In this innovative study Patricia Kitcher argues that we can only understand the deduction of the categories in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in terms of his attempt to fathom the psychological prerequisites of thought. Thus a consideration of his conception of psychology is essential to an understanding of his philosophy. Kitcher specifically considers Kant's claims about the unity of the thinking self; the spatial forms of human perceptions; the relations among mental states necessary for them to have content; the (...) relations between perceptions and judgment; and the limits of philosophical insight into psychological processes. (shrink)

S. L. Hurley; VIII*—Kant on Spontaneity and the Myth of the Giving, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 94, Issue 1, 1 June 1994, Pages 137–164, htt.

IN REASONS AND PERSONS, Derek Parfit defends a conception of the self or person which he labels "Reductionist." It is a conception which owes much to Hume's view of the self as a bundle of causally connected perceptions. Indeed, Parfit's account might be thought of as capturing the best insights of the bundle theory, while avoiding many of the objections to which cruder versions of that theory appear to be liable. Parfit's preliminary characterization of Reductionism is in connection with the (...) notion of personal identity. A Reductionist view of personal identity holds that: the fact of a person's identity over time just consists in the holding of certain more particular facts, and these facts can be described without either presupposing the identity of this person, or explicitly claiming that this person exists. These facts can be described in an impersonal way. (shrink)

G. H. Bird; Discussions: Kantian Myths, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 96, Issue 1, 1 June 1996, Pages 245–252, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristot.