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  1. Metaphysics by Possible Cases.Frank Jackson - 1994 - The Monist 77 (1):93-110.
    We often do metaphysics by intuitions about possible cases. An example is the argument for functionalism about belief and desire. The argument starts from the premise that, intuitively, it is not possible for belief and desire to vary independently of functional nature —functional duplicates are necessarily belief-desire duplicates—and concludes that belief and desire are functional states. An equally famous example is the argument against functionalism for sensory qualities. The argument starts from the premise that, intuitively, it is possible for sensory (...)
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  • Reference and contingency.Gareth Evans - 1979 - The Monist 62 (2):161-189.
    ‘A logical theory may be tested by its capacity for dealing with puzzles, and it is a wholesome plan, in thinking about logic, to stock the mind with as many puzzles as possible, since these serve much the same purpose as is served by experiments in physical science.’ This paper is an attempt to follow Russell’s advice by using a puzzle about the contingent a priori to test and explore certain theories of reference and modality. No one could claim that (...)
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  • Armchair metaphysics.Frank Jackson - 1994 - In Murray Michael & John O'Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 23--42.
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  • The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
    What is the Moral Problem? NORMATIVE ETHICS VS. META-ETHICS It is a common fact of everyday life that we appraise each others' behaviour and attitudes from ...
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  • The incoherence of empiricism.George Bealer - 1992 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66 (1):99-138.
    Radical empiricism is the view that a person's experiences (sensory and introspective), or a person's observations, constitute the person's evidence. This view leads to epistemic self-defeat. There are three arguments, concerning respectively: (1) epistemic starting points; (2) epistemic norms; (3) terms of epistemic appraisal. The source of self-defeat is traced to the fact that empiricism does not count a priori intuition as evidence (where a priori intuition is not a form of belief but rather a form of seeming, specifically intellectual (...)
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  • The philosophical limits of scientific essentialism.George Bealer - 1987 - Philosophical Perspectives 1:289-365.
    Scientific essentialism is the view that some necessities can be known only with the aid of empirical science. The thesis of the paper is that scientific essentialism does not extend to the central questions of philosophy and that these questions can be answered a priori. The argument is that the evidence required for the defense of scientific essentialism is reliable only if the intuitions required by philosophy to answer its central questions is also reliable. Included is an outline of a (...)
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  • From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Frank Jackson champions the cause of conceptual analysis as central to philosophical inquiry. In recent years conceptual analysis has been undervalued and widely misunderstood, suggests Jackson. He argues that such analysis is mistakenly clouded in mystery, preventing a whole range of important questions from being productively addressed. He anchors his argument in discussions of specific philosophical issues, starting with the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism and moving on, via free will, meaning, personal identity, motion, and change, to ethics and the philosophy (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
    The book is an extended study of the problem of consciousness. After setting up the problem, I argue that reductive explanation of consciousness is impossible , and that if one takes consciousness seriously, one has to go beyond a strict materialist framework. In the second half of the book, I move toward a positive theory of consciousness with fundamental laws linking the physical and the experiential in a systematic way. Finally, I use the ideas and arguments developed earlier to defend (...)
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  • Two notions of necessity.Martin Davies & Lloyd Humberstone - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (1):1-31.
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  • (1 other version)Finding the Mind in the Natural World.Frank Jackson - 1994 - In Roberto Casati & Barry Smith (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences: Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg Am Wechsel, Austria 1993). Vienna: Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky. pp. 227-49.
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  • (1 other version)Common Sense and Physics.Michael Dummett - 1979 - In A. J. Ayer & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Perception and identity: essays presented to A. J. Ayer, with his replies. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. pp. 1-40.
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