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  1. Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-Induced Ego Dissolution.Raphaël Millière - 2017 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 11:1-22.
    There is converging evidence that high doses of hallucinogenic drugs can produce significant alterations of self-experience, described as the dissolution of the sense of self and the loss of boundaries between self and world. This article discusses the relevance of this phenomenon, known as “drug-induced ego dissolution (DIED)”, for cognitive neuroscience, psychology and philosophy of mind. Data from self-report questionnaires suggest that three neuropharmacological classes of drugs can induce ego dissolution: classical psychedelics, dissociative anesthetics and agonists of the kappa opioid (...)
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  • Cotard Syndrome, Self-Awareness, and I-Concepts.Rocco Joseph Gennaro - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (1):1-20.
    Various psychopathologies of self-awareness, such as somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion in schizophrenia, might seem to threaten the viability of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness since it requires a HOT about one’s own mental state to accompany every conscious state. The HOT theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state a conscious mental state is that there is a HOT to the effect that “I am in mental state M.” I have argued in previous work that a (...)
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  • Perspectival Self-Consciousness and Ego-Dissolution.Miguel Angel Sebastian - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-27.
    It is often claimed that a minimal form of self-awareness is constitutive of our conscious experience. Some have considered that such a claim is plausible for our ordinary experiences but false when considered unrestrictedly on the basis of the empirical evidence from altered states. In this paper I want to reject such a reasoning. This requires, first, a proper understanding of a minimal form of self-awareness – one that makes it plausible that minimal self-awareness is part of our ordinary experiences. (...)
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  • Attenuating Oneself.Jakub Limanowski & Karl Friston - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-16.
    In this paper, we address reports of “selfless” experiences from the perspective of active inference and predictive processing. Our argument builds upon grounding self-modelling in active inference as action planning and precision control within deep generative models – thus establishing a link between computational mechanisms and phenomenal selfhood. We propose that “selfless” experiences can be interpreted as cases in which normally congruent processes of computational and phenomenal self-modelling diverge in an otherwise conscious system. We discuss two potential mechanisms – within (...)
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  • The Experience of Being Oneself in Memory: Exploring Sense of Identity via Observer Memory.Ying-Tung Lin - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (2):405-422.
    Every episodic memory entails a sense of identity, which allows us to mentally travel through time. There is a special way by which the subject who is remembering comes into contact with the self that is embedded in the episodic simulation of memory: we can directly and robustly experience the protagonist in memory as ourselves. This paper explores what constitutes such experience in memory. On the face of it, the issue may seem trivial: of course, we are able to entertain (...)
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  • The Myth of Cognitive Agency: Subpersonal Thinking as a Cyclically Recurring Loss of Mental Autonomy.Thomas Metzinger - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4:931.
    This metatheoretical paper investigates mind wandering from the perspective of philosophy of mind. It has two central claims. The first is that, on a conceptual level, mind wandering can be fruitfully described as a specific form of mental autonomy loss. The second is that, given empirical constraints, most of what we call “conscious thought” is better analyzed as a subpersonal process that more often than not lacks crucial properties traditionally taken to be the hallmark of personal-level cognition - such as (...)
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  • M-Autonomy.Thomas Metzinger - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (11-12):270-302.
    What we traditionally call ‘conscious thought’ actually is a subpersonal process, and only rarely a form of mental action. The paradigmatic, standard form of conscious thought is non-agentive, because it lacks veto-control and involves an unnoticed loss of epistemic agency and goal-directed causal self-determination at the level of mental content. Conceptually, it must be described as an unintentional form of inner behaviour. Empirical research shows that we are not mentally autonomous subjects for about two thirds of our conscious lifetime, because (...)
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  • Mind-Wandering is Unguided Attention: Accounting for the “Purposeful” Wanderer.Zachary Irving - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):547-571.
    Although mind-wandering occupies up to half of our waking thoughts, it is seldom discussed in philosophy. My paper brings these neglected thoughts into focus. I propose that mind-wandering is unguided attention. Guidance in my sense concerns how attention is monitored and regulated as it unfolds over time. Roughly speaking, someone’s attention is guided if she would feel pulled back, were she distracted from her current focus. Because our wandering thoughts drift unchecked from topic to topic, they are unguided. One motivation (...)
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  • Visual Perspectives in Episodic Memory and the Sense of Self.Ying-Tung Lin - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  • On the Hierarchical Organization of Oscillatory Assemblies: Layered Superimposition and a Global Bioelectric Framework.Ravinder Jerath, Connor Beveridge & Michael Jensen - 2019 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 13.
