For many years some critically engaged German sociologists have challenged Logical Positivism with the criticism that Positivism’s allegedly neutral conception of science in fact supports conservative or even reactionary political movements. This line of criticism is due, at last in part, to the fact that German scientists became acquainted with the positivistic branch of analytical philosophy after World War II almost exclusively through the works of the liberal-conservative K. R. Popper. Popper, however, is by no means representative of all Positivists. (...) There were influential members of the Vienna Circle who saw a direct connection between the aims of the „scientific world view“ and the endeavour to renew the society on the basis of rational, i.e. socialistic, principles. This connection becomes especially clear in the manifesto Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung − Der Wiener Kreis which was published in 1929 by Carnap, Hahn and Neurath. (shrink)

It will be argued that the basic theoretical assumptions of logical empiricism do not destroy the possibility of practical reasoning, because the noncognitivity of normative or evaluative statements still guarantees rational argument over practical questions and problems. Therefore, no logical inconsistency exists between logical empiricism, its noncognitivist meta-ethics and socialist politics. In particular, logical empiricism is not committed to indifference concerning reactionary political programmes, although it itself entails no individual political programme.