Currently the focus of a heated debate among indigenous peoples, human rights advocates, crop breeders, pharmaceutical companies, conservationists, social scientists, and lawyers, the proposal would allow impoverished people in biologically rich areas to realize an economic return from resources under their care. Monetary compensation could both validate their knowledge and provide them with an equitable reward for sharing it, thereby compensating biological stewardship and encouraging conservation.

"Legend is overdue for replacement, and an adequate replacement must attend to the process of science as carefully as Hull has done. I share his vision of a serious account of the social and intellectual dynamics of science that will avoid both the rosy blur of Legend and the facile charms of relativism.... Because of [Hull's] deep concern with the ways in which research is actually done, Science as a Process begins an important project in the study of science. It (...) is one of a distinguished series of books, which Hull himself edits."—Philip Kitcher, Nature "In Science as a Process, [David Hull] argues that the tension between cooperation and competition is exactly what makes science so successful.... Hull takes an unusual approach to his subject. He applies the rules of evolution in nature to the evolution of science, arguing that the same kinds of forces responsible for shaping the rise and demise of species also act on the development of scientific ideas."—Natalie Angier, New York Times Book Review "By far the most professional and thorough case in favour of an evolutionary philosophy of science ever to have been made. It contains excellent short histories of evolutionary biology and of systematics (the science of classifying living things); an important and original account of modern systematic controversy; a counter-attack against the philosophical critics of evolutionary philosophy; social-psychological evidence, collected by Hull himself, to show that science does have the character demanded by his philosophy; and a philosophical analysis of evolution which is general enough to apply to both biological and historical change."—Mark Ridley, Times Literary Supplement "Hull is primarily interested in how social interactions within the scientific community can help or hinder the process by which new theories and techniques get accepted.... The claim that science is a process for selecting out the best new ideas is not a new one, but Hull tells us exactly how scientists go about it, and he is prepared to accept that at least to some extent, the social activities of the scientists promoting a new idea can affect its chances of being accepted."—Peter J. Bowler, Archives of Natural History "I have been doing philosophy of science now for twenty-five years, and whilst I would never have claimed that I knew everything, I felt that I had a really good handle on the nature of science, Again and again, Hull was able to show me just how incomplete my understanding was.... Moreover, [Science as a Process] is one of the most compulsively readable books that I have ever encountered."—Michael Ruse, Biology and Philosophy. (shrink)

Beginning with women's experience, the author examines the field's actual practices of reasoning and conceptualization. She argues that standard sociological methods of inquiry make use of ideological practices, transforming the actualities of people's lives into a formalized picture lacking subjects and subjectivity. The method of Smith recommends anchors a Marxist materialism, based in people's activities, to a woman's stand-point based in experience. She uses this method in a radically original way to explore ideology and objectified knowledge as the conceptual practices (...) of ruling. Smith is equally concerned with the application of sociological ideology to the human service bureacracy and the way institutions of mental health reconstruct women's lives. She provides meticulous accounts of the ways in which police reports, government statistics, hospital records, and pschiatric files are ideologically interpreted, transforming a person's life history in the process. In a revelatory chapter on the biographer Quentin Bell's account of Virginia Woolf's suicide, the author demonstrates how the text implicates the reader in the objectification of Woolf's "psychiatric problems." Highly critical of current sociological practices, The Conceptual Practices of Power both recommends and exemplifies the alternative approach that Smith presented in her earlier work, That Everyday World as Problematic, also published by Northeastern University Press. (shrink)

In this lively and accessible book Lorraine Code addresses one of the most controversial questions in contemporary theory of knowledge, a question of fundamental concern for feminist theory as well: Is the sex of the knower epistemologically significant? Responding in the affirmative, Code offers a radical alterantive to mainstream philosophy's terms for what counts as knowledge and how it is to be evaluated. Code first reviews the literature of established epistemologies and unmasks the prevailing assumption in Anglo-American philosophy that "the (...) knower" is a value-free and ideologically neutral abstraction. Approaching knowledge as a social construct produced and validated through critical dialogue, she defines the knower in light of a conception of subjectivity based on a personal relational model. Code maps out the relevance of the particular people involved in knowing: their historical specificity, the kinds of relationships they have, the effects of social position and power on those relationships, and the ways in which knowledge can change both knower and known. In an exploration of the politics of knowledge that mainstream epistemologies sustain, she examines such issues as the function of knowledge in shaping institutions and the unequal distribution of cognitive resources. What Can She Know? will raise the level of debate concerning epistemological issues among philosophers, political and social scientists, and anyone interested in feminist theory. (shrink)

