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  1. Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Tyler Burge presents an original study of the most primitive ways in which individuals represent the physical world. By reflecting on the science of perception and related psychological and biological sciences, he gives an account of constitutive conditions for perceiving the physical world, and thus aims to locate origins of representational mind.
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  • Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2004 - MIT Press.
    "Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us," writes Alva Noe. "It is something we do." In Action in Perception, Noe argues that perception and perceptual consciousness depend on capacities for action and thought — that ...
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  • Vision Science: Photons to Phenomenology.Stephen Palmer - 1999 - MIT Press.
    This textbook on vision reflects the integrated computational approach of modern research scientists, combining psychological, computational and neuroscientific perspectives.
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  • The Problem of Perception.A. D. Smith - 2002 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    The Problem of Perception offers two arguments against direct realism--one concerning illusion, and one concerning hallucination--that no current theory of ...
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  • Seeing‐As in the Light of Vision Science.Ned Block - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):560-572.
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  • Perplexities of Consciousness.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2011 - Bradford.
    Do you dream in color? If you answer Yes, how can you be sure? Before you recount your vivid memory of a dream featuring all the colors of the rainbow, consider that in the 1950s researchers found that most people reported dreaming in black and white. In the 1960s, when most movies were in color and more people had color television sets, the vast majority of reported dreams contained color. The most likely explanation for this, according to the philosopher Eric (...)
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  • The Situation-Dependency of Perception.Susanna Schellenberg - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (2):55-84.
    I argue that perception is necessarily situation-dependent. The way an object is must not just be distinguished from the way it appears and the way it is represented, but also from the way it is presented given the situational features. First, I argue that the way an object is presented is best understood in terms of external, mind-independent, but situation-dependent properties of objects. Situation-dependent properties are exclusively sensitive to and ontologically dependent on the intrinsic properties of objects, such as their (...)
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  • Sense and Content: Experience, Thought & Their Relations.Christopher Peacocke - 1983 - Mind 94 (375):480-487.
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  • Objects and attention: the state of the art.Brian J. Scholl - 2001 - Cognition 80 (1-2):1-46.
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  • Spatial perception: The perspectival aspect of perception.E. J. Green & Susanna Schellenberg - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (2):e12472.
    When we perceive an object, we perceive the object from a perspective. As a consequence of the perspectival nature of perception, when we perceive, say, a circular coin from different angles, there is a respect in which the coin looks circular throughout, but also a respect in which the coin's appearance changes. More generally, perception of shape and size properties has both a constant aspect—an aspect that remains stable across changes in perspective—and a perspectival aspect—an aspect that changes depending on (...)
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  • The Perspectival Character of Perception.Kevin J. Lande - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (4):187-214.
    You can perceive things, in many respects, as they really are. For example, you can correctly see a coin as circular from most angles. Nonetheless, your perception of the world is perspectival. The coin looks different when slanted than when head-on, and there is some respect in which the slanted coin looks similar to a head-on ellipse. Many hold that perception is perspectival because you perceive certain properties that correspond to the “looks” of things. I argue that this view is (...)
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  • Vision, Action, and Make‐Perceive.Robert Eamon Briscoe - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (4):457-497.
    In this paper, I critically assess the enactive account of visual perception recently defended by Alva Noë (2004). I argue inter alia that the enactive account falsely identifies an object’s apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further that noticing an object’s perspectival shape involves a hybrid experience combining both perceptual and imaginative elements—an (...)
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  • Sustained Representation of Perspectival Shape.Jorge Morales, Axel Bax & Chaz Firestone - 2020 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 117 (26):14873–14882.
    Arguably the most foundational principle in perception research is that our experience of the world goes beyond the retinal image; we perceive the distal environment itself, not the proximal stimulation it causes. Shape may be the paradigm case of such “unconscious inference”: When a coin is rotated in depth, we infer the circular object it truly is, discarding the perspectival ellipse projected on our eyes. But is this really the fate of such perspectival shapes? Or does a tilted coin retain (...)
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  • Reply to Block: Adaptation and the Upper Border of Perception.Tyler Burge - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):573-583.
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  • The puzzle of cross‐modal shape experience.E. J. Green - 2022 - Noûs 56 (4):867-896.
    Thepuzzle of cross‐modal shape experienceis the puzzle of reconciling the apparent differences between our visual and haptic experiences of shape with their apparent similarities. This paper proposes that we can resolve the cross‐modal puzzle by reflecting on another puzzle. Thepuzzle of perspectival characterchallenges us to reconcile the variability of shape experience through shifts in perspective with its constancy. An attractive approach to the latter puzzle holds that shape experience is complex, involving bothperspectivalaspects andconstantaspects. I argue here that parallel distinctions between (...)
