This contains an extended and wide ranging bibliography, beginning with the seventeenth century, of works relevant to the problem of miracles and Hume’s essay. It is especially useful for the problem in its historical setting.

A preliminary study of how God intervenes in nature and human affairs.

An examination of the principles advanced by David Hume, Esq., in An Essay on Miracles; with a correspondence on the subject by Mr Hume, Dr. Campbell, and Dr. Blair. To which are added sermons and tracts. In 1763 Campbell published A Dissertation on Miracles which was intended as a demolition of Hume’s essay On miracles.

1. Causal knowledge is an indispensable element in science. Causal assertions are embedded in both the results and the procedures of scientific investigation. 2. It is therefore worthwhile to investigate the meaning of causal statements and the ways in which we can arrive at causal knowledge.

The centrepiece of Earman’s provocatively titled book Hume’s Abject Failure: The Argument against Miracles is a probabilistic interpretation of Hume’s famous ‘maxim’ concerning the credibility of miracle reports, followed by a trenchant critique of the maxim when thus interpreted. He argues that the first part of this maxim, once its obscurity is removed, is simply trivial, while the second part is nonsensical. His subsequent discussion culminates with a forthright challenge to any would-be defender of Hume to ‘point to some thesis (...) which is both philosophically interesting and which Hume has made plausible’. My main aim here is to answer this challenge, by demonstrating a preferable interpretation of Hume’s maxim, according to which its first half is both plausible and non-trivial, while its second half sketches a useful, albeit approximate, corollary. I conclude by contesting Earman’s negative views on the originality and philosophical significance of Hume’s justly famous essay. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the Bayesian analysis of miracles. It is set in the context of the eighteenth-century debate on miracles. The discussion is focused on the probable response of Thomas Bayes to David Hume's celebrated argument against miracles. The chapter presents the claim that the criticisms Richard Price made against Hume's argument against miracles were largely solid.