Historians of science have long acknowledged the important role that journals play in the scientific enterprise. They both secure the shared values of a scientific community and certify what that community takes to be licensed knowledge. The advent of the first learned periodicals in the mid-seventeenth century was therefore a major event. But why did this event happen when it did, and how was the permanence of the learned journal secured? This paper reveals some of the answers. It examines the (...) shifting fortunes of one of the earliest of natural-philosophical periodicals, the Philosophical Transactions, launched in London in 1665 by Henry Oldenburg. The paper shows how fraught the enterprise of journal publishing was in the Europe of that period, and, not least, it draws attention to a number of publications that arose out of the commercial realm of the Restoration to rival Oldenburg's now famous creation. By doing so it helps restore to view the hard work that underpinned the republic of letters.And as for natural philosophy, is it not removed from Oxford and Cambridge to Gresham College in London, and to be learned out of their gazettes?Thomas Hobbes, Behemoth. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage, qui appartient à la décennie la plus brillante de la vie intellectuelle française au cours du siècle dernier, fit événement. Il consacrait de manière définitive la réputation de Georges Canguilhem maître théoricien de l'épistémologie historique, il articulait une lecture aujourd'hui canonique de la pensée bachelardienne et il offrait une série d'études bientôt tenues pour exemplaires. Aux spécialistes il proposait, dans des écrits appelés à devenir des références obligées, une réflexion sur l'objet et les exigences de la pratique de (...) l'histoire des sciences. Il leur soumettait aussi, requises par les progrès alors éclatants de la nouvelle biologie moléculaire, des méditations sur la nature du vivant et sur les ressorts de son activité. Acte intrépide, car s'y trouvaient mis en examen les fondements même de la philosophie biologique qui avait conféré à la pensée de Canguilhem son originalité propre. Ce livre offrait aussi une douzaine d'études accessibles à un public beaucoup plus large, illustrant les audaces, les difficultés et les accomplissements de grandes figures du passé de la science, Galilée, Claude Bernard, Auguste Comte ou Darwin. Aptes, du fait de leur parfaite lisibilité, à servir d'initiation au domaine de l'histoire des sciences et d'introduction à la pensée de leur auteur, ces études pourtant n'ont cessé d'alimenter aussi la réflexion de chercheurs chevronnés tant elles recèlent, sous leur simplicité d'approche, aperçus inattendus et profondeur de pensée. Pensée réflexive, la philosophie de Canguilhem s'affirme toujours militante, souvent polémique même. Plusieurs de ses écrits réunis ici, notamment des additions des années 1970 et 1980, voulues par lui, s'avèrent effectivement de véritables interventions philosophiques qui questionnent l'identité de la psychologie, la responsabilité du chercheur, de l'expérimentateur et, éminemment, les valeurs du médecin. Canguilhem, pour qui la méthode expérimentale elle-même est "une idée pour une éthique", n'attendait pas moins de l'histoire des sciences et de la philosophie. Comme il écrivait à propos de Galilée : le compromis n'est pas une méthode recevable; plutôt une source d'inquiétude. (shrink)

Qu'un interet renouvele se manifeste aujourd'hui pour la versant epistemologique de l'oeuvre de Gaston Bachelard peut se comprendre au regard de l'histoire contemporaine de la philosophie des sciences. Cette histoire a ete dominee durant la plus grande partie du XXe siecle par une doctrine - celle de l'empirisme (ou positivisme) logique - promue a Vienne a la fin des annees 1920 par une institution originale, le Cercle de Vienne qui publie son manifeste en 1929, et s'organise comme un mouvement a (...) visee universelle et progressiste - celui de la conception scientifique du monde. La tradition francaise de la philosophie des sciences a pris d'entree de jeu un tout autre chemin. Si elle ne les a pas ignorees, elle a refuse de souscrire aux theses majeures du positivisme logique lorsqu'il s'est presente a elle. Elle a toujours lie etroitement philosophie et histoire des sciences. Dans le titre de ce petit livre ecrit durant l'annee universitaire 1967-1968 sous la direction de Georges Canquilhem, Dominique Lecourt a avance l'expression d'epistemologie historique pour signaler, a propos de Gaston Bachelard, cette particularite. (shrink)

Scientific pluralism is an issue at the forefront of philosophy of science. This landmark work addresses the question, Can pluralism be advanced as a general, philosophical interpretation of science?