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  • The nature of perceptual constancies.Peter Https://Orcidorg288X Schulte - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):3-20.
    Perceptual constancies have been studied by psychologists for decades, but in recent years, they have also become a major topic in the philosophy of mind. One reason for this surge of interest is Tyler Burge’s (2010) influential claim that constancy mechanisms mark the difference between perception and mere sensitivity, and thereby also the difference between organisms with genuine representational capacities and ‘mindless’ beings. Burge’s claim has been the subject of intense debate. It is becoming increasingly clear, however, that we cannot (...)
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  • Spatial representations in sensory modalities.Tony Cheng - 2022 - Mind and Language 37 (3):485-500.
    Some sensory modalities, such as sight, touch and audition, are arguably spatial, and one way to understand these spatial senses is to investigate spatial representations in them. Here I focus on a specific element in this area— the interplay between perspectival variation and spatial constancy—and discuss recent interdisciplinary works on this topic. With these relevant experimental works, we will see clearly how traditional controversies in philosophy, for example, whether we perceive perspectival shapes as well as objective shapes, and whether any (...)
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  • Shape, perspective, and what is and is not perceived: Comment on Morales, Bax, and Firestone (2020).Johannes Burge & Tyler Burge - 2023 - Psychological Review 130 (4):1125-1136.
    Psychology and philosophy have long reflected on the role of perspective in vision. Since the dawn of modern vision science—roughly, since Helmholtz in the late 1800s—scientific explanations in vision have focused on understanding the computations that transform the sensed retinal image into percepts of the three-dimensional environment. The standard view in the science is that distal properties—viewpoint-independent properties of the environment (object shape) and viewpoint-dependent relational properties (3D orientation relative to the viewer)–are perceptually represented and that properties of the proximal (...)
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  • Are perspectival shapes seen or imagined? An experimental approach.John Schwenkler & Assaf Weksler - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (5):855-877.
    This paper proposes a novel experimental approach that would help to determine whether perspectival shapes, such as the elliptical profile of a tilted plate or coin, are part of perceptual experience. If they are part of perceptual experience, then it should be possible to identify these shapes simply by attending appropriately to them. Otherwise, in order to identify perspectival shapes they must first be constructed in the visual imagination. We propose that these accounts of perspectival identification can be tested by (...)
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  • Conflicting Appearances.Myles Burnyeat - 1979 - British Academy.
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  • Is the appearance of shape protean?Charles Siewert - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12:1-16.
    </b>This commentary focuses on shape constancy in vision and its relation to sensorimotor knowledge. I contrast “Protean” and “Constancian” views about how to describe perspectival changes in the appearance of an object’s shape. For the Protean, these amount to changes in apparent shape; for Constance, things are not merely judged, but literally appear constant in shape. I give reasons in favor of the latter view, and argue that Noë’s attempt to combine aspects of both views in a “dual aspect” account (...)
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  • Perceptual experience.Christopher S. Hill - 2022 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
    This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. Christopher S. Hill argues that perceptual experience constitutively involves representations of worldly items, and that the relevant form of representation can be explained in broadly biological terms. He then maintains that the representational contents of perceptual experiences are perceptual appearances, interpreted (...)
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  • Perceptual Relativity.Christopher S. Hill - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):179-200.
    Visual experience is shaped by a number of factors that are independent of the external objects that we perceive—factors like lighting, angle of view, and the sensitivities of photoreceptors in the retina. This paper seeks to catalog, analyze, and explain the fluctuations in visual phenomenology that are due to such factors.
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  • Reply to Rescorla and Peacocke: Perceptual Content in Light of Perceptual Constancies and Biological Constraints.Tyler Burge - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):485-501.
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  • Do Things Look Flat?Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):589-599.
    Does a penny viewed at an angle in some sense look elliptical, as though projected on a two-dimensional surface? Many philosophers have said such things, from Malebranche (1674/1997) and Hume (1739/1978), through early 20th-century sense-data theorists, to Tye (2000) and Noë (2004). I confess that it doesn't seem this way to me, though I'm somewhat baffled by the phenomenology and pessimistic about our ability to resolve the dispute. I raise geometrical complaints against the view and conjecture that views of this (...)
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  • No such look: problems with the dual content theory.Walter Hopp - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):813-833.
    It is frequently alleged that a round plate viewed from an oblique angle looks elliptical, and that when one tree is in front of another that is the same intrinsic size, the front one looks larger than the rear one. And yet there is also a clear sense in which the plate viewed from an angle looks round, and a clear sense in which the two trees look to be the same size. According to the Dual Content Theory (DCT), what (...)
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  • Perception and computation.Jonathan Cohen - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):96-124.
