Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Failure to detect mismatches between intention and outcome in a simple decision task.Petter Johansson, Lars Hall, Sverker Sikstrom & Andreas Olsson - 2005 - Science 310 (5745):116-119.
    A fundamental assumption of theories of decision-making is that we detect mismatches between intention and outcome, adjust our behavior in the face of error, and adapt to changing circumstances. Is this always the case? We investigated the relation between intention, choice, and introspection. Participants made choices between presented face pairs on the basis of attractiveness, while we covertly manipulated the relationship between choice and outcome that they experienced. Participants failed to notice conspicuous mismatches between their intended choice and the outcome (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   116 citations  
  • (1 other version)Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson - 1977 - Psychological Review 84 (3):231-59.
    Reviews evidence which suggests that there may be little or no direct introspective access to higher order cognitive processes. Ss are sometimes unaware of the existence of a stimulus that importantly influenced a response, unaware of the existence of the response, and unaware that the stimulus has affected the response. It is proposed that when people attempt to report on their cognitive processes, that is, on the processes mediating the effects of a stimulus on a response, they do not do (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1526 citations  
  • Voluntary action and conscious awareness.Patrick Haggard, Sam Clark & Jeri Kalogeras - 2002 - Nature Neuroscience 5 (4):382-385.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   266 citations  
  • (1 other version)The Illusion of Conscious Will.Daniel M. Wegner - 2002 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
    In this book Daniel Wegner offers a novel understanding of the relation of consciousness, the will, and our intentional and voluntary actions. Wegner claims that our experience and common sense view according to which we can influence our behavior roughly the way we experience that we do it is an illusion.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   487 citations  
  • Apparent mental causation: Sources of the experience of will.Daniel M. Wegner & T. Wheatley - 1999 - American Psychologist 54:480-492.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   251 citations  
  • The feeling of doing: Deconstructing the phenomenology of agnecy.Timothy J. Bayne & Neil Levy - 2009 - In Natalie Sebanz & Wolfgang Prinz (eds.), Disorders of Volition. Bradford Books.
    Disorders of volition are often accompanied by, and may even be caused by, disruptions in the phenomenology of agency. Yet the phenomenology of agency is at present little explored. In this paper we attempt to describe the experience of normal agency, in order to uncover its representational content.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • Abnormalities in the awareness of action.Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, Daniel M. Wolpert & Christopher D. Frith - 2002 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (6):237-242.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   184 citations  
  • (2 other versions)The Illusion of Conscious Will.R. Holton - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):218-221.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   409 citations