- On What Matters: Volume Two.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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The grounding argument against non-reductive moral realism.Ralf M. Bader - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12.details
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On the Defensibility and Believability of Moral Error Theory : Reply to Evers, Streumer, and Toppinen.Jonas Olson - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):461-473.details
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Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory About All Normative Judgments.Bart Streumer - 2017 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Not Just Errors: A New Interpretation of Mackie’s Error Theory.Victor Moberger - 2017 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5 (3).details
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On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.details
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The Evolution of Morality.Richard Joyce - 2005 - Bradford.details
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The Myth of Morality.Richard Joyce - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe it.Ronald Dworkin - 1996 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (2):87-139.details
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On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Non-Naturalism: The Jackson Challenge.Jussi Suikkanen - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 87-110.details
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(1 other version)Moral Discourse and Descriptive Properties.Brad Majors - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):475 - 494.details
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(1 other version)Ethical Non-Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Supervenience.Tristram McPherson - 2012 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 7. Oxford University Press. pp. 205.details
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(1 other version)A Theory of Properties.Peter van Inwagen - 2004 - In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Vol. 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 107-138.details
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Why Logically Equivalent Predicates May Pick out Different Properties.Elliott Sober - 1982 - American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (2):183-189.details
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Ethical Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2005 - New York: Palgrave Macmillan.details
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Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.John Leslie Mackie - 1977 - New York: Penguin Books.details
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Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.details
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Realism and reduction: The Quest for robustness.Mark Schroeder - 2005 - Philosophers' Imprint 5:1-18.details
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What is Hume's Dictum, and why believe it?Jessica Wilson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):595 - 637.details
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From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Timothy Williamson & Frank Jackson - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):625.details
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The Queerness of Objective Values: An Essay on Mackiean Metaethics and the Arguments from Queerness.Victor Moberger - 2018 - Dissertation, Uppsala Universitydetails
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Moral supervenience.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):592-615.details
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(1 other version)From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):539-542.details
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Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism.David Enoch - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Doubts about the Supervenience of the Evaluative.Nicholas L. Sturgeon - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 53-92.details
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(1 other version)Why There Really Are No Irreducibly Normative Properties.Bart Streumer - 2013 - In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking about reasons: themes from the philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 310-336.details
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Naturalism, Theism, Obligation and Supervenience.Alvin Plantinga - 2010 - Faith and Philosophy 27 (3):247-272.details
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(1 other version)Supervenience.Karen Bennett & Brian McLaughlin - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Ethical Non-Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Supervenience.Tristram McPherson - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7.details
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Is Irreducible Normativity Impossibly Queer?Teemu Toppinen - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):437-460.details
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(1 other version)On the Plurality of Worlds.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):42-47.details
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Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.Fred Feldman & J. L. Mackie - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (1):134.details
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(1 other version)I—David McNaughton and Piers Rawling: Descriptivism, Normativity and the Metaphysics of Reasons.David McNaughton & Piers Rawling - 2003 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):23-45.details
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Ethics, Inventing Right and Wrong.[author unknown] - 1977 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 43 (3):581-582.details
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The Moral Problem.Stephen Darwall - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185):508-515.details
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What is Hume’s Dictum, and Why Believe It?Jessica Wilson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):595-637.details
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Naturalism And Normativity: Reply to McNaughton and Rawling.David McNaughton, Piers Rawling & Sabina Lovibond - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):187-203.details
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Are There Irreducibly Normative Properties?Bart Streumer - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):537-561.details
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The Mackiean Supervenience Challenge.Victor Moberger - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (1):219-236.details
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(1 other version)Moral Realism: A Defense. [REVIEW]Mark Timmons - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):265-269.details
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Ethical non-naturalism and normative properties.William J. FitzPatrick - 2010 - In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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On The Plurality of Worlds.Graeme Forbes - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (151):222-240.details
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The Myth of Morality.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2004 - Mind 113 (452):760-763.details
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(1 other version)Moral discourse and descriptive properties.Brad Majors - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):475–494.details
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Cognitivism, a priori deduction, and Moore.Frank Jackson - 2003 - Ethics 113 (3):557-575.details
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Against reductive ethical naturalism.Justin Klocksiem - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):1991-2010.details
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