In a 1993 paper, I argued that empirical treatments of the epistemologyused by scientists in experimental work are too abstract in practice tocounter relativist efforts to explain the outcome of scientificcontroversies by reference to sociological forces. This was because, atthe rarefied level at which the methodology of scientists is treated byphilosophers, multiple mutually inconsistent instantiations of theprinciples described by philosophers are employed by contestingscientists. These multiple construals change within a scientificcommunity over short time frames, and these different versions ofscientific methodology (...) can determine the outcome of a controversy. Iillustrated with a comparatively detailed analysis of the methodologyused by biologists debating the existence of an entity called thebacterial mesosome between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s. This 1993piece has drawn several critiques in the philosophical literature. Inthis present piece I respond to these critiques and argue that they failto address the core argument of the original paper, and I reflectfurther on the methodologies of philosophers of science pursuingempirical or `naturalistic' epistemology. (shrink)

The relation between biomedical knowledge and clinicalknowledge is discussed by comparing their respectivestructures. The knowledge of a disease as a biologicalphenomenon is constructed by the interaction of factsand theories from the main biomedical disciplines:epidemiology, diagnostics, clinical trial, therapydevelopment and pathogenesis. Although these facts andtheories are based on probabilities andextrapolations, the interaction provides a reliableand coherent structure, comparable to a Kuhnianparadigma. In the structure of clinical knowledge,i.e. knowledge of the patient with the disease, notonly biomedical knowledge contributes to the structurebut also (...) economic and social relations, ethics andpersonal experience. However, the interaction betweeneach of the participating ``knowledges'' in clinicalknowledge is not based on mutual dependency andaccumulation of different arguments from each, as inbiomedical knowledge, but on competition and partialexclusion. Therefore, the structure of biomedicalknowledge is different from that of clinicalknowledge. This difference is used as the basis for adiscussion in which the place of technology,evidence-based medicine and the gap between scientificand clinical knowledge are evaluated. (shrink)

Culp (1994) provides a defense for a form of experimental reasoning entitled 'robustness'. Her strategy is to examine a recent episode in experimental microbiology--the case of the mistaken discovery of a bacterial organelle called a 'mesosome'--with an eye to showing how experimenters effectively used robust experimental reasoning (or could have used robust reasoning) to refute the existence of the mesosome. My plan is to criticize Culp's assessment of the mesosome episode and to cast doubt on the epistemic significance of robustness. (...) In turn, I present a different account of the experimental reasoning microbiologists used in arriving at the conclusion that mesosomes are artifacts. I call this form of reasoning 'reliable process reasoning', and close the paper with a brief discussion of how experimental microbiologists justify the claim that an experimental process is reliable. (shrink)

Rasmussen (1993) argues that, because electron microscopists did not use robustness and would not have been warranted in using it as a criterion for the reality or the artifactuality of mesosomes, the bacterial mesosome serves as a test case for robustness that it fails. I respond by arguing that a more complete reading of the research literature on the mesosome shows that ultimately the more robust body of data did not support the mesosome and that electron microscopists used and were (...) warranted in using robustness as a criterion for the artifactuality of mesosomes. (shrink)