Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Shared and Institutional Agency: Toward a Planning Theory of Human Practical Organization.Michael Bratman - 2022 - New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.
    "A fundamental feature of our individual, human agency is its organization over time. Think again about growing food in a garden, or taking a trip, or writing a book. A central idea is that our capacity for planning agency is at the heart of this cross-temporal organization of our individual, human agency. Appeal to this role of our capacity for planning agency both fits our commonsense self-understanding and, I conjecture, would be a part of an empirically informed psychological theory that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Narrative Self-Constitution and Recovery from Addiction.Doug McConnell - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (3):307-322.
    Why do some addicted people chronically fail in their goal to recover, while others succeed? On one established view, recovery depends, in part, on efforts of intentional planning agency. This seems right, however, firsthand accounts of addiction suggest that the agent’s self-narrative also has an influence. This paper presents arguments for the view that self-narratives have independent, self-fulfilling momentum that can support or undermine self-governance. The self-narrative structures of addicted persons can entrench addiction and alienate the agent from practically feasible (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • We-Intentions.Raimo Tuomela & Kaarlo Miller - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 53 (3):367-389.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   177 citations  
  • Against Narrativity.Galen Strawson - 2004 - Ratio 17 (4):428-452.
    I argue against two popular claims. The first is a descriptive, empirical thesis about the nature of ordinary human experience: ‘each of us constructs and lives a “narrative” . . . this narrative is us, our identities’ (Oliver Sacks); ‘self is a perpetually rewritten story . . . in the end, we become the autobiographical narratives by which we “tell about” our lives’ (Jerry Bruner); ‘we are all virtuoso novelists. . . . We try to make all of our material (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   263 citations  
  • Violence as a Force of Oppression.Ann E. Cudd - 2006 - In Analyzing Oppression. New York, US: Oup Usa.
    This chapter argues that violence is and has always been a crucial component in the origin and maintenance of oppression. It explores how violence and the threat of violence constrain the actions of groups, harming the victims and benefiting the correlative privileged social groups. It argues that women as a group are oppressed materially through violence, and that there is a credible, psychologically effective threat of greater harm that is transmitted by the obvious material harm that they do suffer.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   55 citations  
  • The Constitution of Selves.Christopher Williams & Marya Schechtman - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):641.
    Can we understand what makes someone the same person without understanding what it is to be a person? Prereflectively we might not think so, but philosophers often accord these questions separate treatments, with personal-identity theorists claiming the first question and free-will theorists the second. Yet much of what is of interest to a person—the possibility of survival over time, compensation for past hardships, concern for future projects, or moral responsibility—is not obviously intelligible from the perspective of either question alone. Marya (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   290 citations  
  • Free Agency and Self-Worth.Paul Benson - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (12):650-668.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   84 citations  
  • Modest sociality and the distinctiveness of intention.Michael E. Bratman - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):149-165.
    Cases of modest sociality are cases of small scale shared intentional agency in the absence of asymmetric authority relations. I seek a conceptual framework that adequately supports our theorizing about such modest sociality. I want to understand what in the world constitutes such modest sociality. I seek an understanding of the kinds of normativity that are central to modest sociality. And throughout we need to keep track of the relations—conceptual, metaphysical, normative—between individual agency and modest sociality. In pursuit of these (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   61 citations  
  • Embodied agents, narrative selves.Catriona Mackenzie - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):154-171.
    Recent work on diachronic agency has challenged the predominantly structural or synchronic approach to agency that is characteristic of much of the literature in contemporary philosophical moral psychology. However, the embodied dimensions of diachronic agency continue to be neglected in the literature. This article draws on phenomenological perspectives on embodiment and narrative conceptions of the self to argue that diachronic agency and selfhood are anchored in embodiment. In doing so, the article also responds to Diana Meyers' recent work on corporeal (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • One's Remembered Past: Narrative Thinking, Emotion, and the External Perspective.Peter Goldie - 2003 - Philosophical Papers 32 (3):301-319.
    Abstract Narrative thinking has a very important role in our ordinary everyday lives?in our thinking about fiction, about the historical past, about how things might have been, and about our own past and our plans for the future. In this paper, which is part of a larger project, I will be focusing on just one kind of narrative thinking: the kind that we sometimes engage in when we think about, evaluate, and respond emotionally to, our own past lives from a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Shared intention and personal intentions.Margaret Gilbert - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):167 - 187.
