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  1. I could have done otherwise: Availability of counterfactual comparisons informs the sense of agency.Eugenia Kulakova, Nima Khalighinejad & Patrick Haggard - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 49:237-244.
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  • How much does emotional valence of action outcomes affect temporal binding?Joshua Moreton, Mitchell J. Callan & Gethin Hughes - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 49:25-34.
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  • (1 other version)A Study of Ignorance: suffering and freedom in early Buddhist teachings and parallels in modern neuroscience.Margot Wilson - manuscript
    What might early Buddhist teachings offer neuroscience and how might neuroscience inform contemporary Buddhism? Both early Buddhist teachings and cognitive neuroscience suggest that the conditioning of our cognitive apparatus and brain plays a role in agency that may be either efficacious or non-efficacious. Both consider internal time to play a central role in the efficacy of agency. Buddhism offers an approach that promises to increase the efficacy of agency. This approach is found in five early Buddhist teachings that are re-interpreted (...)
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  • Bodily Experience in Schizophrenia: Factors Underlying a Disturbed Sense of Body Ownership.Maayke Klaver & H. Chris Dijkerman - 2016 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 10:197188.
    Emerging evidence is now challenging the view that patients diagnosed with schizophrenia experience a selective deficit in their sense of agency. Additional disturbances seem to exist in their sense of body ownership. However, the factors underlying this disturbance in body ownership remain elusive. Knowledge of these factors, and increased understanding of how body ownership is related to other abnormalities seen in schizophrenia, could ultimately advance development of new treatments. Research on body ownership in schizophrenia has mainly been investigated with the (...)
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  • Intentional binding effect in children: insights from a new paradigm.Annachiara Cavazzana, Chiara Begliomini & Patrizia S. Bisiacchi - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
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  • The critical events for motor-sensory temporal recalibration.Derek H. Arnold, Kathleen Nancarrow & Kielan Yarrow - 2012 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6.
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  • The development of a sense of control scale.Mia Y. Dong, Kristian Sandberg, Bo M. Bibby, Michael N. Pedersen & Morten Overgaard - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  • Priming determinist beliefs diminishes implicit components of self-agency.Margaret T. Lynn, Paul S. Muhle-Karbe, Henk Aarts & Marcel Brass - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • (1 other version)Motor-Sensory Recalibration Modulates Perceived Simultaneity of Cross-Modal Events at Different Distances.Brent D. Parsons, Scott D. Novich & David M. Eagleman - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4.
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  • Habituation to Feedback Delay Restores Degraded Visuomotor Adaptation by Altering Both Sensory Prediction Error and the Sensitivity of Adaptation to the Error.Takuya Honda, Masaya Hirashima & Daichi Nozaki - 2012 - Frontiers in Psychology 3.
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  • Eyes on the Mind: Investigating the Influence of Gaze Dynamics on the Perception of Others in Real-Time Social Interaction.Ulrich J. Pfeiffer, Leonhard Schilbach, Mathis Jording, Bert Timmermans, Gary Bente & Kai Vogeley - 2012 - Frontiers in Psychology 3.
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  • How to (and how not to) think about top-down influences on visual perception.Christoph Teufel & Bence Nanay - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 47:17-25.
    The question of whether cognition can influence perception has a long history in neuroscience and philosophy. Here, we outline a novel approach to this issue, arguing that it should be viewed within the framework of top-down information-processing. This approach leads to a reversal of the standard explanatory order of the cognitive penetration debate: we suggest studying top-down processing at various levels without preconceptions of perception or cognition. Once a clear picture has emerged about which processes have influences on those at (...)
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  • Temporal perception in joint action: This is MY action.Francesca Capozzi, Cristina Becchio, Francesca Garbarini, Silvia Savazzi & Lorenzo Pia - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 40:26-33.
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  • Discrepancy between explicit judgement of agency and implicit feeling of agency: Implications for sense of agency and its disorders.Naho Saito, Keisuke Takahata, Toshiya Murai & Hidehiko Takahashi - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 37:1-7.
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  • Homing in on consciousness in the nervous system: An action-based synthesis.Ezequiel Morsella, Christine A. Godwin, Tiffany K. Jantz, Stephen C. Krieger & Adam Gazzaley - 2016 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39:1-70.
