A fruitful way to approach The Idea of Phenomenology is through Husserl’s claim that consciousness is not a bag, box, or any other kind of container. The bag conception, which dominated much of modern philosophy, is rooted in the idea that philosophy is restricted to investigating only what is really immanent to consciousness, such as acts and sensory contents. On this view, what Husserl called “the riddle of transcendence” can never be solved. The phenomenological reduction, as Husserl develops it in (...) The Idea of Phenomenology, opened up a new and broader sense of immanence that embraces the transcendent, making it possible both to solve the riddle and to escape the bag conception once and for all. The essay will discuss ways in which this new conception of immanence is tied to the key Husserlian themes of appearance, phenomenon, essence, seeing or intuiting, and constitution. (shrink)

The systematic importance of the eidetic account of phantasy for Husserlian phenomenology in general is undisputed, but whether this account can be relevant for Aesthetics has often been put into question. In this paper I argue that Husserl’s rich phenomenology of phantasy, and in particular his account of perceptual phantasy, can nevertheless significantly enhance our understanding of how we recognize and imaginatively participate in artistic fictions. Moreover, I show how Husserl’s peculiar formulation of a non-intuitive phantasy at stake in artistic (...) representation anticipates some uses of the imagination in Aesthetics suggested by Ernst Gombrich and Kendall Walton. (shrink)

Although most interpreters admit that Husserl was not guided by an interest in aesthetics when dealing with the various issues of image consciousness, his considerations are nevertheless usually interpreted in an aesthetic key. The article intends to challenge this line of interpretation by clearly separating between the neutrality of image consciousness, on one hand, and the disinterest of the aesthetic attitude towards reality, on the other hand, as well as by reviewing the elements in Husserl’s theory that led to their (...) association. (shrink)

A fruitful way to approach The Idea of Phenomenology is through Husserl’s claim that consciousness is not a bag, box, or any other kind of container. The bag conception, which dominated much of modern philosophy, is rooted in the idea that philosophy is restricted to investigating only what is really immanent to consciousness, such as acts and sensory contents. On this view, what Husserl called the riddle of transcendence can never be solved. The phenomenological reduction, as Husserl develops it in (...) The Idea of Phenomenology, opened up a new and broader sense of immanence that embraces the transcendent, making it possible both to solve the riddle and to escape the bag conception once and for all. The essay will discuss ways in which this new conception of immanence is tied to the key Husserlian themes of appearance, phenomenon, essence, seeing or intuiting, and constitution. (shrink)

This paper has two motivations. First, I want to delineate structurally the dimensions of phenomenological method: not merely the static and genetic methods, but along with them I want to introduce the new ideas of generativity and generative method (Section 2). Second, because these dimensions cannot merely be treated structurally, I want to examine their dynamic interrelation, that is, the system of motivations obtaining between them. I will do this by elaborating the phenomenological concept of "leading clue" (Section 3). Finally, (...) I will conclude by addressing the relation of phenomenology to generativity (Section 4). (shrink)

The connection between art and philosophy is presented in the essay on two levels. On one hand they are conceived as two parallel and autonomous attitudes , on the other hand there is a possibility of their intertwining . Both directions are based on phenomenology and focus on the problem of „life“ and „praxis“. A. Giacometti’s and W. Kandinsky’s views on art serve as the background of the philosophical analysis.

This is the first book dedicated to Husserl's aesthetics. Paul Crowther pieces together Husserl's ideas of phantasy and image and presents them as a unified and innovative account of aesthetic consciousness. He also shows how Husserl's ideas can be developed to solve problems in aesthetics, especially those related to visual art, literature, theatre, and nature. After outlining the major components of Husserl's phenomenological method, Crowther addresses the scope and structure of Husserl's notion of aesthetic consciousness. For Husserl, aesthetic consciousness in (...) all its forms involves phantasy-where items or states of affairs are represented as if actually perceived or experienced, even though they are not, in fact, given in the present perceptual field. Husserl also makes some extraordinarily interesting links between aesthetic consciousness and nature, showing how natural things and environments become instigators of such consciousness when apprehended in the appropriate terms. This "unreality" of the object of aesthetic consciousness anticipates contemporary debates about pictorial representation and is also relevant to Husserl's accounts of literature and theatre. The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Consciousness and Phantasy will appeal to scholars and advanced students interested in aesthetics, philosophy of art, phenomenological aesthetics, and Husserl's philosophy. (shrink)

The paper contends that transcendental phenomenology is a form of radical immanent critique able to explicate the necessary structures of meaning-constitution as well as evaluate our present situation through the historically traditionalized layers of concrete, lived experience. In order to make this case, the paper examines the critical dimension of phenomenology through the lens of one of its core conditions for possibility: the imagination. Building on—yet also departing from—Husserl’s own analyses, the paper contends that the imagination is both self- and (...) lifeworld-constituting. The imagination is anchored in our everyday senses of self and world as well as able to distance itself from being naively moored in normalized and deeply sedimented commitments. It is precisely this ‘anchored distance,’ rather than a sweeping doxic and ontic neutrality and negative freedom, that reveals the critical dimension of the imagination. (shrink)

1. Phenomenology is first and foremost about intentionality. As Husserl puts it, “Intentionality is the name of the problem encompassed by the whole of phenomenology”.1 Broadly understood, the phen...

Der Herausgeber dieses Jahrbuchs hat geglaubt, mit derVerof- 5 fentlichung der seit dem Erscheinen des ersten Bandes eingelaufenen und zum Teil schon im Herbst 1913 in den Druck gegebenen Arbei­ ten nieht Hinger zogern zu diirfen. So viele geistige Krafte dieser unheilvolle Krieg fesselt und leider auch zerstort, wirklich unterbin­ den kann und wird er das deutsche Geistesleben nieht. Nach wie vor 10 ist es beseelt von der ererbten Liebe zu den Ewigkeitswerten der Kultur, und immerfort wirkt es sich aus (...) in treuer Arbeit an ihren groBen Aufgaben. 1m besonderen unsere phanomenologische Philo­ sophie hat nicht geruht, auch ist ihr unverkennbar das warme Inter­ esse wissenschaftlicher Kreise erhalten geblieben. So diirften die bei- 15 den Bande, in die wir die bereitliegenden Arbeiten verteilt haben, nieht unwillkommen geheiBen werden. Die neuen Jahrbuchsarbeiten unterscheiden sieh ganz so wie die des ersten Bandes nieht nur durch ihre Themen, sondern auch durch die merklich nuancierten Auffas­ sungen, die sieh ihre Verfasser iiber Ziele, Methoden und mancherlei 20 Einzelfragen der phlinomenologisehen Forsehung gebildet haben. Es brauchte eigentlich nieht gesagt zu werden und muG es doeh ange­ siehts vorgekommener MiBverstlindnisse, daB der Herausgeber nur fiir seine eigenen Arbeiten die Verantwortung iibernimmt so wie jeder Mitarbeiter fiir die seinen. Sieherlieh ist die innere Gemein- 25 samkeit der "Phanomenologen" darum doch keine geringere, ja eher eine groBere als innerlhalb irgendwelcher sonstigen Forschungs- [VI] gemeinschaften, z. B. der der Experimental-Psychologen. (shrink)