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  • I'm Thinking Your Thoughts While I Sleep: Sense of Agency and Ownership Over Dream Thought.Melanie Rosen - 2015 - Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 2 (3):326-339.
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  • Psychedelics, Meditation, and Self-Consciousness.Raphaël Millière, Robin L. Carhart-Harris, Leor Roseman, Fynn-Mathis Trautwein & Aviva Berkovich-Ohana - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    In recent years, the scientific study of meditation and psychedelic drugs has seen remarkable developments. The increased focus on meditation in cognitive neuroscience has led to a cross-cultural classification of standard meditation styles validated by functional and structural neuroanatomical data. Meanwhile, the renaissance of psychedelic research has shed light on the neurophysiology of altered states of consciousness induced by classical psychedelics, such as psilocybin and LSD, whose effects are mainly mediated by agonism of serotonin receptors. Few attempts have been made (...)
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  • Real Virtuality: A Code of Ethical Conduct. Recommendations for Good Scientific Practice and the Consumers of VR-Technology.Michael Madary & Thomas Metzinger - 2016 - Frontiers in Robotics and AI 3:1-23.
    The goal of this article is to present a first list of ethical concerns that may arise from research and personal use of virtual reality (VR) and related technology, and to offer concrete recommendations for minimizing those risks. Many of the recommendations call for focused research initiatives. In the first part of the article, we discuss the relevant evidence from psychology that motivates our concerns. In Section “Plasticity in the Human Mind,” we cover some of the main results suggesting that (...)
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  • Dreaming and Neuroesthetics.Umberto Barcaro & Marco Paoli - 2015 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
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  • What Can Body Ownership Illusions Tell Us About Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood?Jakub Limanowski - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
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  • Tickle Me, I Think I Might Be Dreaming! Sensory Attenuation, Self-Other Distinction, and Predictive Processing in Lucid Dreams.Jennifer M. Windt, Dominic L. Harkness & Bigna Lenggenhager - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
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  • ‘Seeing the Dark’: Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference.Jakub Limanowski & Karl Friston - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  • Commentary: The Concept of a Bewusstseinskultur.Sascha Benjamin Fink - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    Thomas Metzinger has diagnosed the need for a Bewusstseinskultur, a ‘consciousness culture’: a culturally implemented way in which a society as a whole engages with the dawning natural science of consciousness, with phenomenal experiences themselves, and with our increasing capability to manipulate them. A Bewusstseinskultur is an achievement, built by a society-wide orientation on empirical evidence, thorough scientific theorizing and rational deliberation. It affects a broad range of issues from animal ethics, drug policy, end-of-life-care, and robo-ethics to post-humanism. However, this (...)
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  • Leibnizin pienet havainnot ja tunteiden muodostuminen.Markku Roinila - 2018 - Havainto.
    Keskityn siihen miten Leibnizilla yksittäiset mielihyvän tai mielipahan tiedostamattomat havainnot voivat kasautua tai tiivistyä ja muodostaa vähitellen tunteita, joista tulemme tietoisiksi.
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  • Enactive or Inactive? Cranially Envatted Dream Experience and the Extended Conscious Mind.M. G. Rosen - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):295-318.
    When we dream, it is often assumed, we are isolated from the external environment. It is also commonly believed that dreams can be, at times, accurate, convincing replicas of waking experience. Here I analyse some of the implications of this view for an enactive theory of conscious experience. If dreams are, as described by the received view, “inactive”, or “cranially envatted” whilst replicating the experience of being awake, this would be problematic for certain extended conscious mind theories. Focusing specifically on (...)
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  • A Template Model of Embodiment While Dreaming: Proposal of a Mini-Me.Judith Koppehele-Gossel, Ansgar Klimke, Karin Schermelleh-Engel & Ursula Voss - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 46:148-162.
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  • Phenomenal Consciousness, Access Consciousness and Self Across Waking and Dreaming: Bridging Phenomenology and Neuroscience.Martina Pantani, Angela Tagini & Antonino Raffone - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (1):175-197.
    The distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness is central to debates about consciousness and its neural correlates. However, this distinction has often been limited to the domain of perceptual experiences. On the basis of dream phenomenology and neuroscientific findings this paper suggests a theoretical framework which extends this distinction to dreaming, also in terms of plausible neural correlates. In this framework, phenomenal consciousness is involved in both waking perception and dreaming, whereas access consciousness is weakened, but not fully eliminated, during (...)
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