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  1. (1 other version)Other Minds.J. L. Austin - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations After Wrongdoing.Margaret Urban Walker - 2006 - Cambridge University Press.
    Moral Repair examines the ethics and moral psychology of responses to wrongdoing. Explaining the emotional bonds and normative expectations that keep human beings responsive to moral standards and responsible to each other, Margaret Urban Walker uses realistic examples of both personal betrayal and political violence to analyze how moral bonds are damaged by serious wrongs and what must be done to repair the damage. Focusing on victims of wrong, their right to validation, and their sense of justice, Walker presents a (...)
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  • Trust and Obligation-Ascription.Philip J. Nickel - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):309-319.
    This paper defends the view that trust is a moral attitude, by putting forward the Obligation-Ascription Thesis: If E trusts F to do X, this implies that E ascribes an obligation to F to do X. I explicate the idea of obligation-ascription in terms of requirement and the appropriateness of blame. Then, drawing a distinction between attitude and ground, I argue that this account of the attitude of trust is compatible with the possibility of amoral trust, that is, trust held (...)
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  • (1 other version)Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy.Elizabeth Fricker - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The epistemology of testimony. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 225.
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  • The epistemic significance of address.Benjamin McMyler - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):1059-1078.
    The overwhelming consensus amongst epistemologists is that there is no salient epistemological difference between the addressees of a speaker’s testimony and non-addressees. I argue that this overwhelming consensus is mistaken. Addressees of a speaker’s testimony are entitled to pass the epistemic buck or defer justificatory responsibility for their beliefs back to the testimonial speaker, while non-addressees are not. I then develop a provisional account of address that is in a position to mark this epistemic distinction between addressees and non-addressees.
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  • What Is Wrong with Lying?Paul Faulkner - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):535-557.
    One thing wrong with lying is that it can be manipulative. Understanding why lying can be a form of manipulation involves understanding how our telling someone something can give them a reason to believe it, and understanding this requires seeing both how our telling things can invite trust and how trust can be a reason to believe someone. This paper aims to outline the mechanism by means of which lies can be manipulative and through doing so identify a unique reason (...)
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  • Assurance and warrant.Edward Hinchman - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14:1-58.
    Previous assurance-theoretic treatments of testimony have not adequately explained how the transmission of warrant depends specifically on the speaker’s mode of address – making it natural to suspect that the interpersonal element is not epistemic but merely psychological or action-theoretic. I aim to fill that explanatory gap: to specify exactly how a testifier’s assurance can create genuine epistemic warrant. In doing so I explain (a) how the illocutionary norm governing the speech act proscribes not lies but a species of bullshit, (...)
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  • How to do things with words.John Langshaw Austin - 1962 - Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. Edited by Marina Sbisá & J. O. Urmson.
    For this second edition, the editors have returned to Austin's original lecture notes, amending the printed text where it seemed necessary.
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  • Learning from words: testimony as a source of knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Testimony is an invaluable source of knowledge. We rely on the reports of those around us for everything from the ingredients in our food and medicine to the identity of our family members. Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in the epistemology of testimony. Despite the multitude of views offered, a single thesis is nearly universally accepted: testimonial knowledge is acquired through the process of transmission from speaker to hearer. In this book, Jennifer Lackey shows that this thesis (...)
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  • Secrets: on the ethics of concealment and revelation.Sissela Bok - 1982 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Shows how the ethical issues raised by secrets and secrecy in our careers or private lives take us to the heart of the critical questions of private and public morality.
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  • Liberal Fundamentalism and Its Rivals.Peter Graham - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The epistemology of testimony. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 93-115.
    When is a testimony-based belief justified? According to so-called "Anti-Reductionism," the principle that a hearer is prima facie justified to take what another tells them at face value is true. I call this position "Liberal Foundationalism." I call it "liberal" for it is more liberal than "Moderate Foundationalism" that holds that perception-based beliefs are prima facie justified but testimony-based beliefs are not. Liberal Foundationalism has two interpretations: the principle is a contingent empirical truth, or an a priori necessary truth. I (...)
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  • On a supposed right to lie because of philanthropic concerns.Immanuel Kant - unknown
    "The moral principle stating that it is a duty to tell the truth would make any society impossible if that principle were taken singly and unconditionally. We have proof of this in the very direct consequences which a German philosopher has drawn from this principle. This philosopher goes as far as to assert that it would be a crime to tell a lie to a murderer who asked whether our friend who is being pursued by the murderer had taken refuge (...)
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  • Telling as inviting to trust.Edward S. Hinchman - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):562–587.
