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  1. (1 other version)The Moral Judgement of the Child.Jean Piaget - 1933 - Philosophy 8 (31):373-374.
    First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
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  • Do infants detect indirect reciprocity?Marek Meristo & Luca Surian - 2013 - Cognition 129 (1):102-113.
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  • Partner choice, fairness, and the extension of morality.Nicolas Baumard, Jean-Baptiste André & Dan Sperber - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (1):102-122.
    Our discussion of the commentaries begins, at the evolutionary level, with issues raised by our account of the evolution of morality in terms of partner-choice mutualism. We then turn to the cognitive level and the characterization and workings of fairness. In a final section, we discuss the degree to which our fairness-based approach to morality extends to norms that are commonly considered moral even though they are distinct from fairness.
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  • (4 other versions)Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
    Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truth which are synthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience. Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill founded. One effect of abandoning them is, as (...)
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  • The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion.Jonathan Haidt - unknown
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  • (2 other versions)A Theory of Justice.John Rawls - unknown
    Since it appeared in 1971, John Rawls's A Theory of Justice has become a classic. The author has now revised the original edition to clear up a number of difficulties he and others have found in the original book. Rawls aims to express an essential part of the common core of the democratic tradition--justice as fairness--and to provide an alternative to utilitarianism, which had dominated the Anglo-Saxon tradition of political thought since the nineteenth century. Rawls substitutes the ideal of the (...)
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  • A Theory of Justice: Original Edition.John Rawls - 2005 - Belknap Press.
    Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition. This reissue makes the first edition once again available for scholars and serious students of Rawls's work.
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  • Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations.Jesse Graham, Jonathan Haidt & Brian A. Nosek - 2009 - Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 96 (5):1029-1046.
    How and why do moral judgments vary across the political spectrum? To test moral foundations theory, the authors developed several ways to measure people’s use of 5 sets of moral intuitions: Harm/care, Fairness/reciprocity, Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, and Purity/sanctity. Across 4 studies using multiple methods, liberals consistently showed greater endorsement and use of the Harm/care and Fairness/reciprocity foundations compared to the other 3 foundations, whereas conservatives endorsed and used the 5 foundations more equally. This difference was observed in abstract assessments of the (...)
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  • (1 other version)Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment.Joshua D. Greene, Sylvia A. Morelli, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom & Jonathan D. Cohen - 2008 - Cognition 107 (3):1144-1154.
    Traditional theories of moral development emphasize the role of controlled cognition in mature moral judgment, while a more recent trend emphasizes intuitive and emotional processes. Here we test a dual-process theory synthesizing these perspectives. More specifically, our theory associates utilitarian moral judgment (approving of harmful actions that maximize good consequences) with controlled cognitive processes and associates non-utilitarian moral judgment with automatic emotional responses. Consistent with this theory, we find that a cognitive load manipulation selectively interferes with utilitarian judgment. This interference (...)
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  • The psychology of meta-ethics: Exploring objectivism.Geoffrey Goodwin & John Darley - 2008 - Cognition 106 (3):1339-1366.
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  • Do Infants Attribute Moral Traits? Fourteen-Month-Olds' Expectations of Fairness Are Affected by Agents' Antisocial Actions.Luca Surian, Mika Ueno, Shoji Itakura & Marek Meristo - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  • Moral alchemy: How love changes norms.Rachel W. Magid & Laura E. Schulz - 2017 - Cognition 167:135-150.
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  • Young children enforce social norms selectively depending on the violator’s group affiliation.Marco Fh Schmidt, Hannes Rakoczy & Michael Tomasello - 2012 - Cognition 124 (3):325-333.
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  • The Moral-Conventional Distinction in Mature Moral Competence.Bryce Huebner, James Lee & Marc Hauser - 2010 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 10 (1-2):1-26.