    What is the primary function of consciousness in the nervous system? The answer to this question remains enigmatic, not so much because of a lack of relevant data, but because of the lack of a conceptual framework with which to interpret the data. To this end, we have developed Passive Frame Theory, an internally coherent framework that, from an action-based perspective, synthesizes empirically supported hypotheses from diverse fields of investigation. The theory proposes that the primary function of consciousness is well-circumscribed, (...)
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  • The influence of action-outcome delay and arousal on sense of agency and the intentional binding effect.Wen Wen, Atsushi Yamashita & Hajime Asama - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36 (C):87-95.
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  • Difficulties for extending Wegner and colleagues’ model of the sense of agency to deficits in delusions of alien control.Glenn Carruthers - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 5 (3):126-141.
    Wegner and colleagues have offered an explanation of the sense of agency over one’s bodily actions. If the orthodox view is correct and there is a sense of agency deficit associated with delusions of alien control, then Wegner and colleagues’ model ought to extend to an explanation of this deficit. Data from intentional binding studies opens up the possibility that an abnormality in representing the timing of mental events leads to a violation of the principle of priority in those suffering (...)
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  • The relationship between human agency and embodiment.Emilie A. Caspar, Axel Cleeremans & Patrick Haggard - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 33:226-236.
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  • (1 other version)When actions feel alien: An explanatory model.Timothy Lane - 2014 - In Tzu-Wei Hung (ed.), Communicative Action. Singapore: Springer Science+Business. pp. 53-74.
    It is not necessarily the case that we ever have experiences of self, but human beings do regularly report instances for which self is experienced as absent. That is there are times when body parts, mental states, or actions are felt to be alien. Here I sketch an explanatory framework for explaining these alienation experiences, a framework that also attempts to explain the “mental glue” whereby self is bound to body, mind, or action. The framework is a multi-dimensional model that (...)
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  • (1 other version)When actions feel alien: An explanatory model.Timothy Lane - 2014 - In Tzu-Wei Hung (ed.), Communicative Action. Singapore: Springer Science+Business. pp. 53-74.
    It is not necessarily the case that we ever have experiences of self, but human beings do regularly report instances for which self is experienced as absent. That is there are times when body parts, mental states, or actions are felt to be alien. Here I sketch an explanatory framework for explaining these alienation experiences, a framework that also attempts to explain the “mental glue” whereby self is bound to body, mind, or action. The framework is a multi-dimensional model that (...)
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  • Agentive awareness is not sensory awareness.Myrto I. Mylopoulos - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):761-780.
    In this paper, I argue that the conscious awareness one has of oneself as acting, i.e., agentive awareness, is not a type of sensory awareness. After providing some set up in Sect. 1, I move on in Sect. 2 to sketch a profile of sensory agentive experiences as representational states with sensory qualities by which we come to be aware of ourselves as performing actions. In Sect. 3, I critique two leading arguments in favor of positing such sensory experiences: the (...)
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  • Attention to action and awareness of other minds.Chris Frith - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):481-487.
    We have only limited awareness of the system by which we control our actions and this limited awareness does not seem to be concerned with the control of action. Awareness of choosing one action rather than another comes after the choice has been made, while awareness of initiating an action occurs before the movement has begun. These temporal differences bind together in consciousness the intention to act and the consequences of the action. This creates our sense of agency. Activity in (...)
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  • Re-construction of action awareness depends on an internal model of action-outcome timing.Max-Philipp Stenner, Markus Bauer, Judith Machts, Hans-Jochen Heinze, Patrick Haggard & Raymond J. Dolan - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 25:11-16.
    The subjective time of an instrumental action is shifted towards its outcome. This temporal binding effect is partially retrospective, i.e., occurs upon outcome perception. Retrospective binding is thought to reflect post-hoc inference on agency based on sensory evidence of the action – outcome association. However, many previous binding paradigms cannot exclude the possibility that retrospective binding results from bottom-up interference of sensory outcome processing with action awareness and is functionally unrelated to the processing of the action – outcome association. Here, (...)
