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Small Stakes Give You the Blues: The Skeptical Costs of Pragmatic Encroachment

Clayton Littlejohn

Manuscrito 40 (4):31-38 (2017)

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The Pragmatic Encroachment Debate.Blake Roeber - 2016 - Noûs 52 (1):171-195.details Does knowledge depend in any interesting way on our practical interests? This is the central question in the pragmatic encroachment debate. Pragmatists defend the affirmative answer to this question while purists defend the negative answer. The literature contains two kinds of arguments for pragmatism: principle-based arguments and case-based arguments. Principle-based arguments derive pragmatism from principles that connect knowledge to practical interests. Case-based arguments rely on intuitions about cases that differ with respect to practical interests. I argue that there are insurmountable (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 41 citations
How to be an Infallibilist.Julien Dutant - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):148-171.details When spelled out properly infallibilism is a viable and even attractive view. Because it has long been summary dismissed, however, we need a guide on how to properly spell it out. The guide has to fulfil four tasks. The first two concern the nature of knowledge: to argue that infallible belief is necessary, and that it is sufficient, for knowledge. The other two concern the norm of belief: to argue that knowledge is necessary, and that it is sufficient, for justified (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 43 citations
On the intimate relationship of knowledge and action.Charity Anderson - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):343-353.details Pragmatic encroachment offers a picture of knowledge whereby knowledge is unstable. This paper argues that pragmatic encroachment is committed to more instability than has been hitherto noted. One surprising result of the arguments in this paper is that pragmatic encroachment is not merely about changes in stakes. All sorts of practical factors can make for the presence or absence of knowledge on this picture stakes-sensitivity’ is misleading. Furthermore, insufficient attention has been paid to the variety of ways in which on (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 20 citations
Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes.Charity Anderson & John Hawthorne - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.details Defenses of pragmatic encroachment commonly rely on two thoughts: first, that the gap between one’s strength of epistemic position on p and perfect strength sometimes makes a difference to what one is justified in doing, and second, that the higher the stakes, the harder it is to know. It is often assumed that these ideas complement each other. This chapter shows that these ideas are far from complementary. Along the way, a variety of strategies for regimenting the somewhat inchoate notion (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 44 citations
(3 other versions)Elusive knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.details David Lewis (1941-2001) was Class of 1943 University Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. His contributions spanned philosophical logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, metaphysics, and epistemology. In On the Plurality of Worlds, he defended his challenging metaphysical position, "modal realism." He was also the author of the books Convention, Counterfactuals, Parts of Classes, and several volumes of collected papers. Download Export citation Bookmark 1054 citations
Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):167-189.details Download Export citation Bookmark 149 citations
(3 other versions)Elusive Knowledge.David Lewis - 1999 - In Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: a contemporary reader. New York: Oxford University Press.details Download Export citation Bookmark 420 citations

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