Switch to: References

Citations of:

Word and Object

MIT Press (1960)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Reading the Minds of Others: Radical Interpretation and the Empirical Study of Childhood Cognitive Development.Manuela Ungureanu - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (3):527-554.
    RÉSUMÉ: Le point de vue de Davidson sur les concepts de croyance et de signification implicites dans nos pratiques d’attribution de croyance et de signification peut à bon droit être mis à l’épreuve par une élucidation de ses rapports avec la psychologie empirique. Mais une telle mise à l’épreuve n’a de valeur que si elle confronte d’abord l’id’e reçue voulant que sa position a peu ou pas de liens avec l’etude empirique du développement cognitif. Je défends ici une approche du (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Question of Moral Action: A Formalist Position.Iddo Tavory - 2011 - Sociological Theory 29 (4):272 - 293.
    This article develops a research position that allows cultural sociologists to compare morality across sociohistorical cases. In order to do so, the article suggests focusing analytic attention on actions that fulfill the following criteria: (a) actions that define the actor as a certain kind of socially recognized person, both within and across fields; (b) actions that actors experience—or that they expect others to perceive—as defining the actor both intersituationally and to a greater extent than other available definitions of self; and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Aspectos Convencionalistas da Filosofia de Willard Quine.Sofia Inês Albornoz Stein - 2003 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 7 (1-2):185-203.
    One of the main contributions of philosophers at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century to philosophy of science and semantics was the thesis inspired in the scientific advances of natural and exact sciences, that there is not a single true theory of what goes on in the empirical world, but rather the possibility of constructing multiple versions, equally satisfactory, of an explanation of the world. In the Vienna Circle, more specifically, the conventionalist movement showed (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Three Problems of Intersubjectivity—And One Solution.Wendelin Reich - 2010 - Sociological Theory 28 (1):40-63.
    Social thinkers often use the concept of intersubjectivity to mark out a problem of theoretical sociology: If people are unable to look into each others' minds, why do they often understand each other nonetheless? This issue has been debated extensively by philosophers and sociologists in three largely disconnected discourses. The article investigates the three discourses for isolable ideas that can be fitted into a sociological answer to the problem of intersubjectivity. An interactional solution, fully coherent with key insights from the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Interactive Now: A Second-Person Approach to Time-Consciousness.Stephen Langfur - 2016 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 47 (2):156-182.
    Husserl offers insight into the constituting of the self-aware ego through time-consciousness. Yet his account does not satisfactorily explain how this ego can experience itself as presently acting. Furthermore, although he acknowledges that the Now is not a knife-edge present, he does not show what determines its duration. These shortfalls and others are overcome through a change of starting point. Citing empirical evidence, I take it as a basic given that when a caregiver frontally engages an infant of two months (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Evolution of Rationality.Elliott Sober - 1981 - Synthese 46 (January):95-120.
    How could the fundamental mental operations which facilitate scientific theorizing be the product of natural selection, since it appears that such theoretical methods were neither used nor useful "in the cave"-i.e., in the sequence of environments in which selection took place? And if these wired-in information processing techniques were not selected for, how can we view rationality as an adaptation? It will be the purpose of this paper to address such questions as these, and in the process to sketch some (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   62 citations  
  • Representation and Psychological Reality.Elliott Sober - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):38-39.
    In this brief space I want to describe how Chomsky's analysis of "psychological reality" departs from what I think is a fairly standard construal of the idea. This familiar formulation arises from distinguishing between someone's following a rule and someone's acting in conformity with a rule. The former idea, but not the latter, involves the idea that the person has some mental representation of the rule that plays a certain causal role in determining behavior. Although there may be many grammatical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Was Bonaventure a Four-Dimensionalist?Damiano Costa - forthcoming - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (2):1-12.
    Bonaventure is sometimes taken to be an ante litteram champion of the four-dimensional theory of persistence. I argue that this interpretation is incorrect: Bonaventure was no four-dimensionalist.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Contextual Logic with Modalities for Time and Space.Haim Gaifman - 2008 - Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (4):433-458.
    Contextuality is trivially pervasive: all human experience takes place in endlessly changing environments and inexorably moving time frames. In order to have any meaning, the changing items must be placed within a more stable setting, a framework that is not subject to the same kind of contextual change. Total contextuality collapses into chaos, or becomes ineffable. While basic learning is highly contextual (one learns by example), what is learned transcends the examples used in the learning. Perhaps, in a similar manner, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Conservatism and its Virtues.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1989 - Synthese 79 (1):143 - 163.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Explication.Moritz Cordes & Geo Siegwart - 2018 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This encyclopedia article provides a procedural account of explication outlining each step that is part of the overall explicative effort (2). It is prefaced by a summary of the historical development of the method (1). The latter part of the article includes a rough structural theory of explication (3) and a detailed presentation of an examplary explication taken from the history of philosophy and the foundations of mathematics (4).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Nominalizing Quantifiers.Friederike Moltmann - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (5):445-481.
