- Modal Idealism.David Builes - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind.details
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A Humean Non-Humeanism.David Builes - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (3):1031-1048.details
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Experience and Time: A Metaphysical Approach.David Builes & Michele Odisseas Impagnatiello - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.details
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Phenomenology of Fundamental Reality.Nino Kadić - 2022 - Dissertation, King's College Londondetails
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An Empirical Argument for Presentism.David Builes & Michele Odisseas Impagnatiello - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics.details
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Powers and the hard problem of consciousness: conceivability, possibility and powers.Sophie R. Allen - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 12 (2):1-33.details
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Towards a Unitary Case for Russellian Panpsychism.Luca Dondoni - 2021 - Philosophia 2021 (1):1-22.details
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Why Can’t There Be Numbers?David Builes - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.details
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(1 other version)Challenging the identity theory of properties.Vassilis Livanios - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5079-5105.details
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Properties.Francesco Orilia & Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Dispositionality, categoricity, and where to find them.Lorenzo Azzano - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2949-2976.details
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Does Dispositionalism Entail Panpsychism?Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2018 - Topoi 39 (5):1073-1088.details
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New powers for Dispositionalism.Giacomo Giannini - 2021 - Synthese 199:2671-2700.details
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The World Just Is the Way It Is.David Builes - 2021 - The Monist 104 (1):1-27.details
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Making sense of powerful qualities.Ashley Coates - 2021 - Synthese 198 (9):8347-8363.details
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Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Compatible with Russellian Panpsychism?Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (5):1065-1085.details
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Alien worlds, alien laws, and the Humean conceivability argument.Lok-Chi Chan, David Braddon-Mitchell & Andrew J. Latham - 2019 - Ratio 33 (1):1-13.details
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The Identity Theory of Powers Revised.Joaquim Giannotti - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):603-621.details
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The Binding Problem for Strong Experiential Monism.Santtu Heikkinen - 2022 - Sophia 61 (4):795-809.details
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Panpsychism and Causation: A New Argument and a Solution to the Combination Problem.Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2014 - Dissertation, Oslodetails
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Legal Agreements and the Capacities of Agents.Andrei Buckareff - 2014 - In Law and the Philosophy of Action. Brill. pp. 195-219.details
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The Argument for Panpsychism from Experience of Causation.Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2019 - In William Seager (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. Routledge.details
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The evolutionary argument for phenomenal powers.Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):293-316.details
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Conscious Thought and the Cognitive Fine-Tuning Problem.Philip Goff - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270):98-122.details
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Wayne Proudfoot’s Religious Experience, Pragmatism, and the Study of Religion.Matthew C. Bagger - 2017 - American Journal of Theology and Philosophy 38 (1):3-9.details
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Real acquaintance and physicalism.Philip Goff - 2015 - In Paul Coates & Sam Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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The dual nature of properties: the powerful qualities view reconsidered.Joaquim Giannotti - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Glasgowdetails
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Pure Powers Are Not Powerful Qualities.Joaquim Giannotti - 2021 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 17 (1):(A2)5-29.details
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Potentiality: Actualism minus naturalism equals platonism.Giacomo Giannini & Matthew Tugby - 2020 - Philosophical Inquiries 1 (8):117-40.details
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Replacing Functional Reduction with Mechanistic Explanation.Markus I. Eronen - 2011 - Philosophia Naturalis 48 (1):125-153.details
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Ontic structural realism as a metaphysics of objects.Michael Esfeld & Vincent Lam - 2011 - In Alisa Bokulich & Peter Bokulich (eds.), Scientific Structuralism. Springer Science+Business Media. pp. 143-159.details
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Causal properties and conservative reduction.Michael Esfeld - unknowndetails
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The Nature of Properties: Causal Essentialism and Quidditism.Jennifer Wang - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (3):168-176.details
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Truth-conditions and the nature of truth: Re-solving mixed conjunctions.Douglas Edwards - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):684-688.details
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Mind and Being: The Primacy of Panpsychism.Galen Strawson - 2016 - In Godehard Brüntrup & Ludwig Jaskolla (eds.), Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives. New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 000-00.details
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The Emperor's New Metaphysics of Powers.Stephen Barker - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):605-653.details
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(1 other version)Can a Single Property Be Both Dispositional and Categorical? The “Partial Consideration Strategy”, Partially Considered.Robert Schroer - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (1):63-77.details
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Do Extrinsic Dispositions Need Extrinsic Causal Bases?Gabriele Contessa - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):622-638.details
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A new look at relational holism in quantum mechanics.Matteo Morganti - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (5):1027--1038.details
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Inherent Properties and Statistics with Individual Particles in Quantum Mechanics.Matteo Morganti - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 40 (3):223-231.details
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Lowe's Unorthodox Dispositionalism.Travis Dumsday - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (1):79-101.details
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How to Be a Pluralist in Substance Ontology.Travis Dumsday - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):995-1022.details
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Is Universal Consciousness Fit for Ground?Miri Albahari - 2024 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Vol 4. Oxford University Press.details
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Phenomenal Powers.Hedda Hassel Mørch - manuscriptdetails
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The Silence of Physics.Barry Dainton - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):2207-2241.details
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Fred’s red: on the objectivity and physicality of mental qualities.Sam Coleman - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-27.details
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Grounding theories of powers.Matthew Tugby - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11187-11216.details
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Powerful Qualities, Zombies and Inconceivability.Alexander Carruth - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):25–46.details
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Dispositions.James M. Bucknell - 2015 - Dissertation, Univeristy of New South Walesdetails
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The Subject of Experience.Galen Strawson - 2017 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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