- Submit
-
Browse
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- More
Switch to: Citations
References in:
Add references
You must login to add references.
|
|
|
|
|
|
, which uses the intuitionistic propositional calculus, with the only connective →. It is very important, because the well known Curry-Howard correspondence between proofs and programs was originally discovered with it, and because it enjoys the normalization property: every typed term is strongly normalizable. It was extended to second order intuitionistic logic, in 1970, by J.-Y. Girard [4], under the name of system F, still with the normalization property.More recently, in 1990, the Curry-Howard correspondence was extended to classical logic, following (...) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In this paper, I present a summary of the philosophical relationship betweenWittgenstein and Brouwer, taking as my point of departure Brouwer's lecture onMarch 10, 1928 in Vienna. I argue that Wittgenstein having at that stage not doneserious philosophical work for years, if one is to understand the impact of thatlecture on him, it is better to compare its content with the remarks on logics andmathematics in the Tractactus. I thus show that Wittgenstein's position, in theTractactus, was already quite close to (...) |
|
|
Dans ce texte, je pars de l’analyse intuitionniste de la vérité mathématique, « A est vrai si et seulement s’il existe une preuve de A » comme cas particulier de l’analyse de la vérité en termes de « vérifacteur », et je montre pourquoi Wittgenstein partageait celle-ci avec les intuitionnistes. Cependant, la notion de preuve à l’oeuvre dans cette analyse est, selon l’intuitionnisme, celle de la « preuve-comme-objet », et je montre par la suite, en interprétant son argument sur le (...) |
|
|
Introduction. Il est bien connu que la correspondance de Curry-Howard permet d'associer un programme, sous la forme d'un λ-terme, à toute preuve intuitionniste, formalisée dans le calcul des prédicats du second ordre. Cette correspondance a été étendue, assez récemment, à la logique classique moyennant une extension convenable du λ-calcul. Chaque théorème formalisé en logique du second ordre correspond donc à une spécification de programme.Il se pose alors le problème, en général tout à fait non trivial, de trouver la spécification associée (...) |
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-6588448685-2mrrg uwo