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  1. The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays.Gregory McCulloch - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (177):534-536.
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  • We-Intentions.Raimo Tuomela & Kaarlo Miller - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 53 (3):367-389.
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  • Being and Nothingness.Frederick A. Olafson, Jean-Paul Sartre & Hazel E. Barnes - 1958 - Philosophical Review 67 (2):276.
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  • Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1945 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Donald A. Landes.
    First published in 1945, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s monumental _Phénoménologie de la perception _signalled the arrival of a major new philosophical and intellectual voice in post-war Europe. Breaking with the prevailing picture of existentialism and phenomenology at the time, it has become one of the landmark works of twentieth-century thought. This new translation, the first for over fifty years, makes this classic work of philosophy available to a new generation of readers. _Phenomenology of Perception _stands in the great phenomenological tradition of Husserl, (...)
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  • (1 other version)The „Shared Manifold‟ Hypothesis: From Mirror Neurons to Empathy.Gallese Vittorio - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):33-50.
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  • Origins of Human Communication.Michael Tomasello - 2008 - MIT Press.
    In this original and provocative account of the evolutionary origins of human communication, Michael Tomasello connects the fundamentally cooperative structure of human communication (initially discovered by Paul Grice) to the especially ...
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  • Self-consciousness and nonconceptual content.Kristina Musholt - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):649-672.
    Self-consciousness can be defined as the ability to think 'I'-thoughts. Recently, it has been suggested that self-consciousness in this sense can (and should) be accounted for in terms of nonconceptual forms of self-representation. Here, I will argue that while theories of nonconceptual self-consciousness do provide us with important insights regarding the essential genetic and epistemic features of self-conscious thought, they can only deliver part of the full story that is required to understand the phenomenon of self-consciousness. I will provide two (...)
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  • Experience and self-consciousness.Joseph Schear - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):95 - 105.
    Does all conscious experience essentially involve self-consciousness? In his Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person, Dan Zahavi answers “yes”. I criticize three core arguments offered in support of this answer—a well-known regress argument, what I call the “interview argument,” and a phenomenological argument. Drawing on Sartre, I introduce a phenomenological contrast between plain experience and self-conscious experience. The contrast challenges the thesis that conscious experience entails self-consciousness.
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  • (1 other version)Being and nothingness.Jean-Paul Sartre - 1956 - Avenel, N.J.: Random House.
    Sartre explains the theory of existential psychoanalysis in this treatise on human reality.
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  • (2 other versions)Phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness.Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    On the phenomenological view, a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant structural feature of conscious experience. Experience happens for the experiencing subject in an immediate way and as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly marked as my experience. For the phenomenologists, this immediate and first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena must be accounted for in terms of a pre-reflective self-consciousness. In the most basic sense of the term, selfconsciousness is not something that comes about the moment one attentively inspects (...)
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  • The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
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  • (1 other version)The 'shared manifold' hypothesis: From mirror neurons to empathy.Vittorio Gallese - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):33-50.
    My initial scope will be limited: starting from a neurobiological standpoint, I will analyse how actions are possibly represented and understood. The main aim of my arguments will be to show that, far from being exclusively dependent upon mentalistic/linguistic abilities, the capacity for understanding others as intentional agents is deeply grounded in the relational nature of action. Action is relational, and the relation holds both between the agent and the object target of the action , as between the agent of (...)
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  • Self-reference and self-awareness.Sydney S. Shoemaker - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):555-67.
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  • (4 other versions)The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. [REVIEW]Adam Morton - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):727-730.
    I discuss Bermudez' minimalist approach to self-consciousness approvingly, connecting it with other positions in philosophy and trying to separate it from ideas about non-conceptual content.
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  • Where do mirror neurons come from.Cecilia Heyes - forthcoming - Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews.
    1. Properties of mirror neurons in monkeys. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (...)
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  • The problem of the essential indexical: and other essays.John Perry - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    A collection of twelve essays by John Perry and two essays he co-authored, this book deals with various problems related to "self-locating beliefs": the sorts of beliefs one expresses with indexicals and demonstratives, like "I" and "this." Postscripts have been added to a number of the essays discussing criticisms by authors such as Gareth Evans and Robert Stalnaker. Included with such well-known essays as "Frege on Demonstratives," "The Problem of the Essential Indexical," "From Worlds to Situations," and "The Prince and (...)
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  • Fichte's intersubjective I.Allen W. Wood - 2006 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):62 – 79.
    The challenge to philosophy of mind for the past two hundred years has been to overcome the Cartesian conception of mind. This essay explores the attempt to do this by J. G. Fichte, especially regarding intersubjectivity or the knowledge of other minds. Fichte provides a transcendental deduction of the concept of the other I, as a condition for experiencing the individuality of our own I. The basis of this argument is the concept of the "summons", which Fichte argues is necessary (...)
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  • A theory of implicit and explicit knowledge.Zoltan Dienes & Josef Perner - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):735-808.
    The implicit-explicit distinction is applied to knowledge representations. Knowledge is taken to be an attitude towards a proposition which is true. The proposition itself predicates a property to some entity. A number of ways in which knowledge can be implicit or explicit emerge. If a higher aspect is known explicitly then each lower one must also be known explicitly. This partial hierarchy reduces the number of ways in which knowledge can be explicit. In the most important type of implicit knowledge, (...)
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  • The sense of ownership: An analogy between sensation and action.J. Dokic - 2003 - In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 321–344.
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  • The Paradox of Self-Consciousness: Representation and Mind.José Luis Bermúdez - 1998 - MIT Press.
    "The book presents in accessible fashion recent important work on the self and self-consciousness and also moves the issues forward with interesting new ideas. It provides a notably crisp and clear treatment of some extremely intriguing topics." -- Jane Heal, Department of Philosophy, University of Cambridge In this book, José Luis Bermú dez addesses two fundamental problems in the philosophy and psychology of self-consciousness: (1) Can we provide a noncircular account of fully fledged self-conscious thought and language in terms of (...)
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  • The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
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  • Indexicality and self-awareness.Tomis Kapitan - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 379--408.
    Self-awareness is commonly expressed by means of indexical expressions, primarily, first- person pronouns like.
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  • Intentional relations and social understanding.John Barresi & Chris Moore - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):107-122.
    Organisms engage in various activities that are directed at objects, whether real or imagined. Such activities may be termed “intentional relations.” We present a four-level framework of social understanding that organizes the ways in which social organisms represent the intentional relations of themselves and other agents. We presuppose that the information available to an organism about its own intentional relations (or first person information) is qualitatively different from the information available to that organism about other agents’ intentional relations (or third (...)
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  • The mechanism of social consciousness.George H. Mead - 1912 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 9 (15):401-406.
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  • Self-recognition in chimpanzees and man: A developmental and comparative perspective.G. G. Gallup - 1979 - In M. Lewis & M. Rosenblum (eds.), Genesis of Behavior, Volume 2. Plenum Press. pp. 107–126.
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  • The co-evolution of intersubjectivity and bodily mimesis.Jordan Zlatev - 2008 - In J. Zlatev, T. Racine, C. Sinha & E. Itkonen (eds.), The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity. John Benjamins. pp. 215--244.
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