Approaches to explanation -- Causal and explanatory relevance -- The kairetic account of /D making -- The kairetic account of explanation -- Extending the kairetic account -- Event explanation and causal claims -- Regularity explanation -- Abstraction in regularity explanation -- Approaches to probabilistic explanation -- Kairetic explanation of frequencies -- Kairetic explanation of single outcomes -- Looking outward -- Looking inward.

A Physicalist Manifesto is a full treatment of the comprehensive physicalist view that, in some important sense, everything is physical. Andrew Melnyk argues that the view is best formulated by appeal to a carefully worked-out notion of realization, rather than supervenience; that, so formulated, physicalism must be importantly reductionist; that it need not repudiate causal and explanatory claims framed in non-physical language; and that it has the a posteriori epistemic status of a broad-scope scientific hypothesis. Two concluding chapters argue in (...) detail that contemporary science provides no significant empirical evidence against physicalism and some considerable evidence for it. Written in a brisk, candid and exceptionally clear style, this 2003 book should appeal to professionals and students in philosophy of mind, metaphysics and philosophy of science. (shrink)

This paper looks at emergence in physical theories and argues that an appropriate way to understand socalled “emergent protectorates” is via the explanatory apparatus of the renormalization group. It is argued that mathematical singularities play a crucial role in our understanding of at least some well-defined emergent features of the world.

Thermodynamics and Statistical Mechanics are related to one another through the so-called "thermodynamic limit'' in which, roughly speaking the number of particles becomes infinite. At critical points (places of physical discontinuity) this limit fails to be regular. As a result, the "reduction'' of Thermodynamics to Statistical Mechanics fails to hold at such critical phases. This fact is key to understanding an argument due to Craig Callender to the effect that the thermodynamic limit leads to mistakes in Statistical Mechanics. I discuss (...) this argument and argue that the conclusion is misguided. In addition, I discuss an analogous example where a genuine physical discontinuity---the breaking of drops---requires the use of infinite idealizations. (shrink)

Phase transitions are well-understood phenomena in thermodynamics (TD), but it turns out that they are mathematically impossible in finite SM systems. Hence, phase transitions are truly emergent properties. They appear again at the thermodynamic limit (TL), i.e., in infinite systems. However, most, if not all, systems in which they occur are finite, so whence comes the justification for taking TL? The problem is then traced back to the TD characterization of phase transitions, and it turns out that the characterization is (...) the result of serious idealizations which under suitable circumstances approximate actual conditions. (shrink)

Are the generalizations of classical equilibrium thermodynamics true of self-gravitating systems? This question has not been addressed from a foundational perspective, but here I tackle it through a study of the “paradoxes” commonly said to afflict such systems. My goals are twofold: (a) to show that the “paradoxes” raise many questions rarely discussed in the philosophical foundations literature, and (b) to counter the idea that these “paradoxes” spell the end for gravitational equilibrium thermodynamics.

This is a companion to another paper. Together they rebut two widespread philosophical doctrines about emergence. The first, and main, doctrine is that emergence is incompatible with reduction. The second is that emergence is supervenience; or more exactly, supervenience without reduction.In the other paper, I develop these rebuttals in general terms, emphasising the second rebuttal. Here I discuss the situation in physics, emphasising the first rebuttal. I focus on limiting relations between theories and illustrate my claims with four examples, each (...) of them a model or a framework for modelling, from well-established mathematics or physics.I take emergence as behaviour that is novel and robust relative to some comparison class. I take reduction as, essentially, deduction. The main idea of my first rebuttal will be to perform the deduction after taking a limit of some parameter. Thus my first main claim will be that in my four examples (and many others), we can deduce a novel and robust behaviour, by taking the limit N→∞ of a parameter N.But on the other hand, this does not show that the N=∞ limit is “physically real”, as some authors have alleged. For my second main claim is that in these same examples, there is a weaker, yet still vivid, novel and robust behaviour that occurs before we get to the limit, i.e. for finite N. And it is this weaker behaviour which is physically real.My examples are: the method of arbitrary functions (in probability theory); fractals (in geometry); superselection for infinite systems (in quantum theory); and phase transitions for infinite systems (in statistical mechanics). (shrink)

The renormalization method is specifically aimed at connecting theories describing physical processes at different length scales and thereby connecting different theories in the physical sciences.The renormalization method used today is the outgrowth of 150 years of scientific study of thermal physics and phase transitions. Different phases of matter show qualitatively different behaviors separated by abrupt phase transitions. These qualitative differences seem to be present in experimentally observed condensed-matter systems. However, the “extended singularity theorem” in statistical mechanics shows that sharp changes (...) can only occur in infinitely large systems. Abrupt changes from one phase to another are signaled by fluctuations that show correlation over infinitely long distances, and are measured by correlation functions that show algebraic decay as well as various kinds of singularities and infinities in thermodynamic derivatives and in measured system parameters.Renormalization methods were first developed in field theory to get around difficulties caused by apparent divergences at both small and large scales. However, no renormalization gives a fully satisfactory formulation of field theory.The renormalization group theory of phase transitions was put together by Kenneth G. Wilson in 1971 based upon ideas of scaling and universality developed earlier in the context of phase transitions and of couplings dependent upon spatial scale coming from field theory. Correlations among regions with fluctuations in their order underlie renormalization ideas. Wilson's theory is the first approach to phase transitions to agree with the extended singularity theorem.Some of the history of the study of these correlations and singularities is recounted, along with the history of renormalization and related concepts of scaling and universality. Applications, particularly to condensed-matter physics and particle physics, are summarized.This note is partially a summary of a talk given at the workshop “Part and Whole” in Leiden during the period March 22–26, 2010. (shrink)