- Toxic intentions.Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (6):1448-1461.details
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(1 other version)The Primacy of the Practical.John Brunero - 2024 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.details
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Integrity as Incentive-Insensitivity: Moral Incapacity Means One can’t be Bought.Etye Steinberg - 2024 - Topoi 43 (2):503-513.details
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In defence of object-given reasons.Michael Vollmer - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):485-511.details
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Self-Inflicted Frankfurt-Style Cases and Flickers of Freedom.Michael Robinson - forthcoming - The Journal of Ethics:1-23.details
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Responsibility for rationality: foundations of an ethics of mind.Sebastian Schmidt - 2024 - New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Morality and the Bearing of Apt Feelings on Wise Choices.Howard Nye - 2021 - In Billy Dunaway & David Plunkett (eds.), Meaning, Decision, and Norms: Themes From the Work of Allan Gibbard. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Maize Books. pp. 125-144.details
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Everything First.Errol Lord - 2023 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 97 (1):248-272.details
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The very idea of rational irrationality.Spencer Paulson - 2024 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 23 (1):3-21.details
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Correctly responding to reasons while being means‐end incoherent.Leonhard Schneider - 2023 - Ratio 36 (1):64-81.details
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THE CONTOURS OF FREE WILL SCEPTICISM.Simon Pierre Chevarie-Cossette - 2019 - Dissertation, Oxford Universitydetails
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Abraham, Isaac, and the Toxin: a Kavkan reading of the binding of Isaac.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2023 - Religious Studies 59 (4):618 - 634.details
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On believing indirectly for practical reasons.Sebastian Https://Orcidorg Schmidt - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1795-1819.details
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Contrastive Intentions.Andrew Peet - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (4):24.details
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Who Cares About Winning?Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt - 2023 - European Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):248-265.details
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Blameworthiness for Non-Culpable Attitudes.Sebastian Https://Orcidorg Schmidt - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):48-64.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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Against the Doctrine of Infallibility.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):pqaa082.details
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Let me go and try.Kirk Ludwig - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (3):340-358.details
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Devoting ourselves to the manifestly unattainable.Nicholas Southwood & David Wiens - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):696-716.details
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Consequentialists Must Kill.Christopher Howard - 2021 - Ethics 131 (4):727-753.details
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Rationality and Success.Preston Greene - 2013 - Dissertation, Rutgers University - New Brunswickdetails
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The consequentialist problem with prepunishment.Preston Greene - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):199-208.details
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Mental action.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741.details
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All Reasons are Fundamentally for Attitudes.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (2).details
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Surprising Suspensions: The Epistemic Value of Being Ignorant.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Dissertation, Rutgers University - New Brunswickdetails
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Computable Rationality, NUTS, and the Nuclear Leviathan.S. M. Amadae - 2018 - In Daniel Bessner & Nicolas Guilhot (eds.), The Decisionist Imagination: Democracy, Sovereignty and Social Science in the 20th Century.details
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Intentions, Intending, and Belief: Noninferential Weak Cognitivism.Philip Clark - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):308-327.details
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Entitlement to Reasons for Action.Abraham Roth - 2017 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 75-92.details
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Review of Arif Ahmed (ed.), Newcomb's Problem. [REVIEW]Jack Spencer - 2019 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2019.details
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Evidentialism doesn’t make an exception for belief.Keshav Singh - 2021 - Synthese 198 (6):5477-5494.details
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Newcomb’s Problem, Arif Ahmed (editor). Cambridge University Press, 2018, 233 pages. [REVIEW]J. Dmitri Gallow - 2020 - Economics and Philosophy 36 (1):171-176.details
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I'll Bet You Think This Blame Is About You.Pamela Hieronymi - 2019 - In D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini (eds.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 5: Themes From the Philosophy of Gary Watson. Oxford University Press. pp. 60–87.details
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Reasoning First.Pamela Hieronymi - 2020 - In Ruth Chang & Kurt Sylvan (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 349–365.details
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On fundamental responsibility.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):198-213.details
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So why can’t you intend to drink the toxin?Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (3):294-311.details
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Decision Theory.Johanna Thoma - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 57-106.details
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Why Play the Notes? Indirect Aesthetic Normativity in Performance.Guy Rohrbaugh - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):78-91.details
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Games and the art of agency.C. Thi Nguyen - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (4):423-462.details
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An Instrumentalist Account of How to Weigh Epistemic and Practical Reasons for Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1071-1094.details
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Rationally determinable conditions.Ram Neta - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):289-299.details
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Epistemic freedom revisited.Gregory Antill - 2020 - Synthese 197 (2):793-815.details
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Learning and Value Change.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19:1--22.details
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Reasons and Rationality: The Case of Group Agents.Lara Buchak & Philip Pettit - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Andrew Evan Reisner (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: Themes From the Philosophy of John Broome. New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Intending, believing, and supposing at will.Joshua Shepherd - 2018 - Ratio 31 (3):321-330.details
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Rationality as the Rule of Reason.Antti Kauppinen - 2019 - Noûs 55 (3):538-559.details
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How Many Accounts of Act Individuation Are There?Joseph Ulatowski - 2008 - Dissertation, University of Utahdetails
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Does Ought Imply Ought Ought?Daniel Immerman - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (273):702-716.details
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Rationality and Moral Risk: A Moderate Defense of Hedging.Christian Tarsney - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Marylanddetails
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Maximalism and Moral Harmony.Douglas W. Portmore - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):318-341.details
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