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Sontag on Impertinent Sympathy and Photographs of Evil

In Colin Marshall (ed.), Comparative Metaethics: Neglected Perspectives on the Foundations of Morality. London: Routledge (2019)

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  1. (2 other versions)Proof of An External World.George Edward Moore - 1993 - In Thomas Baldwin (ed.), G.E. Moore: Selected Writings. New York: Routledge. pp. 147–170.
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  • Yin-Yang and the Heart-Mind.Michael Slote - 2018 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 17 (1):1-11.
    The East Asian notion of a heart-mind is arguably more accurate to our psychology than the Western term “mind” and its equivalents are: the latter term implies the possibility of psychological functioning in the absence of all emotion, and it can be shown that that is impossible. But then it turns out that we can update the traditional Chinese notions of yin 陰 and yang 陽 in such a way as to help us philosophically explain how our functioning psychology involves (...)
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  • Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals.David Hume, L. A. Selby-Bigge & P. H. Nidditch - 1976 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 166 (2):265-266.
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  • (1 other version)Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic Realism.Kendall L. Walton - 1984 - Critical Inquiry 11 (2):246-277.
    That photography is a supremely realistic medium may be the commonsense view, but—as Edward Steichen reminds us—it is by no means universal. Dissenters note how unlike reality a photograph is and how unlikely we are to confuse the one with the other. They point to “distortions” engendered by the photographic process and to the control which the photographer exercises over the finished product, the opportunities he enjoys for interpretation and falsification. Many emphasize the expressive nature of the medium, observing that (...)
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  • (1 other version)Transparent pictures: On the nature of photographic realism.Kendall L. Walton - 1984 - Noûs 18 (1):67-72.
    That photography is a supremely realistic medium may be the commonsense view, but—as Edward Steichen reminds us—it is by no means universal. Dissenters note how unlike reality a photograph is and how unlikely we are to confuse the one with the other. They point to “distortions” engendered by the photographic process and to the control which the photographer exercises over the finished product, the opportunities he enjoys for interpretation and falsification. Many emphasize the expressive nature of the medium, observing that (...)
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  • A limited defense of moral perception.Justin P. McBrayer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):305–320.
    One popular reason for rejecting moral realism is the lack of a plausible epistemology that explains how we come to know moral facts. Recently, a number of philosophers have insisted that it is possible to have moral knowledge in a very straightforward way—by perception. However, there is a significant objection to the possibility of moral perception: it does not seem that we could have a perceptual experience that represents a moral property, but a necessary condition for coming to know that (...)
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  • Moral knowledge by perception.Sarah McGrath - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):209–228.
    On the face of it, some of our knowledge is of moral facts (for example, that this promise should not be broken in these circumstances), and some of it is of non-moral facts (for example, that the kettle has just boiled). But, some argue, there is reason to believe that we do not, after all, know any moral facts. For example, according to J. L. Mackie, if we had moral knowledge (‘‘if we were aware of [objective values]’’), ‘‘it would have (...)
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  • Proof of an External World.G. E. Moore - 1939 - H. Milford.
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  • Moral Perception.Andrew Cullison - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):159-175.
    In this paper, I defend the view that we can have perceptual moral knowledge. First, I motivate the moral perception view by drawing on some examples involving perceptual knowledge of complex non‐moral properties. I argue that we have little reason to think that perception of moral properties couldn't operate in much the same way that our perception of these complex non‐moral properties operates. I then defend the moral perception view from two challenging objections that have yet to be adequately addressed. (...)
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  • Moral perception.Jonathan Dancy - unknown
    I start by examining Robert Audi's positive suggestions about moral perception, and then attempt to point out some challengeable assumptions that he seems to make, and to consider how things might look if those assumptions are abandoned.
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  • Doubts about Moral Perception.Pekka Väyrynen - 2018 - In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 109-28.
    This paper defends doubts about the existence of genuine moral perception, understood as the claim that at least some moral properties figure in the contents of perceptual experience. Standard examples of moral perception are better explained as transitions in thought whose degree of psychological immediacy varies with how readily non-moral perceptual inputs, jointly with the subject's background moral beliefs, training, and habituation, trigger the kinds of phenomenological responses that moral agents are normally disposed to have when they represent things as (...)
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  • On the cognitive triviality of art.Jerome Stolnitz - 1992 - British Journal of Aesthetics 32 (3):191-200.
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  • Normative ethics, conversion, and pictures as tools of moral persuasion.Sarah McGrath - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 1:268-294.
    In attempting to influence the moral views of others, activists sometimes employ pictures as tools of moral persuasion. In such cases, a viewer is confronted with an actual instance of the practice whose morality is at issue and invited to draw a general moral conclusion in response. This paper explores some of the philosophical issues that arise in connection with the use of pictures as tools of moral persuasion, with special attention to the roles of acquaintance and conversion in the (...)
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