- Effective intentions: the power of conscious will.Alfred R. Mele - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Free will.Sam Harris - 2012 - New York: Free Press.details
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Mortal Questions.[author unknown] - 1979 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 43 (3):578-578.details
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Causal-explanatory pluralism: how intentions, functions, and mechanisms influence causal ascriptions.Tania Lombrozo - 2010 - Cognitive Psychology 61 (4):303-332.details
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Is Free Will an Illusion? Confronting Challenges from the Modern Mind Sciences.Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology: Freedom and Responsibility. MIT Press.details
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Nonreductive physicalism and the limits of the exclusion principle.Christian List & Peter Menzies - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (9):475-502.details
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Physicalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.details
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Review of Woodward, Making Things Happen. [REVIEW]Michael Strevens - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):233-249.details
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Making things happen: a theory of causal explanation.James F. Woodward - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Interventionism and Causal Exclusion.James Woodward - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):303-347.details
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Freedom and Belief, Galen Strawson. [REVIEW]Stephen L. White - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (1):119-122.details
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Neuroscientific Prediction and the Intrusion of Intuitive Metaphysics.David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter & Shaun Nichols - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (7).details
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It’s OK if ‘my brain made me do it’: People’s intuitions about free will and neuroscientific prediction.Eddy Nahmias, Jason Shepard & Shane Reuter - 2014 - Cognition 133 (2):502-516.details
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Mortal questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Manipulation, Moral Responsibility, and Bullet Biting.Alfred R. Mele - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (3):167-184.details
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Another Scientific Threat to Free Will?Alfred Mele - 2012 - The Monist 95 (3):422-440.details
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Causal Responsibility and Counterfactuals.David A. Lagnado, Tobias Gerstenberg & Ro'I. Zultan - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (6):1036-1073.details
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Control variables and mental causation.John Campbell - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1pt1):15-30.details
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Consciousness and Moral Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2014 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.Derk Pereboom - 2014 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Physicalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2010 - New York: Routledge.details
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Causal Models: How People Think About the World and its Alternatives.Steven Sloman - 2005 - Oxford, England: OUP.details
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Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will.Gregg Caruso - 2012 - Lexington Books.details
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Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.details
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The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1950 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.details
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Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 2003 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.details
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Do we have free will?Benjamin W. Libet - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):47-57.details
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Freedom and Belief.Galen Strawson - 1989 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 51 (4):742-743.details
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Mortal Questions.Thomas Nagel - 1980 - Critica 12 (34):125-133.details
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Do we have free will?Benjamin W. Libet - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):551--564.details
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