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  1. (6 other versions)Consciousness and its Place in Nature.David J. Chalmers - 2003 - In Stephen Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 102–142.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction1 The Problem Arguments Against Materialism Type‐A Materialism Type‐B Materialism15 The Two‐Dimensional Argument Against Type‐B Materialism Type‐C Materialism Interlude Type‐D Dualism Type‐E Dualism Type‐F Monism Conclusions.
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  • Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism.David Chalmers - 2013 - Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 8.
    I present an argument for panpsychism: the thesis that everything is conscious, or at least that fundamental physical entities are conscious. The argument takes a Hegelian dialectical form. Panpsychism emerges as a synthesis of the thesis of materalism and the antithesis of dualism. In particular, the key premises of the causal argument for materialism and the conceivability argument for dualism are all accommodated by a certain version of panpsychism. This synthesis has its own antithesis in turn: panprotopsychism, the thesis that (...)
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  • (4 other versions)Causation.David Lewis - 1986 - In David K. Lewis (ed.), Philosophical Papers Vol. II. Oxford University Press. pp. 159-213.
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  • Thinking about Consciousness.Diana Raffman - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):171-186.
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  • (2 other versions)A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.
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  • The identity of the categorical and the dispositional.Galen Strawson - 2008 - Analysis 68 (4):271-282.
    Suppose that X and Y can’t possibly exist apart in reality; then—by definition—there’s no real distinction between them, only a conceptual distinction. There’s a conceptual distinction between a rectilinear figure’s triangularity and its trilaterality, for example, but no real distinction. In fundamental metaphysics there is no real distinction between an object’s categorical properties and its dispositional properties. So too there is no real distinction between an object and its properties. And in fundamental metaphysics, for X and Y to be such (...)
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  • (1 other version)Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychism.Galen Strawson - 2006 - In Anthony Freeman (ed.), Consciousness and Its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism? Exeter: Imprint Academic. pp. 3-31.
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  • The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science.Edward Jonathan Lowe - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.
    E. J. Lowe, a prominent figure in contemporary metaphysics, sets out and defends his theory of what there is. His four-category ontology is a metaphysical system which recognizes four fundamental categories of beings: substantial and non-substantial particulars and substantial and non-substantial universals. Lowe argues that this system has an explanatory power which is unrivalled by more parsimonious theories and that this counts decisively in its favour. He shows that it provides a powerful explanatory framework for a unified account of causation, (...)
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  • What is Russellian Monism?Torin Alter & Yujin Nagasawa - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (9-10):67–95.
    Russellian monism offers a distinctive perspective on the relationship between the physical and the phenomenal. For example, on one version of the view, phenomenal properties are the categorical bases of fundamental physical properties, such as mass and charge, which are dispositional. Russellian monism has prominent supporters, such as Bertrand Russell, Grover Maxwell, Michael Lockwood, and David Chalmers. But its strengths and shortcomings are often misunderstood. In this paper we try to eliminate confusions about the view and defend it from criticisms. (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Causality and properties.Sydney Shoemaker - 1980 - In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor. D. Reidel. pp. 109-35.
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  • Phenomenal states II.Brian Loar - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press.
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  • Laws in nature.Stephen Mumford - 2004 - New York: Routledge.
    This book outlines a major new theory of natural laws. The book begins with the question of whether there are any genuinely law-like phenomena in nature. The discussion addresses questions currently being debated by metaphysicians such as whether the laws of nature are necessary or contingent and whether a property can be identified independently of its causal role.
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  • Evolution and epiphenomenalism.William Robinson - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (11):27-42.
    This paper addresses the question whether evolutionary principles are compatible with epiphenomenalism, and argues for an affirmative answer. A general summary of epiphenomenalism is provided, along with certain specifications relevant to the issues of this paper. The central argument against compatibility is stated and rebutted. A specially powerful version of the argument, due to William James (1890), is stated. The apparent power of this argument is explained as resulting from a problem about our understanding of pleasure and an equivocation on (...)
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  • Does origins of life research rest on a mistake?Roger White - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):453–477.
    This disagreement extends to the fundamental details of physical and biochemical theories. On the other hand, (2) There is almostuniversal agreementthatlife did notfirstcome aboutmerely by chance. This is not to say that all scientists think that life’s existence was inevitable. The common view is that given a fuller understanding of the physical and biological conditions and processes involved, the emergence of life should be seen to be quite likely, or at least not very surprising. The view which is almost universally (...)
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  • (4 other versions)Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
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  • (1 other version)Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
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  • (1 other version)The rise of physicalism.David Papineau - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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  • Natural selection and the emergence of mind.Karl Popper - 1978 - Dialectica 32 (3‐4):339-55.
