New research findings of the development and organization of the mind, brain, and behavior bolster the ongoing relational- or intersubjective-field paradigmatic revision of psychoanalytic theory. A multisystems view of learning, memory, and knowledge provide us with a more complex picture of information processing that has fundamental implications for a psychoanalytic theory of therapeutic action. If the implicit and explicit learning/memory systems are viewed as parallel processes, not easily translatable from one to the other, then new implicit relational experience carries considerably (...) more power as compared to explicit/declarative processing in changing and establishing new implicit mental models. When these cognitive processing systems are viewed as more closely interconnected with a developmental emphasis on connecting them through language, then exploratory/interpretive work becomes more central. REM, dream, infant, and cognitive research evidence suggests that imagistic symbolic capacity exists at birth. Learning and remembering using imagistic symbolic processing could suggest a more easily translatable connection with later developed verbal symbolic processing and a closer, although varied, interconnection between implicit and explicit (symbolic) memory systems. Explicit attitudes are more directly modifiable through an explicit/declarative focus. Implicit mental models, it is proposed, are variably modifiable through two different change processes: (1) accommodation or transformation of expectancies through new implicit procedural experience (not requiring explicit focus) and (2) diminished activation and increased capacity to deactivate implicit mental models through explicit/declarative processing and the establishment of contrasting implicit models through new implicit procedural experience. (shrink)

The topic of multiple forms of memory is considered from a biological point of view. Fact-and-event (declarative, explicit) memory is contrasted with a collection of non conscious (non-declarative, implicit) memory abilities including skills and habits, priming, and simple conditioning. Recent evidence is reviewed indicating that declarative and non declarative forms of memory have different operating characteristics and depend on separate brain systems. A brain-systems framework for understanding memory phenomena is developed in light of lesion studies involving rats, monkeys, and humans, (...) as well as recent studies with normal humans using the divided visual field technique, event-related potentials, and positron emission tomography (PET). (shrink)

The neuroscientific understanding of memory centers on issues related to the unconscious mind. Research findings support the analytic idea that unconscious material can affect conscious functioning. However, neuroscience explains this phenomena differently from psychoanalysis. The ideas of neuroscience are compatible with the analytic approach, but do challenge analysts to broaden their thinking on this subject. Information flows through the memory system in a series of stages (iconic memory, working memory, and long-term memory). Long term memory is then divided into explicit (...) and implicit memory. The brain structures involved in explicit memory and influences on the encoding and retrieval of explicit memory are outlined. Explicit memory is seen as a reconstructive process. Priming, procedural memory, and emotional memory are discussed. Clinical implications for psychoanalysis are presented. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

The first part of this paper discusses the development of Freud's views on memory from the time of the Project up to the formulation of the second topography. Freud's attempts to match his psychological views with an organic model were necessarily inconclusive, but in the process many innovative ideas about memory can be seen to resonate with recent developments in cognitive neuroscience. A brief discussion of perceptual identity, internal perception and Freud's affect theory introduce the central theoretical idea in the (...) second half of the paper, namely that Identification can be seen as a form of memory. Modern memory theory is linked with the superego, following which the author proposes that internal objects might be renamed ‘memory-objects’ and that these can be understood in terms of the distinction made in cognitive neuroscience between implicit and explicit memory and between different parts of the brain, in particular the amygdala, the basal ganglia and the hippocampus. Klein's ‘memory in feeling’ and the views of Fairbairn and Ogden in relation to the dynamic nature of internal objects are briefly discussed. The paper ends with a few comments on the aberrations of memory and some implications of the implicit memory-object system. (shrink)