    Developmental psychologists have long argued that the capacity to distinguish moral and conventional transgressions develops across cultures and emerges early in life. Children reliably treat moral transgressions as more wrong, more punishable, independent of structures of authority, and universally applicable. However, previous studies have not yet examined the role of these features in mature moral cognition. Using a battery of adult-appropriate cases (including vehicular and sexual assault, reckless behavior, and violations of etiquette and social contracts) we demonstrate that these features (...)
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  • The influence of intention, outcome and question-wording on children’s and adults’ moral judgments.Gavin Nobes, Georgia Panagiotaki & Kimberley J. Bartholomew - 2016 - Cognition 157 (C):190-204.
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  • A Natural History of Human Morality.Michael Tomasello (ed.) - 2015 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
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  • Mind Perception is the Essence of Morality.Kurt Gray, Liane Young & Adam Waytz - 2012 - Psychological Inquiry 23 (2):101-124.
    Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds—a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions (...)
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  • The Moral Mind: How Five Sets of Innate Intuitions Guide the Development of Many Culture- Specific Virtues, and perhaps even Modules.Jonathan Haidt, Craig Joseph & Others - 2007 - The Innate Mind 3:367--391.
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  • Harm, affect, and the moral/conventional distinction.Daniel Kelly, Stephen Stich, Kevin J. Haley, Serena J. Eng & Daniel M. T. Fessler - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (2):117–131.
    The moral/conventional task has been widely used to study the emergence of moral understanding in children and to explore the deficits in moral understanding in clinical populations. Previous studies have indicated that moral transgressions, particularly those in which a victim is harmed, evoke a signature pattern of responses in the moral/conventional task: they are judged to be serious, generalizable and not authority dependent. Moreover, this signature pattern is held to be pan‐cultural and to emerge early in development. However, almost all (...)
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  • (1 other version)Cognitive Load Selectively Interferes with Utilitarian Moral Judgment.Jonathan D. Cohen Joshua D. Greene, Sylvia A. Morelli, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom - 2008 - Cognition 107 (3):1144.
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  • The case of the drunken sailor: On the generalisable wrongness of harmful transgressions.Katinka J. P. Quintelier, Daniel M. T. Fessler & Delphine De Smet - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (2):183 - 195.
    There is a widespread conviction that people distinguish two kinds of acts: on the one hand, acts that are generalisably wrong because they go against universal principles of harm, justice, or rights; on the other hand, acts that are variably right or wrong depending on the social context. In this paper we criticise existing methods that measure generalisability. We report new findings indicating that a modification of generalisability measures is in order. We discuss our findings in light of recent criticisms (...)
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  • Constraints on conventions: Resolving two puzzles of conventionality.Audun Dahl & Talia Waltzer - 2020 - Cognition 196 (C):104152.
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  • Unsentimental ethics: Towards a content-specific account of the moral–conventional distinction.Edward B. Royzman, Robert F. Leeman & Jonathan Baron - 2009 - Cognition 112 (1):159-174.
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  • Norms with Feeling: Towards a Psychological Account of Moral Judgment.Shaun Nichols - 2002 - Cognition 84 (2):221–236.
    There is a large tradition of work in moral psychology that explores the capacity for moral judgment by focusing on the basic capacity to distinguish moral violations (e.g. hitting another person) from conventional violations (e.g. playing with your food). However, only recently have there been attempts to characterize the cognitive mechanisms underlying moral judgment (e.g. Cognition 57 (1995) 1; Ethics 103 (1993) 337). Recent evidence indicates that affect plays a crucial role in mediating the capacity to draw the moral/conventional distinction. (...)
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  • Harmful transgressions qua moral transgressions: A deflationary view.Paulo Sousa & Jared Piazza - 2014 - Thinking and Reasoning 20 (1):99-128.
    One important issue in moral psychology concerns the proper characterisation of the folk understanding of the relationship between harmful transgressions and moral transgressions. Psychologist Elliot Turiel and associates have claimed with a broad range of supporting evidence that harmful transgressions are understood as transgressions that are authority independent and general in scope which, according to them, characterises these transgressions as moral transgressions. Recently many researchers questioned the position advocated by the Turiel tradition with some new evidence. We entered this debate (...)
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