- (1 other version)Personal Identity and the Hybrid View: A Middle Way.Harold W. Noonan - 2021 - Metaphysica 22 (2):263-283.details
|
|
Immunity to error through misidentification and the functionalist, self-reflexive account of episodic memory.Steven James - 2021 - Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 64:189-200.details
|
|
¿Hemos respondido la pregunta "¿Puede pensar una máquina?"?Gonzalez Rodrigo - 2019 - In Discusiones Fundamentales en Filosofía de la Mente: Voces Locales. Valparaíso: Universidad de Valparaíso. pp. 71-95.details
|
|
The Eclipse of Value-Free Economics. The concept of multiple self versus homo economicus.Aleksander Ostapiuk - 2020 - Wrocław, Polska: Publishing House of Wroclaw University of Economics and Business.details
|
|
Immunity to wh-misidentification.Aidan McGlynn - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2293-2313.details
|
|
Is Psychology What Matters in Survival?Johan E. Gustafsson - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (3):504-516.details
|
|
Personal identity and persisting as many.Sara Weaver & John Turri - 2018 - In Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 2. Oxford University Press. pp. 213-242.details
|
|
Is Remembering to do a Special Kind of Memory?Thor Grünbaum & Søren Kyllingsbæk - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (2):385-404.details
|
|
Episodic memory is not immune to error through misidentification: against Fernández.Kourken Michaelian - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9525-9543.details
|
|
Introduction to Part Three: Personal Identity.Andrea Sauchelli - 2020 - In Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 48-67.details
|
|
Why It Does Not Matter What Matters: Relation R, Personal Identity, and Moral Theory.Bastian Steuwer - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):178-198.details
|
|
(1 other version)Reasons and Conscious Persons.Christian Coseru - 2020 - In Andrea Sauchelli (ed.), Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 160-186.details
|
|
Identidad personal y ontología de la persona.José Tomás Alvarado Marambio - 2016 - Universitas Philosophica 33 (66):77-112.details
|
|
Parfits Reduktionismus und die Möglichkeit struktureller Einheit: Vorarbeiten zu einer aristotelischen Theorie personaler Identität.Sascha Settegast - 2018 - In Sebastian Gäb, Dominic Harion & Peter Welsen (eds.), Person und Identität. Regensburg: S. Roderer. pp. 109-170.details
|
|
Communicating and Disagreeing with Distinct Concepts: A Defense of Semantic Internalism.Matheus Valente - 2019 - Theoria 85 (4):312-336.details
|
|
Not All Killings Are Equally Wrong.Todd Karhu - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (4):378–394.details
|
|
Moore’s Paradox: An Evansian Account.Hongwoo Kwon - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):585-601.details
|
|
Continuities and discontinuities between imagination and memory: The view from philosophy.Kourken Michaelian, Denis Perrin & André Sant'Anna - 2020 - In Anna Abraham (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of the Imagination. Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
The best memories: Identity, narrative, and objects.Richard Heersmink & Christopher Jade McCarroll - 2020 - In Timothy Shanahan & Paul Smart (eds.), Blade Runner 2049: A Philosophical Exploration. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. pp. 87-107.details
|
|
Unconscious Perception Reconsidered.Ian Phillips - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (4):471-514.details
|
|
Observer memory and immunity to error through misidentification.Jordi Fernández - 2021 - Synthese (1):641-660.details
|
|
On Seeming to Remember.Fabrice Teroni - 2018 - In Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus & Denis Perrin (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. New York: Routledge. pp. 329-345.details
|
|
Personal Identity.David Shoemaker & Kevin P. Tobia - 2022 - In Manuel Vargas & John Doris (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Mental Time Travel and Attention.Jonardon Ganeri - 2017 - Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (4):353-373.details
|
|
Non-branching personal persistence.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2307-2329.details
|
|
Delayed Fission and the Standard Psychological View of Personal Identity.Huiyuhl Yi - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (2):173-191.details
|
|
Episodic memory and theory of mind: a connection reconsidered.Christoph Hoerl - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (2):148-160.details
|
|
Self-Consciousness.Joel Smith - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Responsibility Without Identity.David Shoemaker - 2012 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 18 (1):109-132.details
|
|
Rational Agency without Self‐Knowledge: Could ‘We’ Replace ‘I’?Luke Roelofs - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):3-33.details
|
|
The Subject of Experience.Galen Strawson - 2017 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Persons Versus Brains: Biological Intelligence in Human Organisms.E. Steinhart - 2001 - Biology and Philosophy 16 (1):3-27.details
|
|
(1 other version)Immunity to Error and Subjectivity.Robert J. Howell - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):581-604.details
|
|
Combining Minds: A Defence of the Possibility of Experiential Combination.Luke Roelofs - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Torontodetails
|
|
Some puzzles concerning relations between minds, brains, and bodies.Rick Grush - 2016details
|
|
Plenitude, Pluralism, and Neo-Lockean Persons.Harold Noonan - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (11-12):108-131.details
|
|
Three Questions About Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Giovanni Merlo - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (3):603-623.details
|
|
Personal memories.Marina Trakas - 2015 - Dissertation, Macquarie Universitydetails
|
|
Psychological Deprogramming–Reprogramming and the Right Kind of Cause.Andrew Naylor - 2016 - Philosophical Papers 45 (1-2):267-288.details
|
|
Memory as mental time travel.Denis Perrin & Kourken Michaelian - 2017 - In Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. New York: Routledge. pp. 228-239.details
|
|
Intervening in the brain: Changing psyche and society.Dirk Hartmann, Gerard Boer, Jörg Fegert, Thorsten Galert, Reinhard Merkel, Bart Nuttin & Steffen Rosahl - 2007 - Springer.details
|
|
The perfect murder: A philosophical whodunit.Jeremy Allen Byrd - 2007 - Synthese 157 (1):47-58.details
|
|
Head Transplants, Personal Identity and Neuroethics.Assya Pascalev, Mario Pascalev & James Giordano - 2015 - Neuroethics 9 (1):15-22.details
|
|
Muisti.Jani Hakkarainen, Mirja Hartimo & Jaana Virta (eds.) - 2013 - Tampere: Tampere University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Against discontinuism: Mental time travel and our knowledge of past and future events.Kourken Michaelian - 2016 - In Kourken Michaelian, Stanley B. Klein & Karl K. Szpunar (eds.), Seeing the Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 62-92.details
|
|
De se thoughts and immunity to error through misidentification.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3311-3333.details
|
|
(1 other version)‘The Secrets of All Hearts’: Locke on Personal Identity.Galen Strawson - 2015 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:111-141.details
|
|
The Demonstrative Model of first-person thought.Daniel Morgan - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1795-1811.details
|
|
Personal identity and the Phineas Gage effect.Kevin P. Tobia - 2015 - Analysis 75 (3):396-405.details
|
|
On behalf of St Anselm.Edgar Danielyan - 2015 - Analysis 75 (3):405-407.details
|
|