    This article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In a technical phrase, what is it for people to share an intention ? Extending and refining earlier work of the author’s, it argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention (the disjunction, concurrence, and obligation criteria) and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in the paper, people (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   124 citations  
  • Walking Together: A Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon.Margaret Gilbert - 1990 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):1-14.
    The everyday concept of a social group is approached by examining the concept of going for a walk together, an example of doing something together, or "shared action". Two analyses requiring shared personal goals are rejected, since they fail to explain how people walking together have obligations and rights to appropriate behavior, and corresponding rights of rebuke. An alternative account is proposed: those who walk together must constitute the "plural subject" of a goal. The nature of plural subjecthood, the thesis (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   226 citations  
  • (1 other version)Free agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.
    In the subsequent pages, I want to develop a distinction between wanting and valuing which will enable the familiar view of freedom to make sense of the notion of an unfree action. The contention will be that, in the case of actions that are unfree, the agent is unable to get what he most wants, or values, and this inability is due to his own "motivational system." In this case the obstruction to the action that he most wants to do (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   507 citations  
  • (3 other versions)Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
    It is my view that one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will. Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call "first-order desires" or "desires of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1518 citations  
  • Self to self.David Velleman - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (1):39-76.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  • Narrative unity as a condition of personhood.John Christman - 2004 - Metaphilosophy 35 (5):695-713.
    In this article I critically discuss a claim made by several writers in philosophy and the social sciences that for an individual to count as a person, a single personality, or the subject of a life, the experiences of the subject in question must take a narrative form. I argue that narrativity is a misleading and, in some ways of understanding it, implausible condition of what it is that adds unity to personhood and personality. I pursue this critique by considering (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • You, Me, and We: The Sharing of Emotional Experiences.D. Zahavi - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (1-2):84-101.
    When surveying recent philosophical work on the nature and status of collective intentionality and we-intentions, it is striking how much effort is spent on analysing the structure of joint action and on establishing whether or not the intention to, say, go for a walk or paint a house together is reducible to some form of I-intentionality. Much less work has been devoted to an analysis of shared affects and emotions. This is regrettable, not only because emotional sharing in all likelihood (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   77 citations  
  • Rethinking Relational Autonomy.Andrea C. Westlund - 2009 - Hypatia 24 (4):26-49.
    John Christman has argued that constitutively relational accounts of autonomy, as defended by some feminist theorists, are problematically perfectionist about the human good. I argue that autonomy is constitutively relational, but not in a way that implies perfectionism: autonomy depends on a dialogical disposition to hold oneself answerable to external, critical perspectives on one's action-guiding commitments. This type of relationality carries no substantive value commitments, yet it does answer to core feminist concerns about autonomy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   112 citations  
  • Faces of Intention.Michael Bratman - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):119-121.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   106 citations  
  • Autonomy and the split-level self.Marilyn A. Friedman - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):19-35.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   63 citations  
  • Relational autonomy, normative authority and perfectionism.Catriona Mackenzie - 2008 - Journal of Social Philosophy 39 (4):512-533.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   120 citations  
  • We-intentions revisited.Raimo Tuomela - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (3):327 - 369.
    This paper gives an up-to-date account of we-intentions and responds to some critics of the author’s earlier work on the topic in question. While the main lines of the new account are basically the same as before, the present account considerably adds to the earlier work. For one thing, it shows how we-intentions and joint intentions can arise in terms of the so-called Bulletin Board View of joint intention acquisition, which relies heavily on some underlying mutually accepted conceptual and situational (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   102 citations  
  • Imagining oneself otherwise.Catriona Mackenzie - 2000 - In Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar (eds.), Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   274 citations  
  • Collective Responsibility and the Narrative Self.Cassie Striblen - 2013 - Social Theory and Practice 39 (1):147-165.
    This essay advocates applying a “narrative” conception of the individual self to the problem of “collective responsibility.” Participants in the debate agree that groups are composed of individuals and that group responsibility must somehow mimic individual responsibility. However, participants do not begin from a neutral and unproblematic conception of the individual. So far, most participants have assumed standard models of the individual that may unduly bias their conclusions about different forms of group responsibility. I argue that switching to a “narrative” (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Thread of Life.Richard Wollheim - 1984 - The Personalist Forum 1 (1):55-58.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   98 citations  
  • Narrative, self-governance, and addiction.Doug McConnell - unknown
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Narrative self-constitution and vulnerability to co-authoring.Doug McConnell - 2016 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 37 (1):29-43.
