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Control Consciousness

Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (4):643-657 (2010)

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  1. Fast Backprojections From the Motion to the Primary Visual Area Necessary for Visual Awareness.Alvaro Pascual-Leone & Vincent Walsh - 2001 - Science 292 (5516):510-512.
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  • The Phenomenology of Agency.Tim Bayne - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.
    The phenomenology of agency has, until recently, been rather neglected, overlooked by both philosophers of action and philosophers of consciousness alike. Thankfully, all that has changed, and of late there has been an explosion of interest in what it is like to be an agent. 1 This burgeoning field crosses the traditional boundaries between disciplines: philosophers of psychopathology are speculating about the role that unusual experiences of agency might play in accounting for disorders of thought and action; cognitive scientists are (...)
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  • Phenomenal Consciousness and the Allocentric-Egocentric Interface.Pete Mandik - 2005 - Endophysics.
    I propose and defend the Allocentric-Egocentric Interface Theory of Con- sciousness. Mental processes form a hierarchy of mental representations with maxi- mally egocentric (self-centered) representations at the bottom and maximally allocentric (other-centered) representations at the top. Phenomenally conscious states are states that are relatively intermediate in this hierarchy. More speci.
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  • Consciousness and the Computational Mind.RAY JACKENDOFF - 1987 - MIT Press.
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  • Reading and Visual Memory-Remembering Scenes That Were Never Seen.H. Intraub & Je Hoffman - 1986 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 24 (5):325-325.
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  • Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
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  • A Neurofunctional Theory of Consciousness.Jesse J. Prinz - 2005 - In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 381-396.
    Reading the philosophical literature on consciousness, one might get the idea that there is just one problem in consciousness studies, the hard problem. That would be a mistake. There are other problems; some are more tractable, but none are easy, and all interesting. The literature on the hard problem gives the impression that we have made little progress. Consciousness is just an excuse to work and re-work familiar positions on the mind-body problem. But progress is being made elsewhere. Researchers are (...)
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  • Qualia, Space, and Control.Pete Mandik - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):47-60.
    According to representionalists, qualia-the introspectible properties of sensory experience-are exhausted by the representational contents of experience. Representationalists typically advocate an informational psychosemantics whereby a brain state represents one of its causal antecedents in evolutionarily determined optimal circumstances. I argue that such a psychosemantics may not apply to certain aspects of our experience, namely, our experience of space in vision, hearing, and touch. I offer that these cases can be handled by supplementing informational psychosemantics with a procedural psychosemantics whereby a representation (...)
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  • A Neurofunctional Theory of Visual Consciousness.Jesse Prinz - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):243-59.
    This paper develops an empirically motivated theory of visual consciousness. It begins by outlining neuropsychological support for Jackendoff's (1987) hypothesis that visual consciousness involves mental representations at an intermediate level of processing. It then supplements that hypothesis with the further requirement that attention, which can come under the direction of high level representations, is also necessary for consciousness. The resulting theory is shown to have a number of philosophical consequences. If correct, higher-order thought accounts, the multiple drafts account, and the (...)
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  • The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement.Andrew Brook & Pete Mandik - 2007 - Analyse & Kritik 29 (1):3-23.
    A movement dedicated to applying neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and using philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience began about twenty-five years ago. Results in neuroscience have affected how we see traditional areas of philosophical concern such as perception, belief-formation, and consciousness. There is an interesting interaction between some of the distinctive features of neuroscience and important general issues in the philosophy of science. And recent neuroscience has thrown up a few conceptual issues that philosophers are perhaps best trained (...)
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  • The Neurophilosophy of Consciousness.Pete Mandik - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 418--430.
    The neurophilosophy of consciousness brings neuroscience to bear on philosophical issues concerning phenomenal consciousness, especially issues concerning what makes mental states conscious, what it is that we are conscious of, and the nature of the phenomenal character of conscious states. Here attention is given largely to phenomenal consciousness as it arises in vision. The relevant neuroscience concerns not only neurophysiological and neuroanatomical data, but also computational models of neural networks. The neurophilosophical theories that bring such data to bear on the (...)
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  • The Neurophilosophy of Subjectivity.Pete Mandik - 2009 - In John Bickle (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
    The so-called subjectivity of conscious experience is central to much recent work in the philosophy of mind. Subjectivity is the alleged property of consciousness whereby one can know what it is like to have certain conscious states only if one has undergone such states oneself. I review neurophilosophical work on consciousness and concepts pertinent to this claim and argue that subjectivity eliminativism is at least as well supported, if not more supported, than subjectivity reductionism.
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  • An Epistemological Theory of Consciousness?Pete Mandik - 2008 - In Alessio Plebe & Vivian De La Cruz (eds.), Philosophy in the Neuroscience Era. Squilibri.
    This article tackles problems concerning the reduction of phenomenal consciousness to brain processes that arise in consideration of specifically epistemological properties that have been attributed to conscious experiences. In particular, various defenders of dualism and epiphenomenalism have argued for their positions by assuming special epistemic access to phenomenal consciousness. Many physicalists have reacted to such arguments by denying the epistemological premises. My aim in this paper is to take a different approach in opposing dualism and argue that when we correctly (...)
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  • Do We Have Free Will?Benjamin W. Libet - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):47-57.
    I have taken an experimental approach to this question. Freely voluntary acts are preceded by a specific electrical change in the brain that begins 550 ms before the act. Human subjects became aware of intention to act 350-400 ms after RP starts, but 200 ms. before the motor act. The volitional process is therefore initiated unconsciously. But the conscious function could still control the outcome; it can veto the act. Free will is therefore not excluded. These findings put constraints on (...)