    Students of perception have long puzzled over a range of cases in which perception seems to tell us distinct, and in some sense conflicting, things about the world. In the cases at issue, the perceptual system is capable of responding to a single stimulus — say, as manifested in the ways in which subjects sort that stimulus — in different ways. This paper is about these puzzling cases, and about how they should be characterized and accounted for within a general (...)
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  • Visual shape perception as Bayesian inference of 3D object-centered shape representations.Goker Erdogan & Robert A. Jacobs - 2017 - Psychological Review 124 (6):740-761.
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  • Seeing Shape: Shape Appearances and Shape Constancy.David J. Bennett - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):487-518.
    A coin rotating back in depth in some sense presents a changing, elliptical shape. How are we to understand such (in this case) ‘appearances of ellipticality’? How is the experiential sense of such shifting shape appearances related to the experiential sense of enduring shape definitive of perceived shape constancy? Is the experiential recovery of surface shape based on the prior (perhaps more fundamental) recovery of point or element 3D spatial locations?—or is the perception of shape a largely independent perceptual achievement? (...)
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  • The perception of size and shape.Christopher S. Hill & David J. Bennett - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):294-315.
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  • The Role of Spatial Appearances in Achieving Spatial-Geometric Perceptual Constancy.David J. Bennett - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):1-41.
    Long tradition in philosophy and in empirical psychology has it that the perceptual recovery of enduring objective size and shape proceeds through initial spatial appearance experiences—like the sensed changing visual field size of a receding car, or the shifting shape appearance of a coin as it rotates in depth. The present paper carefully frames and then critically examines such proposals. It turns out that these are contingent, empirical matters, requiring close examination of relevant research in perception science in order to (...)
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  • The Neural Substrates of Conscious Perception without Performance Confounds.Jorge Morales, Brian Odegaard & Brian Maniscalco - forthcoming - In Felipe De Brigard & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.), Anthology of Neuroscience and Philosophy.
    To find the neural substrates of consciousness, researchers compare subjects’ neural activity when they are aware of stimuli against neural activity when they are not aware. Ideally, to guarantee that the neural substrates of consciousness—and nothing but the neural substrates of consciousness—are isolated, the only difference between these two contrast conditions should be conscious awareness. Nevertheless, in practice, it is quite challenging to eliminate confounds and irrelevant differences between conscious and unconscious conditions. In particular, there is an often-neglected confound that (...)
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  • Perceptual Constancies and Perceptual Modes of Presentation.Michael Rescorla - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):468-476.
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  • Retinal Images and Object Files: Towards Empirically Evaluating Philosophical Accounts of Visual Perspective.Assaf Weksler - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):91-103.
    According to an influential philosophical view I call “the relational properties view”, “perspectival” properties, such as the elliptical appearance of a tilted coin, are relational properties of external objects. Philosophers have assessed this view on the basis of phenomenological, epistemological or other purely philosophical considerations. My aim in this paper is to examine whether it is possible to evaluate RPV empirically. In the first, negative part of the paper I consider and reject a certain tempting way of doing so. In (...)
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  • Grouping based on phenomenal proximity.Irvin Rock & Leonard Brosgole - 1964 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 67 (6):531.
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  • Border crossings: Perceptual and post-perceptual object representation.Tyler Burge - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3):125-125.
    Carey's claim that no object representations are perceptual rests on a faulty view of perception. To delineate origins of post-perceptual ( or ) representation, we need a more accurate view of perceptual representation.
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  • Stability by Degrees: Conceptions of Constancy from the History of Perceptual Psychology.Louise Daoust - 2021 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 43 (1):1-22.
    Do the physical facts of the viewed environment account for the ordinary experiences we have of that environment? According to standard philosophical views, distal facts do account for our experiences, a phenomenon explained by appeal to perceptual constancy, the phenomenal stability of objects and environmental properties notwithstanding physical changes in proximal stimulation. This essay reviews a significant but neglected research tradition in experimental psychology according to which percepts systematically do not correspond to mind-independent distal facts. Instead, stability of percept values (...)
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  • Size-constancy judgments and perceptual compromise.V. R. Carlson - 1962 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 63 (1):68.
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  • Reconsidering perceptual content.William T. Wojtach - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (1):22-43.
    An important class of teleological theories cannot explain the representational content of visual states because they fail to address the relationship between the world, projected retinal stimuli, and perception. A different approach for achieving a naturalized theory of visual content is offered that rejects the traditional internalism/externalism debate in favor of what is termed “empirical externalism.” This position maintains that, while teleological considerations can underwrite a broad understanding of representation, the content of visual representation can only be determined empirically according (...)
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  • Content and constancy: Phenomenology, psychology, and the content of perception. [REVIEW]Sean Dorrance Kelly - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):682–690.
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