V. C. Chappell; IV*—Stuff and Things, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 71, Issue 1, 1 June 1971, Pages 61–76, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelia.

The paper develops two approaches to mass term and count noun substantivals. One treats them on the model of adjectives, Designating phases of a more basic substratum. The other treats them in a more commonsense way, As multiply designating individuals. The two accounts are tested against two problems originally raised by aristotle and heraclitus respectively. The comparison is aimed at bringing out certain central features of one-Place predication, Or more materially, Features of the notion of kind.

" It is the connected presentation of Jespersen's views of the general principles of grammar based on years of studying various languages through both direct ...

But Findlay's remark, like so much that has been written on the subject of time in the present century, was provoked in the first place by McTaggart's ...

It is argued that the usual proposals for dealing with mass-Quantification--All x is f--Are inadequate with the predicate is complex or when multiple quantification is considered. Mass-Quantification is seen as a generalisation of ordinary (thing) quantification in that the specialising assumption that the domain of quantification is atomic is not made. It is suggested that the semantic values of predicates are complete ideals of the boolean algebra consisting of the quantity which is the domain of quantification and all its sub-Quantities, (...) While logical connectives are represented by operations on complete ideals. (shrink)

If quantum mechanics (QM) is to be taken as an atomistic theory with the elementary particles as atoms (an ATEP), then the elementary particlcs must be individuals. There must then be, for each elementary particle a, a property being identical with a that a alone has. But according to QM, elementary particles of the same kind share all physical properties. Thus, if QM is an ATEP, identity is a metaphysical but not a physical property. That has unpalatable consequences. Dropping the (...) assumption that QM is an ATEP makes it possible to replace the assumption that elementary particles are individuals with the assumption that there are various kinds of elementary stuff that have smallest quantities — the smallest quantity of light, for example, is a photon. The problems about identity disappear, and the explanatory virtues of an ATEP are maintained. (shrink)

The author attacks the view that identity, Like largeness, Is a relative relation. The primary advocate of the view that identity is relative is p.T. Geach. It is argued that geach has not shown that the failure of the identity of indiscernibles principle, As a truth of logic, Forces us to stop taking indiscernibility within particular formal theories or languages as a sufficient condition for identity. The author also argues that the whole notion of relative identity, As explicated by geach, (...) Is very probably incoherent. (shrink)

A logic of intervals is proposed akin to the one published by Hamblin (Hamblin (1969) and (1971)). Like Hamblin's, the present system is also based on a single primitive. However, the work presented here differs from Hamblin's in a number of respects. Most importantly, the present system is explicitly based on mereological ideas in such a way that not only are the two notions of abutment and temporal order involved in Hamblin's primitive two-place relation "abuts at the earlier end" distinguished (...) ; the temporal ordering itself is built up from a symmetric mereological primitive. The present system is shown to be complete. (shrink)

previous theories and the relevance of those criticisms to the new accounts. Additionally, we have included a new section at the end, which gives some directions to literature outside of formal semantics in which the notion of mass has been employed. We looked at work on mass expressions in psycholinguistics and computational linguistics here, and we discussed some research in the history of philosophy and in metaphysics that makes use of the notion of mass.