I focus here on archaeologists who work with Indigenous descendant communities in North America and address two key questions raised by their practice about the advantages of situated inquiry. First, what exactly are the benefits of collaborative practice—what does it contribute, in this case to archaeology? And, second, what is the philosophical rationale for collaborative practice? Why is it that, counter-intuitively for many, collaborative practice has the capacity to improve archaeology in its own terms and to provoke critical scrutiny of (...) its goals and methodological norms? The broader import, I argue, is a rethinking of traditional views of objectivity that takes social, contextual values to be a resource for improving what we know, rather than inevitably a source of compromising error and distortion (as discussed in detail in Chapters 7 and 9). (shrink)

Commentators on the work of Immanuel Kant have long held that his later "critical" writings are a radical rejection of his earlier, less celebrated efforts. In this pathbreaking book, Susan Shell demonstrates not only the developmental unity of Kant's individual writings, but also the unity of his work and life experience. Shell argues that the central animating issues of Kant's lifework concerned the perplexing relation of spirit to body. Through an exacting analysis of individual writings, Shell maps the philosophical contours (...) of Kant's early intellectual struggles and their relation to his more mature thought. The paradox of mind in matter and the tensions it generates—between freedom and determinacy, independence and community, ideal and real—are shown to inform the whole of his work. Shell's fresh, penetrating analysis of the precritical works will surely catapult them to new prominence in Kant studies. Shell's critique goes further to consider the context of contemporary intellectual life. She explores the fascinating realm of Kant's sexual and medical idiosyncracies, linking them to the primary concerns of his critical philosophy. She develops a sure-to-be controversial treatment of the connection between Kant's philosophy and his chronic hypochondria, and illuminates previously unforeseen connections in a remarkable convergence of life and thought, with important theoretical and practical implications for modern times. (shrink)

Feminist critiques of science provide fertile ground for any investigation of the ways in which social influences may shape the content of science. Many authors working in this field are from the natural and social sciences; others are philosophers. For philosophers of science, recent work on sexist and androcentric bias in science raises hard questions about the extent to which reigning accounts of scientific rationality can deal successfully with mounting evidence that gender ideology has had deep and extensive effects on (...) the development of many scientific disciplines.Feminist critiques of biology have been especially important in the political struggle for gender equality because biologically determinist arguments are so often cited to ‘explain’ women’s oppression. They explain why it is ‘natural’ for women to function in a socially subordinate role, why men are smarter and more aggressive than women, why women are destined to be homebodies, and why men rape. (shrink)

Why does an object or phenomenon become the subject of scientific inquiry? Why do some of these objects remain provocative, while others fade from center stage? And why do objects sometimes return as the focus of research long after they were once abandoned? Addressing such questions, _Biographies of Scientific Objects_ is about how whole domains of phenomena—dreams, atoms, monsters, culture, society, mortality, centers of gravity, value, cytoplasmic particles, the self, tuberculosis—come into being and sometimes pass away as objects of scientific (...) study. With examples drawn from both the natural and social sciences, and ranging from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries, this book explores the ways in which scientific objects are both real and historical. Whether discovered or invented, these objects of inquiry broaden and deepen in meaning—growing more "real"—as they become entangled in webs of cultural significance, material practices, and theoretical derivations. Thus their biographies will matter to anyone concerned with the formation of scientific knowledge. Contributors are Jed Z. Buchwald, Lorraine Daston, Rivka Feldhay, Jan Goldstein, Gerard Jorland, Doris Kauffman, Bruno Latour, Theodore M. Porter, Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, Marshall Sahlins, and Peter Wagner. (shrink)

"Kant and the Capacity to Judge" will prove to be an important and influential event in Kant studies and in philosophy.

"Local History/Global Designs" is one of the most important books in the historical humanities to have emerged since the end of the Cold War University. This is vintage Mignolo: packed with insights, breadth, and intellectual zeal.

This book offers an account of how values play an important role within scientific practices, and how this account illuminates many ethical issues that arise concerning scientific practices and applications.

