance of questions and the relevance of evidence, while, on the other hand, such social choices are the prerogative of society. This tension can be resolved by recognizing social values and identifying them as separate premises or as commissions while withholding commitment to them, and by elaborating a plurality (...) of policy packages that envisage the implementation of different social goals. There are limits to upholding the value-free ideal in scientific research. But by following the mentioned strategy, science can give useful policy advice by leaving the value-free ideal largely intact. Such scientific restraint avoids the risk of appearing to illegitimately impose values on the public and could make the advice given more trustworthy. (shrink)

In the last decade, philosophers have offered a number of proposals concerning the logical form of hypothetical cases, or thought experiments, as these are used for purposes of testing philosophical claims. In this paper, I discuss what the desiderata for a formal proposal are. Employing a comparison with general philosophy of science, I suggest that one important desideratum is to highlight recurrent patterns of disagreement surrounding cases. I advocate a proposal in propositional modal logic which, I argue, better meets this (...) desideratum than competing proposals. I also sketch how this proposal may be extended into more fine grained analyses, employing counterfactual conditionals yet avoiding certain problems due to so-called "deviant realizations". (shrink)

The inaugural title in the new, Open Access series BSPS Open, The Material Theory of Induction will initiate a new tradition in the analysis of inductive inference. The fundamental burden of a theory of inductive inference is to determine which are the good inductive inferences or relations of inductive support and why it is that they are so. The traditional approach is modeled on that taken in accounts of deductive inference. It seeks universally applicable schemas or rules or a single (...) formal device, such as the probability calculus. After millennia of halting efforts, none of these approaches has been unequivocally successful and debates between approaches persist. The Material Theory of Induction identifies the source of these enduring problems in the assumption taken at the outset: that inductive inference can be accommodated by a single formal account with universal applicability. Instead, it argues that that there is no single, universally applicable formal account. Rather, each domain has an inductive logic native to it. Which that is, and its extent, is determined by the facts prevailing in that domain. Paying close attention to how inductive inference is conducted in science and copiously illustrated with real-world examples, The Material Theory of Induction will initiate a new tradition in the analysis of inductive inference. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper I review the two most recent biographies on Otto Neurath and Ludwig von Mises as well as the scarce literature on the relations between their lives and ideas. Recent publications by Nemeth, O’Neill, and Uebel reflect growing interest in the connections between these two main proponents of Logical Empiricism and the Austrian School of Economics respectively, but are mainly focused on the so-called socialist calculation debates. In the second part I propose that additional (...) research on Neurath’s and Mises’ idiosyncratic positions is likely to uncover general relations between epistemological assumptions, economic theories, and political views. -/- . (shrink)

All three authors range themselves against John Norton's deductive analysis of thought experiments. Brown's insight, Nersessian's mental modelling, and Gooding's embodiment, arise, in each case, from a major all-purpose philosophical theory. None reaches down to the specific level of thought experiments, which are small, rare, and precious. I urge attention to Wittgenstein's remark that "the experimental character disappears when one looks at the process as a memorable picture." Thought experiments are not experiments. They are static. They become fixed, more like (...) jokes or optical illusions. Unlike real experiments, they have no life of their own. (shrink)

Otto Neurath and Amartya Sen have founded approaches to measure well-being. Their ultimate goal has been to find a measure of well-being that enables us to compare the well-being of different persons. Beitz1 perceives the capability approach as “a solution to the problem of finding an adequate basis for interpersonal comparisons, or, in other words, to the problem of defining well-being.” Thus, a close link can be established between measurement and interpersonal comparisons of well-being.Indeed, the question of interpersonal comparability has (...) been at the centre of their concern right from the beginning and is still present in their advocacy of dominance orderings. The paper follows this line of thought: The first section presents their results of analysing the interdependence between measurability and comparability of utility. The second section introduces and compares their concepts of “conditions of life” and “functionings.” The third section comes back to the question of interpersonal comparisons in their frameworks of conditions of life and bundles of functionings. The fourth section leaves Neurath aside and concentrates on Kurt Grelling’s interpretation of the term life-situation and Gerhard Weisser’s absorption of it. A parallel between Grelling’s view of life-situations and Sen’s idea of a capability-set is drawn. The last section concludes. (shrink)