Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Why do informal proofs conform to formal norms?Jody Azzouni - 2009 - Foundations of Science 14 (1-2):9-26.
    Kant discovered a philosophical problem with mathematical proof. Despite being a priori , its methodology involves more than analytic truth. But what else is involved? This problem is widely taken to have been solved by Frege’s extension of logic beyond its restricted (and largely Aristotelian) form. Nevertheless, a successor problem remains: both traditional and contemporary (classical) mathematical proofs, although conforming to the norms of contemporary (classical) logic, never were, and still aren’t, executed by mathematicians in a way that transparently reveals (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • The derivation-indicator view of mathematical practice.Jody Azzouni - 2004 - Philosophia Mathematica 12 (2):81-106.
    The form of nominalism known as 'mathematical fictionalism' is examined and found wanting, mainly on grounds that go back to an early antinominalist work of Rudolf Carnap that has unfortunately not been paid sufficient attention by more recent writers.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   65 citations  
  • (1 other version)Why Do We Prove Theorems?Yehuda Rav - 1998 - Philosophia Mathematica 6 (3):5-41.
    Ordinary mathematical proofs—to be distinguished from formal derivations—are the locus of mathematical knowledge. Their epistemic content goes way beyond what is summarised in the form of theorems. Objections are raised against the formalist thesis that every mainstream informal proof can be formalised in some first-order formal system. Foundationalism is at the heart of Hilbert's program and calls for methods of formal logic to prove consistency. On the other hand, ‘systemic cohesiveness’, as proposed here, seeks to explicate why mathematical knowledge is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   88 citations  
  • (1 other version)Why Do We Prove Theorems?Yehuda Rav - 1999 - Philosophia Mathematica 7 (1):5-41.
    Ordinary mathematical proofs—to be distinguished from formal derivations—are the locus of mathematical knowledge. Their epistemic content goes way beyond what is summarised in the form of theorems. Objections are raised against the formalist thesis that every mainstream informal proof can be formalised in some first-order formal system. Foundationalism is at the heart of Hilbert's program and calls for methods of formal logic to prove consistency. On the other hand, ‘systemic cohesiveness’, as proposed here, seeks to explicate why mathematical knowledge is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   95 citations  
  • Proofs, pictures, and Euclid.John Mumma - 2010 - Synthese 175 (2):255 - 287.
    Though pictures are often used to present mathematical arguments, they are not typically thought to be an acceptable means for presenting mathematical arguments rigorously. With respect to the proofs in the Elements in particular, the received view is that Euclid's reliance on geometric diagrams undermines his efforts to develop a gap-free deductive theory. The central difficulty concerns the generality of the theory. How can inferences made from a particular diagrams license general mathematical results? After surveying the history behind the received (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   57 citations  
  • A Critique of a Formalist-Mechanist Version of the Justification of Arguments in Mathematicians' Proof Practices.Yehuda Rav - 2007 - Philosophia Mathematica 15 (3):291-320.
    In a recent article, Azzouni has argued in favor of a version of formalism according to which ordinary mathematical proofs indicate mechanically checkable derivations. This is taken to account for the quasi-universal agreement among mathematicians on the validity of their proofs. Here, the author subjects these claims to a critical examination, recalls the technical details about formalization and mechanical checking of proofs, and illustrates the main argument with aanalysis of examples. In the author's view, much of mathematical reasoning presents genuine (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations