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Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (11-12):270-302 (2015)

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  1. Multiple Realizability.John Bickle - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • What Does It Mean to Have an Open MIND?Thomas Metzinger & Jennifer Windt - 2015 - Open MIND.
    We decided to use our editors’ introduction to briefly address a difficult, somewhat deeper, and in some ways more classical problem: that of what genuine open mindedness really is and how it can contribute to the Mind Sciences. The material in the collection speaks for itself. Here, and in contrast to the vast collection that is Open MIND, we want to be concise. We want to point to the broader context of a particular way of thinking about the mind. And (...)
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  • Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience.Max R. Bennett & P. M. S. Hacker - 2006 - Behavior and Philosophy 34:71-87.
    The book "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience" is an engaging criticism of cognitive neuroscience from the perspective of a Wittgensteinian philosophy of ordinary language. The authors' main claim is that assertions like "the brain sees" and "the left hemisphere thinks" are integral to cognitive neuroscience but that they are meaningless because they commit the mereological fallacy—ascribing to parts of humans, properties that make sense to predicate only of whole humans. The authors claim that this fallacy is at the heart of Cartesian (...)
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  • Measuring Consciousness in Dreams: The Lucidity and Consciousness in Dreams Scale.Ursula Voss, Karin Schermelleh-Engel, Jennifer Windt, Clemens Frenzel & Allan Hobson - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):8-21.
    In this article, we present results from an interdisciplinary research project aimed at assessing consciousness in dreams. For this purpose, we compared lucid dreams with normal non-lucid dreams from REM sleep. Both lucid and non-lucid dreams are an important contrast condition for theories of waking consciousness, giving valuable insights into the structure of conscious experience and its neural correlates during sleep. However, the precise differences between lucid and non-lucid dreams remain poorly understood. The construction of the Lucidity and Consciousness in (...)
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  • What is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness?David J. Chalmers - 2000 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 17--39.
    The search for neural correlates of consciousness (or NCCs) is arguably the cornerstone in the recent resurgence of the science of consciousness. The search poses many difficult empirical problems, but it seems to be tractable in principle, and some ingenious studies in recent years have led to considerable progress. A number of proposals have been put forward concerning the nature and location of neural correlates of consciousness. A few of these include.
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  • Why Are Dreams Interesting for Philosophers? The Example of Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood, Plus an Agenda for Future Research.Thomas Metzinger - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4:746.
    This metatheoretical paper develops a list of new research targets by exploring particularly promising interdisciplinary contact points between empirical dream research and philosophy of mind. The central example is the MPS-problem. It is constituted by the epistemic goal of conceptually isolating and empirically grounding the phenomenal property of “minimal phenomenal selfhood,” which refers to the simplest form of self-consciousness. In order to precisely describe MPS, one must focus on those conditions that are not only causally enabling, but strictly necessary to (...)
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  • Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action, and the Embodied Mind.Andy Clark - 2016 - Oxford University Press USA.
    How is it that thoroughly physical material beings such as ourselves can think, dream, feel, create and understand ideas, theories and concepts? How does mere matter give rise to all these non-material mental states, including consciousness itself? An answer to this central question of our existence is emerging at the busy intersection of neuroscience, psychology, artificial intelligence, and robotics.In this groundbreaking work, philosopher and cognitive scientist Andy Clark explores exciting new theories from these fields that reveal minds like ours to (...)
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  • Full-Body Illusions and Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood.Olaf Blanke & Thomas Metzinger - 2009 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):7-13.
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  • Precis: Being No-One.Thomas Metzinger - 2005 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 11:1-30.
    This is a short sketch of some central ideas developed in my recent book _Being No One_ (BNO hereafter). A more systematic summary, which focuses on short answers to a set of specific, individual questions is already contained _in _the book, namely as BNO section 8.2. Here, I deliberately and completely exclude all work related to semantically differentiating and empirically constraining the philosophical concept of a "quale" (mostly Chapter 2, 3 & 8), all proposals regarding conceptual foundations for the overall (...)