    All people are vulnerable to having their self-concepts shaped by others. This article investigates that vulnerability using a theory of narrative self-constitution. According to narrative self-constitution, people depend on others to develop and maintain skills of self-narration and they are vulnerable to having the content of their self-narratives co-authored by others. This theoretical framework highlights how vulnerability to co-authoring is essential to developing a self-narrative and, thus, the possibility of autonomy. However, this vulnerability equally entails that co-authors can undermine autonomy (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Deciding Together.Andrea Westlund - 2009 - Philosophers' Imprint 9.
    In this paper I develop a conception of joint practical deliberation as a special type of shared cooperative activity, through which co-deliberators jointly accept reasons as applying to them as a pair or group. I argue, moreover, that the aspiration to deliberative “pairhood” is distinguished by a special concern for mutuality that guides each deliberator’s readiness to accept a given consideration as a reason-for-us. It matters to each of us, as joint deliberators, that each party’s (individual) reasons for accepting something (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Introduction: Practical Identity and Narrative Agency.Catriona Mackenzie - 2007 - In Kim Atkins & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Practical Identity and Narrative Agency. New York: Routledge.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Personal identity, narrative integration, and embodiment.Catriona Mackenzie - 2009 - In Sue Campbell, Letitia Meynell & Susan Sherwin (eds.), Embodiment and Agency. Pennsylvania State University Press. pp. 100--125.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • Dynamics of Sociality.Michael E. Bratman - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):1-15.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Self, Society, and Personal Choice.Diana T. Meyers - 1991 - Hypatia 6 (2):222-225.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   130 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Alternative of Oneself: Recasting Some of Our Practical Problems.Jan Bransen - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):381-400.
    This paper argues that there are practical problems of such a kind that neither impartial morality nor rational choice theory can provide us with comfort and guidance in our attempt to make the right choice if confronted with such a problem. It argues that both morality and rational choice theory are bound to misconstrue problems of this kind. Appreciating the limits of both morality and rational choice theory, as currently discussed in the literature, enables us to identify the features of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Alternatives of Oneself: Recasting some of our practical problems.Jan Bransen - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):381-400.
    This paper argues that there are practical problems of such a kind that neither impartial morality nor rational choice theory can provide us with comfort and guidance in our attempt to make the right choice if confronted with such a problem. It argues that both morality and rational choice theory are bound to misconstrue problems of this kind. Appreciating the limits of both morality and rational choice theory, as currently discussed in the literature (Wolf, Morton, Pettit, Hollis & Sugden), enables (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • The Sources of Normativity.Christine Korsgaard - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):384-394.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   688 citations  
  • Narrative Integration, Fragmented Selves, and Autonomy.Catriona Mackenzie & Jacqui Poltera - 2010 - Hypatia 25 (1):31 - 54.
    In this paper we defend the notion of narrative identity against Galen Strawson's recent critique. With reference to Elyn Saks's memoir of her schizophrenia, we question the coherence ofStrawsons conception of the Episodic self and show why the capacity for narrative integration is important for a flourishing life. We aho argue that Scú put pressure on narrative theories that specify unduly restncúve constraints on self-constituting narratives, and chrify the need to distinguish identity from autonomy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • We-Narratives and the Stability and Depth of Shared Agency.Deborah Tollefsen & Shaun Gallagher - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (2):95-110.
    The basic approach to understanding shared agency has been to identify individual intentional states that are somehow “shared” by participants and that contribute to guiding and informing the actions of individual participants. But, as Michael Bratman suggests, there is a problem of stability and depth that any theory of shared agency needs to solve. Given that participants in a joint action might form shared intentions for different reasons, what binds them to one another such that they have some reason for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Advancing the ‘We’ Through Narrative.Shaun Gallagher & Deborah Tollefsen - 2019 - Topoi 38 (1):211-219.
    Narrative is rarely mentioned in philosophical discussions of collective intentionality and group identity despite the fact that narratives are often thought important for the formation of action intentions and self-identity in individuals. We argue that the concept of the ‘we-narrative’ can solve several problems in regard to defining the status of the we. It provides the typical format for the attribution of joint agency; it contributes to the formation of group identity; and it generates group stability.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations