A great deal of philosophical work has explored the complex conceptual intersection between ethics and epistemology in the context of issues of testimony and belief, and much of this work has significant educational implications. In this paper, I discuss a troubling example of a case of testimony that seems to pose a problem for some established ways of thinking about these issues and that, in turn, suggests some equally troubling educational conclusions.

The problem of imaginative resistance holds interest for aestheticians, literary theorists, ethicists, philosophers of mind, and epistemologists. We present a somewhat opinionated overview of the philosophical discussion to date. We begin by introducing the phenomenon of imaginative resistance. We then review existing responses to the problem, giving special attention to recent research directions. Finally, we consider the philosophical significance that imaginative resistance has—or, at least, is alleged to have—for issues in moral psychology, theories of cognitive architecture, and modal epistemology.

David Wiggins; IV*—Moral Cognitivism, Moral Relativism and Motivating Moral Beliefs, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 91, Issue 1, 1 June 1991, P.

Sidgwick's theses that "if I judge any action to be right for myself, I implicitly judge it to be right for any other person whose nature and circumstances do not differ from my own in certain important respects" fails to differentiate moral judgments of importantly different kinds and, In particular, Overlooks peculiarities of a kind of judgment, Made by a prospective agent, About what "he" ought to do. The court-Martial in melville's "billy budd" is closely examined as an example. Although (...) we can speak of such an agent "finding out" what he ought to do, He is not finding out what "anyone" ought to do in such a situation, But something "about himself": something, However, Which can only be expressed in moral categories. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to expand the diet of examples considered in philosophical discussions of imagination and pretense, and to offer some preliminary observations about what we might learn about the nature of imagination as a result. The article presents a number of cases involving imaginative contagion: cases where merely imagining or pretending that P has effects that we would expect only perceiving or believing that P to have. Examples are offered that involve visual imagery, motor imagery, fictional (...) emotions, and social priming. It is suggested that imaginative contagion is a more prevalent phenomenon than has typically been recognized. (shrink)

Bernard Williams; IV*—Moral Incapacity, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 93, Issue 1, 1 June 1993, Pages 59–70, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotel.

David Wiggins; IV*—Moral Cognitivism, Moral Relativism and Motivating Moral Beliefs, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 91, Issue 1, 1 June 1991, P.

Bernard Williams; IV*—Moral Incapacity, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 93, Issue 1, 1 June 1993, Pages 59–70, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotel.

Raimond Gaita draws moral philosophy away from the academic study of ethics and considers instead how real people actually think, talk and feel about morality. He explores our ideas of good and evil, and their link to our respect for human beings and the'preciousness' of each individual.