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  • Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. DENNETT - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.
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  • Minimal Self-Models and the Free Energy Principle.Jakub Limanowski & Felix Blankenburg - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.
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  • A Review of Mentation in Rem and NRem Sleep: “Covert” Rem Sleep as a Possible Reconciliation of Two Opposing Models. [REVIEW]Tore A. Nielsen - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):851-866.
    Numerous studies have replicated the finding of mentation in both rapid eye movement (REM) and nonrapid eye movement (NREM) sleep. However, two different theoretical models have been proposed to account for this finding: (1) a one-generator model, in which mentation is generated by a single set of processes regardless of physiological differences between REM and NREM sleep; and (2) a two-generator model, in which qualitatively different generators produce cognitive activity in the two states. First, research is reviewed demonstrating conclusively that (...)
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  • Phenomenal Transparency and Cognitive Self-Reference.Thomas Metzinger - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):353-393.
    A representationalist analysis of strong first-person phenomena is developed (Baker 1998), and it is argued that conscious, cognitive self-reference can be naturalized under this representationalist analysis. According to this view, the phenomenal first-person perspective is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a cognitive first-person perspective. Cognitive self-reference always is reference to the phenomenal content of a transparent self-model. The concepts of phenomenal transparency and introspection are clarified. More generally, I suggest that the concepts of phenomenal opacity and phenomenal (...)
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  • Mind-Blanking: When the Mind Goes Away.Adrian F. Ward & Daniel M. Wegner - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4.
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  • Self-Projection and the Brain.Randy L. Buckner & Daniel C. Carroll - 2007 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):49-57.
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  • Meta-Awareness, Perceptual Decoupling and the Wandering Mind.Jonathan W. Schooler, Jonathan Smallwood, Kalina Christoff, Todd C. Handy, Erik D. Reichle & Michael A. Sayette - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (7):319-326.
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  • The Uses and Abuses of the Personal/Subpersonal Distinction.Zoe Drayson - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):1-18.
    In this paper, I claim that the personal/subpersonal distinction is first and foremost a distinction between two kinds of psychological theory or explanation: it is only in this form that we can understand why the distinction was first introduced, and how it continues to earn its keep. I go on to examine the different ontological commitments that might lead us from the primary distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations to a derivative distinction between personal and subpersonal states. I argue that (...)
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  • Focused Daydreaming and Mind-Wandering.Fabian Dorsch - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):791-813.
    In this paper, I describe and discuss two mental phenomena which are somewhat neglected in the philosophy of mind: focused daydreaming and mind-wandering. My aim is to show that their natures are rather distinct, despite the fact that we tend to classify both as instances of daydreaming. The first difference between the two, I argue, is that, while focused daydreaming is an instance of imaginative mental agency, mind-wandering is not—though this does not mean that mind-wandering cannot involve mental agency at (...)
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  • Excessive Daydreaming: A Case History and Discussion of Mind Wandering and High Fantasy Proneness.Cynthia Schupak & Jesse Rosenthal - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):290-292.
    This case study describes a patient presenting with a long history of excessive daydreaming which has caused her distress but is not incident to any other apparent clinical psychiatric disorders. We have treated this patient for over 10 years, and she has responded favorably to fluvoxamine therapy, stating that it helps to control her daydreaming. Our patient, and other psychotherpists, have brought to our attention other possible cases of excessive daydreaming. We examine the available literature regarding daydreaming, mind wandering, and (...)
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  • The Illusion of Conscious Will.Daniel M. Wegner - 2002 - MIT Press.
    In this book Daniel Wegner offers a novel understanding of the relation of consciousness, the will, and our intentional and voluntary actions. Wegner claims that our experience and common sense view according to which we can influence our behavior roughly the way we experience that we do it is an illusion.
