Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truth which are synthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience. Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill founded. One effect of abandoning them is, as (...) we shall see, a blurring of the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science. Another effect is a shift toward pragmatism. (shrink)

This book, one of the first full-length studies of the modalities to emerge from the debate to which Saul Kripke, David Lewis, Ruth Marcus, and others are contributing, is an exploration and defense of the notion of modality de re, the idea that objects have both essential and accidental properties. Plantinga develops his argument by means of the notion of possible worlds and ranges over such key problems as the nature of essence, transworld identity, negative existential propositions, and the existence (...) of unactual objects in other possible worlds. He also applies his logical theories to the elucidation of two problems in the philosophy of religion: the problem of evil and the ontological argument. (shrink)

are synthetic a priori judgements possible?" In both cases, i~thas usually been t'aken for granted in fife one case by Kant that synthetic a priori judgements were possible, and in the other case in contemporary,'d-". philosophical literature that contingent statements of identity are ppss. ible. I do not intend to deal with the Kantian question except to mention:ssj~".

An objection is offered to the Frege-Russell definition, which identifies the number 1 with the set of all unit sets. It is argued here that the identity conditions for sets require that if any member of a set had not existed, the set itself would not have. Therefore, had any object whatever not existed, the unit set containing it would not have either, and thus the set with which the definition identifies 1 would not have. But then, 1 either would (...) not have existed or would have been a different entity than it is, and it is argued that neither alternative is acceptable. (shrink)

This book presents the classic relative consistency proofs in set theory that are obtained by the device of 'inner models'. Three examples of such models are investigated in Chapters VI, VII, and VIII; the most important of these, the class of constructible sets, leads to G6del's result that the axiom of choice and the continuum hypothesis are consistent with the rest of set theory [1]I. The text thus constitutes an introduction to the results of P. Cohen concerning the independence of (...) these axioms [2], and to many other relative consistency proofs obtained later by Cohen's methods. Chapters I and II introduce the axioms of set theory, and develop such parts of the theory as are indispensable for every relative consistency proof; the method of recursive definition on the ordinals being an import ant case in point. Although, more or less deliberately, no proofs have been omitted, the development here will be found to require of the reader a certain facility in naive set theory and in the axiomatic method, such e as should be achieved, for example, in first year graduate work. (shrink)