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  • An integrative pluralistic approach to phenomenal consciousness.Rick Dale, Deborah P. Tollefsen & Christopher T. Kello - 2012 - In Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.), Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. Philadelphia: John Benjamins. pp. 88--231.
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  • Sensation of agency and perception of temporal order.Jana Timm, Marc Schönwiesner, Iria SanMiguel & Erich Schröger - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 23:42-52.
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  • Experience of agency and sense of responsibility.Giovanna Moretto, Eamonn Walsh & Patrick Haggard - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1847-1854.
    The experience of agency refers to the feeling that we control our own actions, and through them the outside world. In many contexts, sense of agency has strong implications for moral responsibility. For example, a sense of agency may allow people to choose between right and wrong actions, either immediately, or on subsequent occasions through learning about the moral consequences of their actions. In this study we investigate the relation between the experience of operant action, and responsibility for action outcomes (...)
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  • The neural basis of event-time introspection.Adrian G. Guggisberg, Sarang S. Dalal, Armin Schnider & Srikantan S. Nagarajan - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1899-1915.
    We explored the neural mechanisms allowing humans to report the subjective onset times of conscious events. Magnetoencephalographic recordings of neural oscillations were obtained while human subjects introspected the timing of sensory, intentional, and motor events during a forced choice task. Brain activity was reconstructed with high spatio-temporal resolution. Event-time introspection was associated with specific neural activity at the time of subjective event onset which was spatially distinct from activity induced by the event itself. Different brain regions were selectively recruited for (...)
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  • Mapping introspection’s blind spot: Reconstruction of dual-task phenomenology using quantified introspection.Sébastien Marti, Jérôme Sackur, Mariano Sigman & Stanislas Dehaene - 2010 - Cognition 115 (2):303-313.
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  • Subliminal priming of actions influences sense of control over effects of action.Dorit Wenke, Stephen M. Fleming & Patrick Haggard - 2010 - Cognition 115 (1):26-38.
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  • Feelings of control: Contingency determines experience of action.James W. Moore, David Lagnado, Darvany C. Deal & Patrick Haggard - 2009 - Cognition 110 (2):279-283.
    The experience of causation is a pervasive product of the human mind. Moreover, the experience of causing an event alters subjective time: actions are perceived as temporally shifted towards their effects [Haggard, P., Clark, S., & Kalogeras, J.. Voluntary action and conscious awareness. Nature Neuroscience, 5, 382-385]. This temporal shift depends partly on advance prediction of the effects of action, and partly on inferential "postdictive" explanations of sensory effects of action. We investigated whether a single factor of statistical contingency could (...)
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  • A specific role for efferent information in self-recognition.Manos Tsakiris, Patrick Haggard, Nicolas Franck, Nelly Mainy & Angela Sirigu - 2005 - Cognition 96 (3):215-231.
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  • Assessing intentional binding with the method of constant stimuli.Sophie Nolden, Carola Haering & Andrea Kiesel - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (3):1176-1185.
    Intentional binding describes the phenomenon that actions and their effects are perceived to be temporally approximated. We introduced a new method of duration estimation to the research field, the method of constant stimuli. Participants freely chose to press one of two keys or experienced passive key presses. After an interval of 250 ms or 600 ms a visual effect occurred. In Experiment 1, each key produced an effect after a specific interval. In Experiment 2, both keys produced an effect after (...)
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  • Bias and learning in temporal binding: Intervals between actions and outcomes are compressed by prior bias.Andre M. Cravo, Hamilton Haddad, Peter Me Claessens & Marcus Vc Baldo - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1174-1180.
    It has consistently been shown that agents judge the intervals between their actions and outcomes as compressed in time, an effect named intentional binding. In the present work, we investigated whether this effect is result of prior bias volunteers have about the timing of the consequences of their actions, or if it is due to learning that occurs during the experimental session. Volunteers made temporal estimates of the interval between their action and target onset , or between two events . (...)
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  • Inferring sense of agency from the quantitative aspect of action outcome.Takahiro Kawabe - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2):407-412.
    The sense of agency refers to an experience in which one’s own action causes a change in environment. It is strongly modulated by both the contingency between action and its outcome and the consistency between predicted and actual action outcomes. Recent studies have suggested that the action outcome can retrospectively modulate action awareness. We suspect that the sense of agency can also be retrospectively modulated. This study examined whether the quantity of action outcome could influence the sense of agency. The (...)
