Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Conceptual Similarity across Sensory and Neural Diversity: The Fodor/Lepore Challenge Answered.Paul M. Churchland - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):5.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • (1 other version)On the persistence of phenomenology.Diana Raffman - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 293--308.
    In Thomas Metzinger, Conscious Experience, Schoningh Verlag. 1995. [ online ].
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Multistable phenomena: Changing views in perception.David A. Leopold & Nikos K. Logothetis - 1999 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3 (7):254-264.
    Traditional explanations of multistable visual phenomena (e.g. ambiguous figures, perceptual rivalry) suggest that the basis for spontaneous reversals in perception lies in antagonistic connectivity within the visual system. In this review, we suggest an alternative, albeit speculative, explanation for visual multistability – that spontaneous alternations reflect responses to active, programmed events initiated by brain areas that integrate sensory and non-sensory information to coordinate a diversity of behaviors. Much evidence suggests that perceptual reversals are themselves more closely related to the expression (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   75 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Phenomenal states.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   352 citations  
  • Phenomenal consciousness: The explanatory gap as a cognitive illusion.Michael Tye - 1999 - Mind 108 (432):705-25.
    The thesis that there is a troublesome explanatory gap between the phenomenal aspects of experiences and the underlying physical and functional states is given a number of different interpretations. It is shown that, on each of these interpretations, the thesis is false. In supposing otherwise, philosophers have fallen prey to a cognitive illusion, induced largely by a failure to recognize the special character of phenomenal concepts.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   80 citations  
  • (1 other version)The subjectivity of subjective experience: A representationalist analysis of the first-person perspective.Thomas Metzinger - 2004 - Networks:285--306.
    Before one can even begin to model consciousness and what exactly it means that it is a subjective phenomenon one needs a theory about what a first-person perspective really is. This theory has to be conceptually convincing, empirically plausible and, most of all, open to new developments. The chosen conceptual framework must be able to accommodate scientific progress. Its ba- sic assumptions have to be plastic as it were, so that new details and empirical data can continuously be fed into (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Language, Music, and Mind.Stephen Davies - 1993 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52 (3):360-362.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Sensational sentences.Georges Rey - 1993 - In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • (1 other version)Consciousness, color, and content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233-235.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   519 citations  
  • (1 other version)On the persistence of phenomenology.Diana Raffman - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 293–308.
    In Thomas Metzinger, Conscious Experience, Schoningh Verlag. 1995. [ online ].
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   91 citations  
  • What is the "subjectivity" of the mental?William G. Lycan - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:229-238.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  • Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2000 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
    A further development of Tye's theory of phenomenal consciousness along with replies to common objections.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   389 citations  
  • Neurocomputational Perspective.P. M. Churchland - 1993 - Behavior and Philosophy 20 (2):75-88.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   124 citations  
  • Oscillatory gamma activity in humans and its role in object representation.C. Tallon-Baudry & O. Bertrand - 1999 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):151-162.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   77 citations  
  • Two kinds of consciousness.Tyler Burge - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  • Some reductive strategies in cognitive neurobiology.Paul M. Churchland - 1986 - Mind 95 (July):279-309.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   90 citations  
  • Multistable phenomena: Changing views in perception.N. K. Logothetis D. A. Leopold - 1999 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3:254-264.
    Traditional explanations of multistable visual phenomena (e.g. ambiguous figures, perceptual rivalry) suggest that the basis for spontaneous reversals in perception lies in antagonistic connectivity within the visual system. In this review, we suggest an alternative, albeit speculative. explanation for visual multistability - that spontaneous alternations reflect responses to active, programmed events initiated by brain areas that integrate sensory and non-sensory information to coordinate a diversity of behaviors. Much evidence suggests that perceptual reversals are themselves more closely related to the expression (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • What is the "Subjectivity" of the Mental.William G. Lycan - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:109-130.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   64 citations  
  • (1 other version)Inverted Earth, Swampman, and Representationism.Michael Tye - 1998 - Noûs 32 (S12):459-477.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Color adaptation under conditions of homogeneous visual stimulation (Ganzfeld).Julian E. Hochberg, William Triebel & Gideon Seaman - 1951 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 41 (2):153.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • (1 other version)Consciousness, Color and Content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):619-621.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   424 citations