The first English-language publication of a classic French book on the relationship between the development of photography and of the medical category of hysteria. In this classic of French cultural studies, Georges Didi-Huberman traces the intimate and reciprocal relationship between the disciplines of psychiatry and photography in the late nineteenth century. Focusing on the immense photographic output of the Salpetriere hospital, the notorious Parisian asylum for insane and incurable women, Didi-Huberman shows the crucial role played by photography in the invention (...) of the category of hysteria. Under the direction of the medical teacher and clinician Jean-Martin Charcot, the inmates of Salpetriere identified as hysterics were methodically photographed, providing skeptical colleagues with visual proof of hysteria's specific form. These images, many of which appear in this book, provided the materials for the multivolume album Iconographie photographique de la Salpetriere. As Didi-Huberman shows, these photographs were far from simply objective documentation. The subjects were required to portray their hysterical "type"—they performed their own hysteria. Bribed by the special status they enjoyed in the purgatory of experimentation and threatened with transfer back to the inferno of the incurables, the women patiently posed for the photographs and submitted to presentations of hysterical attacks before the crowds that gathered for Charcot's "Tuesday Lectures." Charcot did not stop at voyeuristic observation. Through techniques such as hypnosis, electroshock therapy, and genital manipulation, he instigated the hysterical symptoms in his patients, eventually giving rise to hatred and resistance on their part. Didi-Huberman follows this path from complicity to antipathy in one of Charcot's favorite "cases," that of Augustine, whose image crops up again and again in the Iconographie. Augustine's virtuosic performance of hysteria ultimately became one of self-sacrifice, seen in pictures of ecstasy, crucifixion, and silent cries. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Historical Contexts of Cultural Appropriation in Archaeology A Typology of Cultural Appropriation in Archaeology Modes of Resolution Conclusions Acknowledgments References.

This chapter points out that standard versions of virtue epistemology accept and are motivated by the same central problems in epistemology — such as analyzing the concepts of knowledge and justification, and addressing skeptical challenges — which motivate contemporary epistemology. The only significant difference is that virtue epistemology claims that the concepts of knowledge and justification must be analyzed in terms of virtues. What motivates virtue ethicists, however, is not what is motivating other ethicists. The contemporary census amongst ethicists has (...) a different set of problems than the ones motivating virtue ethicists. Virtue epistemologists should mount a similar challenge to their contemporaries: instead of focusing on static states such as beliefs and evaluating whether or not they are justified, they should focus their efforts on evaluating and regulating the activities of inquiry and deliberation, and the role which virtues play in such evaluation and regulation. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the standard epistemological requirements of impartiality on the part of the knower, and passivity on the part of the thing under investigation, exclude from the purview of epistemology a very important kind of knowledge, namely: knowledge of persons. Feminist philosophers have focused on problems in explaining knowledge of other persons, but the same considerations require a reorientation in the way we think of knowledge of oneself. Because of the subjectivity of the knower and reflexive nature of (...) the investigation involving self-knowledge, one's inquiry is affected in a way that challenges the accuracy of what is learned. The chapter's response is to treat the procedural methods used to obtain knowledge of oneself as continuous with the methods of acquiring knowledge of other persons via knowing their moral and cognitive characters. It highlights the intersection between virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. (shrink)

This chapter explains why virtue ethics in the latter twentieth century has taken the following two forms: the first form orders evaluative concepts and then argues that the concept of a virtue is more basic than the concepts of a right act and a good state of affairs; the second form focuses on deeper questions about the nature and ambition of modern ethics and its ability to satisfy our need for reflective guidance. The former is a common approach given its (...) focus on arguments for theory construction. The latter is more radical given that its themes are suspicious of rules and principles and, sometimes, moral theory itself. Because so many debates over virtue ethics reduce to debates over the kind of criteria needed to judge ethical theories, they will remain unresolved. Epistemologists must learn from moral philosophers about the myriad usages of virtue in language, as well as the different models each usage is working within. (shrink)

I have sketched the well-known distinction between facts and evidence not to defend or attack it , but rather as a preface to a key episode in the history of the conceptual categories of fact and evidence. My question is neither, “Do neutral facts exist?” nor “How does evidence prove or disprove?” but rather, “How did our current conceptions of neutral facts and enlisted evidence, and the distinction between them, come to be?” How did evidence come to be incompatible with (...) intention, and is it possible to imagine a kind of evidence that is intention-laden?It is my claim that partial answers to these questions lie buried in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century literature on prodigies and miracles. I shall argue that during this period prodigies briefly became the prototype for a new kind of scientific fact, and that miracles briefly exemplified a form of evidence patent to the senses and crucially dependent on intention. Both conceptions diverge sharply not only from current notions of facts and evidence, but also from medieval views on the nature of prodigies and miracles. Prodigies were originally closely akin to portent, divine signs revealing God’s will and things to come; miracles were more intimately associated with the private experience of grace than with the public evidence of the senses. Prodigies were transformed from signs into nonsignifying facts, and miracles into compelling evidence, as part of more sweeping changes in natural philosophy and theology in the mid-seventeenth century. Lorraine Daston is professor of history of science at the University of Göttingen, Federal Republic of Germany. She is the author of Classical Probability in the Enlightenment and is currently at work on a history of scientific objectivity. (shrink)