    How can I give you a reason to believe what I tell you? I can influence the evidence available to you. Or I can simply invite your trust. These two ways of giving reasons work very differently. When a speaker tells her hearer that p, I argue, she intends that he gain access to a prima facie reason to believe that p that derives not from evidence but from his mere understanding of her act. Unlike mere assertions, acts of telling (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Trust as an affective attitude.Karen Jones - 1996 - Ethics 107 (1):4-25.
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  • Deciding to trust, coming to believe.Richard Holton - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):63 – 76.
    Can we decide to trust? Sometimes, yes. And when we do, we need not believe that our trust will be vindicated. This paper is motivated by the need to incorporate these facts into an account of trust. Trust involves reliance; and in addition it requires the taking of a reactive attitude to that reliance. I explain how the states involved here differ from belief. And I explore the limits of our ability to trust. I then turn to the idea of (...)
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  • On Telling and Trusting.Paul Faulkner - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):875-902.
    A key debate in the epistemology of testimony concerns when it is reasonable to acquire belief through accepting what a speaker says. This debate has been largely understood as the debate over how much, or little, assessment and monitoring an audience must engage in. When it is understood in this way the debate simply ignores the relationship speaker and audience can have. Interlocutors rarely adopt the detached approach to communication implied by talk of assessment and monitoring. Audiences trust speakers to (...)
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  • (3 other versions)Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
    The doyen of living English philosophers, by these reflections, took hold of and changed the outlook of a good many other philosophers, if not quite enough. He did so, essentially, by assuming that talk of freedom and responsibility is talk not of facts or truths, in a certain sense, but of our attitudes. His more explicit concern was to look again at the question of whether determinism and freedom are consistent with one another -- by shifting attention to certain personal (...)
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  • Belief's Own Ethics.Jonathan Eric Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.
    In this book Jonathan Adler offers a strengthened version of evidentialism, arguing that the ethics of belief should be rooted in the concept of belief--that...
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  • (1 other version)The Will to Believe, and other Essays in Popular Philosophy.William James - 1897 - Philosophical Review 6 (3):331.
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  • Testimony and Assertion.David Owens - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (1):105-129.
    Two models of assertion are described and their epistemological implications considered. The assurance model draws a parallel between the ethical norms surrounding promising and the epistemic norms which facilitate the transmission of testimonial knowledge. This model is rejected in favour of the view that assertion transmits knowledge by expressing belief. I go on to compare the epistemology of testimony with the epistemology of memory.
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  • Trust and Rationality.Judith Baker - 1987 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 68 (1):1-13.
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  • (6 other versions)The Will to Believe.W. James - 1896 - Philosophical Review 6:88.
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  • Why Do We Believe What We Are Told?Angus Ross - 1986 - Ratio (1):69-88.
    It is argued that reliance on the testimony of others cannot be viewed as reliance on a kind of evidence. Speech being essentially voluntary, the speaker cannot see his own choice of words as evidence of their truth, and so cannot honestly offer them to others as such. Rather, in taking responsibility for the truth of what he says, the speaker offers a guarantee or assurance of its truth, and in believing him the hearer accepts this assurance. I argue that, (...)
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  • The Epistemology of Testimony.Elizabeth Fricker & David E. Cooper - 1987 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 61 (1):57 - 106.
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  • (3 other versions)Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation.Sissela Bok - 1985 - Philosophy 60 (231):143-145.
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  • Concealment and Exposure.Thomas Nagel - 1998 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 27 (1):3-30.
    Everyone knows that something has gone wrong, in the United States, with the conventions of privacy. Along with a vastly increased tolerance for variation in sexual life we have seen a sharp increase in prurient and censorious attention to the sexual lives of public figures and famous persons, past and present. The culture seems to be growing more tolerant and more intolerant at the same time, though perhaps different parts of it are involved in the two movements.
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  • (1 other version)Testimony and epistemic autonomy.Elizabeth Fricker - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The epistemology of testimony. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 225--253.
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  • (3 other versions)The will to believe.William James - 1896 - [New York]: Dover Publications.
    Two books bound together, from the religious period of one of the most renowned and representative thinkers. Written for laymen, thus easy to understand, it is penetrating and brilliant as well. Illuminations of age-old religious questions from a pragmatic perspective, written in a luminous style.
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  • The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. Human Immortality; Two Supposed Objections to the Doctrine.William James - 1956 - Dover Publications.
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  • Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge. [REVIEW]Jennifer Lackey - 2012 - Philosophy Now 88:44-45.
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  • (1 other version)Getting told and being believed.Richard Moran - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The epistemology of testimony. New York: Oxford University Press.
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