The philosophy of medicine and psychiatry has considered the defining of disease, illness, and disorder an important project for over three decades. Within this literature, accounts based on adaptive "functions" have been prominent, particularly in the DSM nosology. In response to this trend, Jerome Wakefield has presented a view of mental disorder as "harmful dysfunction." In this view, "harm" contributes the value-element to disorder concepts, while "dysfunction" implies a value-free foundation as long as the latter is grounded in evolutionary biology. (...) In a critical review of Wakefield's and others' functionalist arguments for disorder concepts, we make four major points. We recommend a shift away from the definition of value-free disorder concepts, instead emphasizing the analysis of the logical features and the value commitments in nosological categories. (shrink)

The role of individual life accounts has been promoted--largely through what has come to be described as narrative ethics-as important to the practice of medical ethics for a number of years. Beyond this the apparent incompatibility of personal stories with scientific procedure has limited their use. In this article I will argue that this represents a serious under-utilisation of a valuable method for researching ethical dilemmas and the settings in which these dilemmas are played out. Life stories need not simply (...) provide a stimulus to scientific research but can in themselves yield intellectually robust evidence on the general as well as the particular. By drawing on the rigorous methods developed elsewhere, personal accounts not only allow us to "enter the world of the sick person" but allow us to do so in such a way as to contribute to empirical and theoretical knowledge. (shrink)

Emphasizing the continuity between his moral and aesthetic doctrines and the metaphysical basis in which they rest, the author explores Kant's relation to Leibniz and Hume, and his attempt to construct a philosophy which was neither rationalist nor empiricist, and could display the limits of human understanding; he shows that Kant was not only a master of philosophical criticism, but the greater defender of the objectivity of human knowledge, in both the scientific and the moral spheres.

Since the time of Hippocrates, medical science sought to develop a practice based on "knowledge rather than opinion". However, in the light of recent alternative approaches to healing and a philosophy of science that, through thinkers like Kuhn, Rorty, and Foucault, is critical of claims to objective truth, we must reappraise the way in which medical interventions can be based on proven pathophysiological knowledge rather than opinion. Developing insights in Foucault, Lacan, and Wittgenstein, this essay argues for a recovery of (...) the Aristotelian idea of a techne, where there is a dynamic interplay between praxis and conceptualization. The result is a post-Kuhnian epistemology for medical science that recognizes the evaluative dimension of knowledge, but that also looks to a Platonic conception of the good as the ultimate constraint on human thought, thus avoiding the radically self-contained accounts of truth found in some post-modern thinkers. Keywords: normal science, power, truth, virtue CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

A modern philosopher and author of Modern Philosophy presents a useful, refreshing guide for "doing" rather than "studying" philosophy, making the subject accessible and real to the layperson. 10,000 first printing.