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  • (1 other version)Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. New York, US: Oxford University Press.
    Confronted with the apparent explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness, there are many possible reactions. Some deny that any explanatory gap exists at all. Some hold that there is an explanatory gap for now, but that it will eventually be closed. Some hold that the explanatory gap corresponds to an ontological gap in nature.
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  • (1 other version)Realistic monism - why physicalism entails panpsychism.Galen Strawson - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):3-31.
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  • (6 other versions)Consciousness and its place in nature.David Chalmers - 2003 - In Ted A. Warfield & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 102--142.
    Consciousness fits uneasily into our conception of the natural world. On the most common conception of nature, the natural world is the physical world. But on the most common conception of consciousness, it is not easy to see how it could be part of the physical world. So it seems that to find a place for consciousness within the natural order, we must either revise our conception of consciousness, or revise our conception of nature. In twentieth-century philosophy, this dilemma is (...)
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  • (1 other version)Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • (4 other versions)The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism.Karl R. Popper & John C. Eccles - 1978 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (3):265-273.
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  • (1 other version)From an Ontological Point of View.Crawford L. Elder - 2004 - Mind 113 (452):757-760.
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  • Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties.Alexander Bird - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Professional philosophers and advanced students working in metaphysics and the philosophy of science will find this book both provocative and stimulating.
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  • (2 other versions)The Mind and its place in nature.C. D. Broad - 1925 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 103:145-146.
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  • (1 other version)John Heil, From an Ontological Point of View. [REVIEW]John W. Carroll - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (1):127-131.
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  • Conscious Thought and the Cognitive Fine-Tuning Problem.Philip Goff - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270):98-122.
    Cognitive phenomenalism is the view that occurrent thoughts are identical with, or constituted of, cognitive phenomenology. This paper raises a challenge for this view: the cognitive fine-tuning problem. In broad brushstrokes the difficulty is that, for the cognitive phenomenalist, there is a distinction between three kinds of fact: cognitive phenomenal facts, sensory phenomenal facts, and functional facts. This distinction gives rise to the challenge of explaining why, in actuality, these three phenomena tend to be matched together in ways that respect (...)
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  • (1 other version)A World of States of Affairs.John Heil & D. M. Armstrong - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):115.
    Despite heroic efforts, philosophers have found it increasingly difficult to evade discussion of metaphysical topics. Take the philosophy of mind. Take, in particular, the mind-body problem in its latest guise: the problem of causal relevance. If mental properties are not reducible to physical properties, how can we reconcile the role such properties seem to have in producing bodily motions that constitute actions with the apparent fact that the very same motions are entirely explicable on the basis of purely physical properties (...)
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  • The Mind and its Place in Nature.Charlie Dunbar Broad - 1925 - London, England: Routledge.
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  • The ontological turn.C. B. Martin & John Heil - 1999 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):34–60.
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  • The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism by Karl R. Popper and John C. Eccles. [REVIEW]Daniel C. Dennett - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):91-97.
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  • (4 other versions)The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism.Karl R. Popper & John C. Eccles - 1977 - Philosophy 54 (208):249-251.
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  • (4 other versions)The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism.K. R. Popper & J. C. Eccles - 1977 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 42 (3):629-630.
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  • (1 other version)Remarks on David Papineau's Thinking about Consciousness1.Christopher S. Hill - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):147-147.
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  • (1 other version)The Analysis of Matter.E. H. Kennard & Bertrand Russell - 1928 - Philosophical Review 37 (4):382.
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  • (2 other versions)Phenomenal states (second version). In (N. Block, O. Flanagan, & G. Güzeldere, eds).Brian Loar - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press.
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  • The Misuse and Failure of the Evolutionary Argument.Joseph Corabi - 2014 - Disputatio 6 (39):199-227.
    The evolutionary argument is an argument against epiphenomenalism, designed to show that some mind-body theory that allows for the efficacy of qualia is true. First developed by Herbert Spencer and William James, the argument has gone through numerous incarnations and it has been criticized in a number of different ways. Yet many have found the criticisms of the argument in the literature unconvincing. Bearing this in mind, I examine two primary issues: first, whether the alleged insights employed in traditional versions (...)
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  • (1 other version)A World of States of Affairs.[author unknown] - 1997 - Philosophy 74 (287):130-134.
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  • (2 other versions)Causality and Properties.Sidney Shoemaker - 1997 - In David Hugh Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • (1 other version)The Analysis of Matter.Bertrand Russell - 1927/1992 - Humana Mente 3 (9):93-95.
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  • From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Philosophy 79 (309):491-494.
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