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  • The Natural Philosophy of Agency.Shaun Gallagher - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):347–357.
    A review of several theories and brain-imaging experiments shows that there is no consensus about how to define the sense of agency. In some cases the sense of agency is construed in terms of bodily movement or motor control, in others it is linked to the intentional aspect of action. For some theorists it is the product of higher-order cognitive processes, for others it is a feature of first-order phenomenal experience. In this article I propose a multiple aspects account of (...)
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  • Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis.Jesse J. Prinz - 2002 - Mind 113 (449):210-214.
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  • Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
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  • The Architecture of Representation.Rick Grush - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):5-23.
    b>: In this article I outline, apply, and defend a theory of natural representation. The main consequences of this theory are: i) representational status is a matter of how physical entities are used, and specifically is not a matter of causation, nomic relations with the intentional object, or information; ii) there are genuine (brain-)internal representations; iii) such representations are really representations, and not just farcical pseudo-representations, such as attractors, principal components, state-space partitions, or what-have-you;and iv) the theory allows us to (...)
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  • All Consciousness is Perceptual.Jesse J. Prinz - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
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  • Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis.Jesse J. Prinz - 2002 - MIT Press.
    In Furnishing the Mind, Jesse Prinz attempts to swing the pendulum back toward empiricism.
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  • Brain Wise.Patricia Smith Churchland - 2002 - MIT Press.
    A neurophilosopher?s take on the self, free will, human understanding, and the experience of God, from the perspective of the brain.
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  • Mental Action and Self-Awareness.Christopher Peacocke - 2006 - In Jonathan D. Cohen & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    This paper is built around a single, simple idea. It is widely agreed that there is a distinctive kind of awareness each of us has of his own bodily actions. This action-awareness is different from any perceptual awareness a subject may have of his own actions; it can exist in the absence of such perceptual awareness. The single, simple idea around which this paper is built is that the distinctive awareness that subjects have of their own mental actions is a (...)
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  • The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement.Pete Mandik & Andrew Brook - 2007 - Analyze and Kritik 26 (1):3-23.
    A movement dedicated to applying neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and using philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience began about twenty-five years ago. Results in neuroscience have affected how we see traditional areas of philosophical concern such as perception, belief-formation, and consciousness. There is an interesting interaction between some of the distinctive features of neuroscience and important general issues in the philosophy of science. And recent neuroscience has thrown up a few conceptual issues that philosophers are perhaps best trained (...)
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  • The Information Capacity of the Human Motor System in Controlling the Amplitude of Movement.Paul M. Fitts - 1992 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 121 (3):262-269.
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  • Brain-wise. Studies in Neurophilosophy.Patricia Smith Churchland - 2004 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 66 (4):767-768.
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  • Functionalism, Dualism, And.Jesse Prinz - 2001 - In William P. Bechtel, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale & Robert S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell. pp. 278.
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  • Functionalism, Dualism, and the Neural Correlates of Consciousness.J. J. Prinz - 2001 - In William P. Bechtel, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale & Robert S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell. pp. 278--294.
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  • The Information Capacity of the Human Motor System in Controlling the Amplitude of Movement.Paul M. Fitts - 1954 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 47 (6):381.
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  • The Quest for Consciousness.Christof Koch - 2004 - Roberts & Company.
    In "The Quest for Consciousness," Caltech neuroscientist Christof Koch explores the biological basis of consciousness.
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  • Do We Have Free Will?Benjamin W. Libet - 2002 - In Robert H. Kane (ed.), Journal of Consciousness Studies. Oxford University Press. pp. 551--564.
    I have taken an experimental approach to this question. Freely voluntary acts are preceded by a specific electrical change in the brain that begins 550 ms before the act. Human subjects became aware of intention to act 350-400 ms after RP starts, but 200 ms. before the motor act. The volitional process is therefore initiated unconsciously. But the conscious function could still control the outcome; it can veto the act. Free will is therefore not excluded. These findings put constraints on (...)
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  • Skill Theory V2.0: Dispositions, Emulation, and Spatial Perception.Rick Grush - 2007 - Synthese 159 (3):389 - 416.
    An attempt is made to defend a general approach to the spatial content of perception, an approach according to which perception is imbued with spatial content in virtue of certain kinds of connections between perceiving organism's sensory input and its behavioral output. The most important aspect of the defense involves clearly distinguishing two kinds of perceptuo-behavioral skills—the formation of dispositions, and a capacity for emulation. The former, the formation of dispositions, is argued to by the central pivot of spatial content. (...)
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  • The Philosophy of Neuroscience.John Bickle, Pete Mandik & Anthony Landreth - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Over the past three decades, philosophy of science has grown increasingly “local.” Concerns have switched from general features of scientific practice to concepts, issues, and puzzles specific to particular disciplines. Philosophy of neuroscience is a natural result. This emerging area was also spurred by remarkable recent growth in the neurosciences. Cognitive and computational neuroscience continues to encroach upon issues traditionally addressed within the humanities, including the nature of consciousness, action, knowledge, and normativity. Empirical discoveries about brain structure and function suggest (...)
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  • An Experimental Study of Imagination.Charles West Perky - 1911 - Philosophical Review 20:108.
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  • Image and Brain: The Resolution of the Imagery Debate.Stephen M. Kosslyn - 1994 - MIT Press.
    This long-awaited work by prominent Harvard psychologist Stephen Kosslyn integrates a twenty-year research program on the nature of high-level vision and mental ...
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  • Consciousness of Action.Marc Jeannerod - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 540--550.
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  • The Intermediate Level Theory of Consciousness.Jesse J. Prinz - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 248--260.
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