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  • The time windows of the sense of agency.Chlöé Farrer, G. Valentin & J. M. Hupé - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1431-1441.
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  • Predictable and self-initiated visual motion is judged to be slower than computer generated motion.John A. Dewey & Thomas H. Carr - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (3):987-995.
    Self-initiated action effects are often perceived as less intense than identical but externally generated stimuli. It is thought that forward models within the sensorimotor system pre-activate cortical representations of predicted action effects, reducing perceptual sensitivity and attenuating neural responses. As self-agency and predictability are seldom manipulated simultaneously in behavioral experiments, it is unclear if self-other differences depend on predictable action effect contingencies, or if both self- and externally generated stimuli are modulated similarly by predictability. We factorially combined variation in predictability (...)
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  • When dyads act in parallel, a sense of agency for the auditory consequences depends on the order of the actions.John A. Dewey & Thomas H. Carr - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):155-166.
    The sense of agency is the perception of willfully causing something to happen. Wegner and Wheatley proposed three prerequisites for SA: temporal contiguity between an action and its effect, congruence between predicted and observed effects, and exclusivity . We investigated how temporal contiguity, congruence, and the order of two human agents’ actions influenced SA on a task where participants rated feelings of self-agency for producing a tone. SA decreased when tone onsets were delayed, supporting contiguity as important, but the order (...)
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  • Exploring implicit and explicit aspects of sense of agency.P. C. Fletcher J. W. Moore, D. Middleton, P. Haggard - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (4):1748.
    Sense of agency refers to the sense of initiating and controlling actions in order to influence events in the outside world. Recently, a distinction between implicit and explicit aspects of sense of agency has been proposed, analogous to distinctions found in other areas of cognition, notably learning. However, there is yet no strong evidence supporting separable implicit and explicit components of sense of agency. The so-called ‘Perruchet paradigm’ offers one of the few convincing demonstrations of separable implicit and explicit learning (...)
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  • Intention, Emotion, and Action: A Neural Theory Based on Semantic Pointers.Tobias Schröder, Terrence C. Stewart & Paul Thagard - 2014 - Cognitive Science 38 (5):851-880.
    We propose a unified theory of intentions as neural processes that integrate representations of states of affairs, actions, and emotional evaluation. We show how this theory provides answers to philosophical questions about the concept of intention, psychological questions about human behavior, computational questions about the relations between belief and action, and neuroscientific questions about how the brain produces actions. Our theory of intention ties together biologically plausible mechanisms for belief, planning, and motor control. The computational feasibility of these mechanisms is (...)
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  • On the influence of causal beliefs on the feeling of agency.Andrea Desantis, Cédric Roussel & Florian Waszak - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1211-1220.
    The sense of agency is the experience of being the origin of a sensory consequence. This study investigates whether contextual beliefs modulate low-level sensorimotor processes which contribute to the emergence of the sense of agency. We looked at the influence of causal beliefs on ‘intentional binding’, a phenomenon which accompanies self-agency. Participants judged the onset-time of either an action or a sound which followed the action. They were induced to believe that the tone was either triggered by themselves or by (...)
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  • When moving without volition: implied self-causation enhances binding strength between involuntary actions and effects.Myrthel Dogge, Marloes Schaap, Ruud Custers, Daniel M. Wegner & Henk Aarts - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):501-506.
    The conscious awareness of voluntary action is associated with systematic changes in time perception: The interval between actions and outcomes is experienced as compressed in time. Although this temporal binding is thought to result from voluntary movement and provides a window to the sense of agency, recent studies challenge this idea by demonstrating binding in involuntary movement. We offer a potential account for these findings by proposing that binding between involuntary actions and effects can occur when self-causation is implied. Participants (...)
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  • Intentional binding and the sense of agency: a review.James W. Moore & Sukhvinder S. Obhi - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):546-561.