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  • Compulsive Fantasy: Proposed Evidence of an Under-Reported Syndrome Through a Systematic Study of 90 Self-Identified Non-Normative Fantasizers.Jayne Bigelsen & Cynthia Schupak - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1634-1648.
    The experiences of 90 individuals who self-identify as “excessive” or “maladaptive” fantasizers are summarized in this report. Our sample consisted of 75 female and 15 male participants, ranging in age from 18 to 63 who responded to online announcements. Participants completed a 14-question emailed survey requesting descriptions of their fantasy habits and causes of potential distress regarding fantasy. Results demonstrated that participants shared a number of remarkably specific behaviors and concerns regarding their engagement in extensive periods of highly-structured, immersive imaginative (...)
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  • Conscious Experience.Thomas Metzinger (ed.) - 1995 - Ferdinand Schoningh.
    The contributions to this book are original articles, representing a cross-section of current philosophical work on consciousness and thereby allowing students and readers from other disciplines to acquaint themselves with the very latest debate, so that they can then pursue their own research interests more effectively. The volume includes a bibliography on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science and brain research, covering the last 25 years and consisting of over 1000 entries in 18 thematic sections, compiled by David Chalmers and Thomas (...)
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  • Empirical Perspectives From the Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity: A Brief Summary with Examples.Thomas Metzinger - 2008 - In Rahul Banerjee & B. K. Chakrabarti (eds.), Models of Brain and Mind: Physical, Computational, and Psychological Approaches. Elsevier.
    In Rahul Banerjee and Bikas K. Chakrabarti (eds.), Progress in Brain Research, 168: 215-246. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Electronic offprint available upon request.
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  • Cognitive Phenomenology.Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Does thought have distinctive experiential features? Is there, in addition to sensory phenomenology, a kind of cognitive phenomenology--phenomenology of a cognitive or conceptual character? Leading philosophers of mind debate whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology and whether it is part of conscious perception and conscious emotion.
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  • Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity.Thomas Metzinger - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):369-372.
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  • The Illusion of Conscious Will.Daniel Wegner - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):218-221.
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  • Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience.M. R. Bennett & P. M. S. Hacker - 2004 - Philosophy 79 (307):141-146.
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  • The Centered Mind: What the Science of Working Memory Shows Us About the Nature of Human Thought.Peter Carruthers - 2015 - Oxford University Press UK.
    The Centered Mind offers a new view of the nature and causal determinants of both reflective thinking and, more generally, the stream of consciousness. Peter Carruthers argues that conscious thought is always sensory-based, relying on the resources of the working-memory system. This system enables sensory images to be sustained and manipulated through attentional signals directed at midlevel sensory areas of the brain. When abstract conceptual representations are bound into these images, we consciously experience ourselves as making judgments or arriving at (...)
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  • Dreaming: A Conceptual Framework for Philosophy of Mind and Empirical Research.Jennifer Windt - unknown
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  • The Predictive Mind.Jakob Hohwy - 2013 - Oxford University Press UK.
    A new theory is taking hold in neuroscience. It is the theory that the brain is essentially a hypothesis-testing mechanism, one that attempts to minimise the error of its predictions about the sensory input it receives from the world. It is an attractive theory because powerful theoretical arguments support it, and yet it is at heart stunningly simple. Jakob Hohwy explains and explores this theory from the perspective of cognitive science and philosophy. The key argument throughout The Predictive Mind is (...)
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  • The Philosophy of Dreaming and Self-Consciousness: What Happens to the Experiential Subject During the Dream State?Jennifer Michelle Windt & Thomas Metzinger - 2007 - In Deirdre Barrett & Patrick McNamara (eds.), The New Science of Dreaming Vol 3: Cultural and Theoretical Perspectives. Praeger Publishers/Greenwood Publishing Group. pp. 193-247.
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  • Self-Deception and the Dolphin Model of Cognition.Iuliia Pliushch & Thomas Metzinger - 2015 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness. MIT Press.
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  • Self Models.Thomas Metzinger - 2007 - Scholarpedia.
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