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  1. (1 other version)Reality and Representation.David Papineau - 1988 - Mind 97 (388):629-632.
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  • The Language of Thought.J. A. Fodor - 1978 - Critica 10 (28):140-143.
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  • Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - Behaviorism 14 (1):51-56.
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  • (1 other version)The Unavailability of What We Mean.Georges Rey - 1993 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 46 (1):61-101.
    Fodor and LePore's attack on conceptual role semantics relies on Quine's attack on the traditional analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, which in turn consists of four arguments: an attack on truth by convention; an appeal to revisability; a claim of confirmation holism; and a charge of explanatory vacuity. Once the different merits of these arguments are sorted out, their proper target can be seen to be not the Traditional Distinctions, but an implicit assumption about their superficial availability that we (...)
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  • Teleological Explanations: An Etiological Analysis of Goals and Functions.Larry Wright - 1976 - University of California Press.
    INTRODUCTION The appeal to teleological principles of explanation within the body of natural science has had an unfortunate history. ...
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  • Dthat.David Kaplan - 1978 - In Peter Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics: Pragmatics. Academic Press. pp. 221--243.
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  • Representations: philosophical essays on the foundations of cognitive science.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - Cambridge: MIT Press.
    Introduction: Something on the State of the Art 1 I. Functionalism and Realism 1. Operationalism and Ordinary Language 35 2. The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explanations 63 3. What Psychological States are Not 79 4. Three Cheers for Propositional Attitudes 100 II. Reduction and Unity of Science 5. Special Sciences 127 6. Computation and Reduction 146 III. Intensionality and Mental Representation 7. Propositional Attitudes 177 8. Tom Swift and His Procedural Grandmother 204 9. Methodological Solipsism Considered as a (...)
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  • The nature of selection: evolutionary theory in philosophical focus.Elliott Sober - 1984 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
    The Nature of Selection is a straightforward, self-contained introduction to philosophical and biological problems in evolutionary theory. It presents a powerful analysis of the evolutionary concepts of natural selection, fitness, and adaptation and clarifies controversial issues concerning altruism, group selection, and the idea that organisms are survival machines built for the good of the genes that inhabit them. "Sober's is the answering philosophical voice, the voice of a first-rate philosopher and a knowledgeable student of contemporary evolutionary theory. His book merits (...)
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  • Mind and cognition: a reader.William G. Lycan (ed.) - 1990 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
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  • The misuse of Sober's selection for/selection of distinction.R. Goode & P. E. Griffiths - 1995 - Biology and Philosophy 10 (1):99-108.
    Elliott Sober''s selection for/selection of distinction has been widely used to clarify the idea that some properties of organisms are side-effects of selection processes. It has also been used, however, to choose between different descriptions of an evolutionary product when assigning biological functions to that product. We suggest that there is a characteristic error in these uses of the distinction. Complementary descriptions of function are misrepresented as mutually excluding one another. This error arises from a failure to appreciate that selection (...)
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  • Functions.Larry Wright - 1973 - Philosophical Review 82 (2):139-168.
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  • The teleological notion of 'function'.Karen Neander - 1991 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (4):454 – 468.
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  • On the distinction between disease and illness.Christopher Boorse - 1975 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 5 (1):49-68.
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  • The Nature of Psychological Explanation.Robert Cummins - 1983 - MIT Press.
    In exploring the nature of psychological explanation, this book looks at how psychologists theorize about the human ability to calculate, to speak a language and the like. It shows how good theorizing explains or tries to explain such abilities as perception and cognition. It recasts the familiar explanations of "intelligence" and "cognitive capacity" as put forward by philosophers such as Fodor, Dennett, and others in terms of a theory of explanation that makes established doctrine more intelligible to professionals and their (...)
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  • Functional analysis.Robert E. Cummins - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (November):741-64.
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  • A Study of Concepts.Christopher Peacocke - 1992 - MIT Press.
    Philosophers from Hume, Kant, and Wittgenstein to the recent realists and antirealists have sought to answer the question, What are concepts? This book provides a detailed, systematic, and accessible introduction to an original philosophical theory of concepts that Christopher Peacocke has developed in recent years to explain facts about the nature of thought, including its systematic character, its relations to truth and reference, and its normative dimension. Particular concepts are also treated within the general framework: perceptual concepts, logical concepts, and (...)
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  • Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Fred I. Dretske - 1988 - MIT Press.
    In this lucid portrayal of human behavior, Fred Dretske provides an original account of the way reasons function in the causal explanation of behavior.
