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_Emotion as Feeling Towards Value: A Theory of Emotional Experience_, by Jonathan Mitchell [Book Review]

Jean Moritz Müller & Sabine A. Döring

Mind 133 (531):842-851 (2024)

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Response-Dependent Normative Properties and the Epistemic Account of Emotion.Jean Moritz Müller - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (3):355-364.details It is popular to hold that our primary epistemic access to specific response-dependent properties like the fearsome or admirable (or so-called ‘affective properties’) is constituted by the corresponding emotion. I argue that this view is incompatible with a widely held meta-ethical view, according to which affective properties have deontic force. More specifically, I argue that this view cannot accommodate for the requirement that deontic entities provide guidance. If affective properties are to guide the formation of the corresponding emotion, our primary (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
How (Not) to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Attitudes.Jean Moritz Müller - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):281-308.details It is popular to hold that emotions are evaluative. On the standard account, the evaluative character of emotion is understood in epistemic terms: emotions apprehend or make us aware of value properties. As this account is commonly elaborated, emotions are experiences with evaluative intentional content. In this paper, I am concerned with a recent alternative proposal on how emotions afford awareness of value. This proposal does not ascribe evaluative content to emotions, but instead conceives of them as evaluative at the (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 36 citations
Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation.Sabine A. Döring - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):363-394.details Theories of practical reason must meet a psychological requirement: they must explain how normative practical reasons can be motivationally efficacious. It would be pointless to claim that we are subject to normative demands of reason, if we were in fact unable to meet those demands. Concerning this requirement to account for the possibility of rational motivation, internalist approaches are distinguished from externalist ones. I defend internalism, whilst rejecting both ways in which the belief‐desire model can be instantiated. Both the Humean (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 182 citations
Long-term emotions and emotional experiences in the explanation of actions.Christine Tappolet - 2002 - European Review of Philosophy 5:151-161.details This paper consists in a critical review of Peter Goldie's book, The Emotion. A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Goldie is right to distinguish between long-term emotions and emotional experiences. And he is also right to reject the view that emotions are reducible to 'feelingless' states plus some extra feelings. However, Goldie's own account in terms of "feeling towards" is problematic. Goldie would have been better advised to claim that emotional experiences are necessarily emotional representations of something as (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations

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