Men make for themselves pictures of ideal forms of life. Such pictures are various and may be in sharp opposition to each other; and one and the same individual may be captivated by different and sharply conflicting pictures at different times. At one time it may seem to him that he should live—even that a man should live —in such-and-such a way; at another that the only truly satisfactory form of life is something totally different, incompatible with the first. In (...) this way, his outlook may vary radically, not only at different periods of his life, but from day to day, even from one hour to the next. It is a function of so many variables: age, experiences, present environment, current reading, current physical state are some of them. As for the ways of life that may thus present themselves at different times as each uniquely satisfactory, there can be no doubt about their variety and opposition. The ideas of self-obliterating devotion to duty or to the service of others; of personal honour and magnanimity; of asceticism, contemplation, retreat; of action, dominance and power; of the cultivation of “an exquisite sense of the luxurious”; of simple human solidarity and co-operative endeavour; of a refined complexity of social existence; of a constantly maintained and renewed affinity with natural things—any of these ideas, and a great many others too, may form the core and substance of a personal ideal. (shrink)

In Morals By Agreement, David Gauthier concludes that under certain conditions it is rational for an agent to be disposed to choose in accordance with a fair cooperative scheme rather than to choose the course of action that maximizes his utility. This is only one of a number of important claims advanced in that book. In particular, he also propounds a distinctive view concerning what counts as a fair cooperative arrangement. The thesis concerning the rationality of adopting a cooperative disposition (...) is, however, logically independent of his substantive view of a fair cooperative scheme and is itself central to the project as a whole. Gauthier's concern is to establish that certain moral principles are those that fully rational, self-interested persons would agree to take as regulative of their dealings with one another – that a contractarian approach, in this sense, can provide an adequate basis for a theory of morality. (shrink)

Since it appeared in 1971, John Rawls's A Theory of Justice has become a classic. The author has now revised the original edition to clear up a number of difficulties he and others have found in the original book. Rawls aims to express an essential part of the common core of the democratic tradition--justice as fairness--and to provide an alternative to utilitarianism, which had dominated the Anglo-Saxon tradition of political thought since the nineteenth century. Rawls substitutes the ideal of the (...) social contract as a more satisfactory account of the basic rights and liberties of citizens as free and equal persons. "Each person," writes Rawls, "possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override." Advancing the ideas of Rousseau, Kant, Emerson, and Lincoln, Rawls's theory is as powerful today as it was when first published. (shrink)

An argument against the bias towards the near; how a defence of temporal neutrality is not a defence of S; an appeal to inconsistency; why we should reject S and accept CP.

Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition. This reissue makes the first edition once again available for scholars and serious students of Rawls's work.

I want to extend here a line of reasoning that I pursued in Rationality and Dynamic Choice . In that book I argued that the standard Bayesian model of expected-utility reasoning needs to be revised to accommodate a capacity, on the part of rational decision-makers, to effectively coordinate with their own future selves — to be guided by plans that they have deliberately adopted. I also suggested that an analogous line of reasoning might be employed to show that rational agents (...) could engage in rule-governed coordination of their choices with one another to a greater extent than the standard theory would seem to admit. It is this suggestion that I now want to explore more fully in the present paper. It is not that the standard theory denies the possibility of such coordination. On that account, however, coordination can only be achieved by the adoption of an effective enforcement system. Since, however, any enforcement scheme requires the expenditure of scarce resources, the standard theory seems committed to the view that rational agents can achieve only a second best outcome. It is worth considering whether thoroughly rational persons who know each other to be such might not do better than this. It is also the case that the process whereby individuals come to agreement on the terms of their coordination schemes is conceived as driven essentially by non-cooperative considerations, specifically the relative bargaining power or threat advantage of the participants. Bargaining outcomes based on this principle, however, tend to generate mutually disadvantageous conflict, and thus there are greater costs yet to be borne by “rational” interacting agents. I shall have to leave the exploration of this second problem to another occasion, however. (shrink)