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  • What do frogs really believe?Nicholas Agar - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (1):1-12.
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  • In defense of proper functions.Ruth Millikan - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (June):288-302.
    I defend the historical definition of "function" originally given in my Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories (1984a). The definition was not offered in the spirit of conceptual analysis but is more akin to a theoretical definition of "function". A major theme is that nonhistorical analyses of "function" fail to deal adequately with items that are not capable of performing their functions.
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  • Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - MIT Press.
    Preface by Daniel C. Dennett Beginning with a general theory of function applied to body organs, behaviors, customs, and both inner and outer representations, ...
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  • The Language of Thought.Jerry Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
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  • Reality and representation.David Papineau - 1987 - New York: Blackwell.
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  • Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst’s Defense.Karen Neander - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (2):168-184.
    In this paper I defend an etiological theory of biological functions (according to which the proper function of a trait is the effect for which it was selected by natural selection) against three objections which have been influential. I argue, contrary to Millikan, that it is wrong to base our defense of the theory on a rejection of conceptual analysis, for conceptual analysis does have an important role in philosophy of science. I also argue that biology requires a normative notion (...)
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  • The present status of the innateness controversy.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - In Representations: philosophical essays on the foundations of cognitive science. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 257-316.
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  • According to Fodor, beliefs (and I shall take these as exemplary) involve relations to internal representations: to believe that p is to be in a certain relation to some internal state s which represents.Colin McGinn - 1982 - In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 207.
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  • How direct is visual perception? Some reflections on Gibson's 'ecological approach'.Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1981 - Cognition 9 (2):139-96.
    Examines the theses that the postulation of mental processing is unnecessary to account for our perceptual relationship with the world, see turvey etal. for a criticque.
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  • (1 other version)Truth, rules, hoverflies, and the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (3):323-53.
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  • Speaking up for Darwin.Ruth G. Millikan - 1990 - In Barry M. Loewer (ed.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 151-164.
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  • Thoughts without laws: Cognitive science with content.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (January):47-80.
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  • Holism: A Consumer Update.Georges Rey (ed.) - 1993 - Amsterdam: Rodopi.
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  • Intentionality and teleological error.Paul M. Pietroski - 1992 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3):267-82.
    Theories of content purport to explain, among other things, in virtue of what beliefs have the truth conditions they do have. The desire for such a theory has many sources, but prominent among them are two puzzling facts that are notoriously difficult to explain: beliefs can be false, and there are normative constraints on the formation of beliefs.2 If we knew in virtue of what beliefs had truth conditions, we would be better positioned to explain how it is possible for (...)
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  • (1 other version)Does Representational Content Arise from Biological Function?Richard J. Hall - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:193 - 199.
    In virtue of what does a representational state have the content it does? Several philosophers have recently proposed that a representational state gets its content from its biological function. After explaining the sense of biological function used in these views, I criticise the proposal. I argue that biological function only determines representational content up to extensional equivalence. I maintain that this holds even if biological function is defined in terms of an intensional notion like Sober's "selection for".
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  • (1 other version)The unavailability of what we mean: A reply to Quine, Fodor and Lepore.Georges Rey - 1986 - In Abraham Zvie Bar-On (ed.), Grazer Philosophische Studien. Distributed in the U.S.A. By Humanities Press. pp. 61-101.
    Fodor and LePore's attack on conceptual role semantics relies on Quine's attack on the traditional analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, which in turn consists of four arguments: an attack on truth by convention; an appeal to revisability; a claim of confirmation holism; and a charge of explanatory vacuity. Once the different merits of these arguments are sorted out, their proper target can be seen to be not the Traditional Distinctions, but an implicit assumption about their superficial availability that we (...)
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  • (2 other versions)The structure of content.Colin McGinn - 1982 - In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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  • Semantics, wisconsin style.Jerry A. Fodor - 1984 - Synthese 59 (3):231-50.
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  • (1 other version)The biological way of thought.Morton Beckner - 1968 - Berkeley,: University of California Press.
    Interprets biological theory while looking at work done on genetics, systematics and selection.
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  • Reply to Alexander Rosenberg's Review of The Nature of Selection.Elliott Sober - 1986 - Behaviorism 14 (1):77-88.
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  • (1 other version)Replies.Jerry Fodor - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (1):50–57.
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  • What the Frog's Eye Tells the Frog's Brain.J. Lettvin - 1959 - Proceedings of the Institute of Radio Engineers 49:1940-1951.
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