    It is nearly 10 years since Patrick Haggard and colleagues first reported the ‘intentional binding’ effect . The intentional binding effect refers to the subjective compression of the temporal interval between a voluntary action and its external sensory consequence. Since the first report, considerable interest has been generated and a fascinating array of studies has accumulated. Much of the interest in intentional binding comes from the promise to shed light on human agency. In this review we survey studies on intentional (...)
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  • Experiences of activity and causality in schizophrenia: When predictive deficits lead to a retrospective over-binding.Jean-Rémy Martin - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1361-1374.
    In this paper I discuss an intriguing and relatively little studied symptomatic expression of schizophrenia known as experiences of activity in which patients form the delusion that they can control some external events by the sole means of their mind. I argue that experiences of activity result from patients being prone to aberrantly infer causal relations between unrelated events in a retrospective way owing to widespread predictive deficits. Moreover, I suggest that such deficits may, in addition, lead to an aberrant (...)
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  • Temporal Experience and the Temporal Structure of Experience.Geoffrey Lee - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
    I assess a number of connected ideas about temporal experience that are introspectively plausible, but which I believe can be argued to be incorrect. These include the idea that temporal experiences are extended experiential processes, that they have an internal structure that in some way mirrors the structure of the apparent events they present, and the idea that time in experience is in some way represented by time itself. I explain how these ideas can be developed into more sharply defined (...)
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  • Delusions, Illusions and Inference under Uncertainty.Jakob Hohwy - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (1):57-71.
    Three challenges to a unified understanding of delusions emerge from Radden's On Delusion (2011). Here, I propose that in order to respond to these challenges, and to work towards a unifying framework for delusions, we should see delusions as arising in inference under uncertainty. This proposal is based on the observation that delusions in key respects are surprisingly like perceptual illusions, and it is developed further by focusing particularly on individual differences in uncertainty expectations.
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  • The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency vs. Joint-Agency.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2011 - In Axel Seemann (ed.), Joint Attention: New Developments. MIT Press.
    This chapter aims at investigating the phenomenology of joint action and at gaining a better understanding of (1) how the sense of agency one experiences when engaged in a joint action differs from the sense of agency one has for individual actions and (2) how the sense of agency one experiences when engaged in a joint action differs according to the type of joint action and to the role one plays in it.
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  • Sense of agency, associative learning, and schizotypy.James W. Moore, Anthony Dickinson & Paul C. Fletcher - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):792-800.
    Despite the fact that the role of learning is recognised in empirical and theoretical work on sense of agency , the nature of this learning has, rather surprisingly, received little attention. In the present study we consider the contribution of associative mechanisms to SoA. SoA can be measured quantitatively as a temporal linkage between voluntary actions and their external effects. Using an outcome blocking procedure, it was shown that training action–outcome associations under conditions of increased surprise augmented this temporal linkage. (...)
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  • Rewarding performance feedback alters reported time of action.Eve A. Isham & Joy J. Geng - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1577-1585.
    Past studies have shown that the perceived time of actions is retrospectively influenced by post-action events. The current study examined whether rewarding performance feedback altered the reported time of action. In Experiment 1, participants performed a speeded button press task and received monetary reward for a presumed “fast,” or a monetary punishment for a presumed “slow” response. Rewarded trials resulted in the false perception that the response action occurred earlier than punished trials. In Experiments 2 and 3, the need for (...)
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  • Explaining delusions of control: The comparator model 20years on.Chris Frith - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):52-54.
    Over the last 20 years the comparator model for delusions of control has received considerable support in terms of empirical studies. However, the original version clearly needs to be replaced by a model with a much greater degree of sophistication and specificity. Future developments are likely to involve the specification of the role of dopamine in the model and a generalisation of its explanatory power to the whole range of positive symptoms. However, we will still need to explain why symptoms (...)
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  • The Elusive Experience of Agency.Robert E. Briscoe - 2011 - Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):262-267.
    I here present some doubts about whether Mandik’s (2010) proposed intermediacy and recurrence constraints are necessary and sufficient for agentive experience. I also argue that in order to vindicate the conclusion that agentive experience is an exclusively perceptual phenomenon (Prinz, 2007), it is not enough to show that the predictions produced by forward models of planned motor actions are conveyed by mock sensory signals. Rather, it must also be shown that the outputs of “comparator” mechanisms that compare these predictions against (...)
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