Taking into account how much modern medicine is a function of—and at the same time has a function in—science and technology, it is hardly surprising that both the approach of science studies and the idea of the social and cultural construction of health, disease, and bodies overlap, generally and specifically, in the realm of the novel field of MEDICINE STUDIES. The work already done in science and technology studies as well as in social studies of medicine, together with the rich (...) tradition of medical history and philosophy of medicine, may be considered a solid base and a good vantage point for further analysis. By exploring the shifts of knowledge production in medicine we may be able to see the driving forces behind the ongoing development of medicine and the associated transformation of its social functions in a new light. Based on historiographical reconstructions we may come up with a much more broadly contextualized understanding of the ways in which science, technology, medicine and society interact and in what regard their mutual interdependencies have been undergoing profound changes for a number of decades. By tracing the channels through which key concepts defining the relationship of medicine and its social context are negotiated, we may further explore how our notions of health, disease, and humanity are continuously morphing alongside the incessant transformations of medicine. This editorial explores the aims and scope of MEDICINE STUDIES as a truly transdisciplinary endeavor. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to understand an important passage in the history of the sciences of the psyche: starting from the psychiatric problematization — and the consequent emergence — of the concept and the object called ‘sexuality’ in the second half of the 19th century, it attempts to show a series of continuities and discontinuities between this kind of reasoning and the birth of psychoanalysis in the first years of the 20th century. The particular focus is therefore directed (...) on two texts: Krafft-Ebing’s Psychopathia Sexualis and Freud’s Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. The argument runs along three intertwined axes: (1) an historico-epistemological analysis of the concepts and their transformations in the field of the science of sexuality; (2) an analysis of the power relationships between patients and physicians; and (3) an account of the psychiatric technologies of the self that have as an effect the emergence of new forms of ‘objective’ knowledge of the subject. The broader goal is to trace a map of the simultaneous and correlate coming into being and transformations both of new forms of objects and of new forms of subjects through the mediation of scientific concepts and techniques. (shrink)

Few people, if any, still argue that science in all its aspects is a value-free endeavor. At the very least, values affect decisions about the choice of research problems to investigate and the uses to which the results of research are applied. But what about the actual doing of science? -/- As Science, Values, and Objectivity reveals, the connections and interactions between values and science are quite complex. The essays in this volume identify the crucial values that play a role (...) in science, distinguish some of the criteria that can be used for value identification, and elaborate the conditions for warranting certain values as necessary or central to the very activity of scientific research. -/- Recently, social constructivists have taken the presence of values within the scientific model to question the basis of objectivity. However, the contributors to <I>Science, Values, and Objectivity</I> recognize that such acknowledgment of the role of values does not negate the fact that objects exist in the world. Objects have the power to constrain our actions and thoughts, though the norms for these thoughts lie in the public, social world. -/- Values may be decried or defended, praised or blamed, but in a world that strives for a modicum of reason, values, too, must be reasoned. Critical assessment of the values that play a role in scientific research is as much a part of doing good science as interpreting data. (shrink)

The notorious French philosopher, literary critic and film star First translated in 1983, Dissemination contains three of Derrida's most central and seminal works: 'Plato's Pharmacy', 'The Double Session' and 'Dissemination'. The essays provide original readings of philosophy and literature, and present a re-evaluation of the logic of meaning and the function of writing in Western discourse. This is a groundbreaking work on the relationship and interplay between language, literature and philosophy.

Borderlands/La Frontera deals with the psychology of resistance to oppression. The possibility of resistance is revealed by perceiving the self in the process of being oppressed as another face of the self in the process of resisting oppression. The new mestiza consciousness is born from this interplay between oppression and resistance. Resistance is understood as social, collective activity, by adding to Anzaldúa's theory the distinction between the act and the process of resistance.

Douglas proposes a new ideal in which values serve an essential function throughout scientific inquiry, but where the role values play is constrained at key points, protecting the integrity and objectivity of science.

2009 Massachusetts Institute of Technology All rights reserved. No part of this book may ... ISBN 978-0-262-01324-6 (hardcover : alk. paper)— ISBN 978-0-262 -51304-3 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Science— Political aspects. 2. Science and state. 3 .

This is an important book precisely because there is none other quite like it.

..". thoughtful critiques of the myriad issues between women and science." -- Belles Lettres "Outstanding collection of essays that raise the fundamental questions of gender in what we have been taught are objective sciences." -- WATERwheel ..". all of the articles are well written, informative, and convincing. Admirable editorial work makes this anthology unusually helpful for scholars and students... Highly recommended... " -- Choice Questioning the objectivity of scientific inquiry, this volume addresses the scope of gender bias in science. The (...) contributors examine the ways in which science is affected by and reinforces sexist biases. The essays reveal science to be a cultural institution, structured by the political, social, and economic values of the culture within which it is practiced. (shrink)