    Quantified expressions in natural language generally are taken to act like quantifiers in logic, which either range over entities that need to satisfy or not satisfy the predicate in order for the sentence to be true or otherwise are substitutional quantifiers. I will argue that there is a philosophically rather important class of quantified expressions in English that act quite differently, a class that includes something, nothing, and several things. In addition to expressing quantification, such expressions act like nominalizations, introducing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • On Language and the Passage of Time.Ned Markosian - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 66 (1):1 - 26.
    Since the early part of this century there has been a considerable amount of discussion of the question 'Does time pass?'. A useful way of approaching the debate over the passage of time is to consider the following thesis: The space-time thesis (SPT): Time is similar to the dimensions of space in at least this one respect: there is no set of properties such that (i) these properties are possessed by time, (ii) these properties are not possessed by any dimension (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The 3d/4d Controversy and Non-Present Objects.Ned Markosian - 1994 - Philosophical Papers 23 (3):243-249.
    Worlds, Lewis says this: Let us say that something persists iff, somehow or other, it exists at various times; this is the neutral word. Something perdures iff it persists by having different temporal parts, or stages, at different times, though no one part of it is wholly present at more than one time; whereas it endures iff it persists by being wholly present at more than one time. Perdurance corresponds to the way a road persists through space; part of it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • A Ranking‐Theoretic Approach to Conditionals.Wolfgang Spohn - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (6):1074-1106.
    Conditionals somehow express conditional beliefs. However, conditional belief is a bi-propositional attitude that is generally not truth-evaluable, in contrast to unconditional belief. Therefore, this article opts for an expressivistic semantics for conditionals, grounds this semantics in the arguably most adequate account of conditional belief, that is, ranking theory, and dismisses probability theory for that purpose, because probabilities cannot represent belief. Various expressive options are then explained in terms of ranking theory, with the intention to set out a general interpretive scheme (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Coevolution of Lexicon and Syntax From a Simulation Perspective.Tao Gong, James W. Minett, Jinyun Ke, John H. Holland & William S.-Y. Wang - 2005 - Complexity 10 (6):50-62.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Ontology of Musical Works: A Philosophical Pseudo-Problem.James Young - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (2):284-297.
    A bewildering array of accounts of the ontology of musical works is available. Philosophers have held that works of music are sets of performances, abstract, eternal sound-event types, initiated types, compositional action types, compositional action tokens, ideas in a composer’s mind and continuants that perdure. This paper maintains that questions in the ontology of music are, in Rudolf Carnap’s sense of the term, pseudo-problems. That is, there is no alethic basis for choosing between rival musical ontologies. While we have no (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Indeterminacy of Translation: Fifty Years Later.Stephen L. White - 2012 - Disputatio 4 (32):385 - 393.
    The paper considers the Quinean heritage of the argument for the indeterminacy of translation. Beyond analyzing Quine’s notion of stimulus meaning, the paper discusses two Kripkean argument’s against the Quinean claim that dispositions can provide the basis for an account of meaning: the Normativity Argument and the Finiteness Argument. An analogy between Kripke’s arguments and Hume’s argument for epistemological skepticism about the external world will be drawn. The paper shows that the answer to Kripke’s rule-following skepticism is analogous to the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Indispensability Arguments and Their Quinean Heritage.Jacob Busch & Andrea Sereni - 2012 - Disputatio 4 (32):343 - 360.
    Indispensability arguments for mathematical realism are commonly traced back to Quine. We identify two different Quinean strands in the interpretation of IA, what we label the ‘logical point of view’ and the ‘theory-contribution’ point of view. Focusing on each of the latter, we offer two minimal versions of IA. These both dispense with a number of theoretical assumptions commonly thought to be relevant to IA. We then show that the attribution of both minimal arguments to Quine is controversial, and stress (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • An Ideal Solution to Disputes About Multiply Realized Kinds.Colin Klein - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):161 - 177.
    Multiply realizable kinds are scientifically problematic, for it appears that we should not expect discoveries about them to hold of other members of that kind. As such, it looks like MR kinds should have no place in the ontology of the special sciences. Many resist this conclusion, however, because we lack a positive account of the role that certain realization-unrestricted terms play in special science explanations. I argue that many such terms actually pick out idealizing models. Idealizing explanation has many (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Models and Fictions in Science.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (1):101 - 116.
    Non-actual model systems discussed in scientific theories are compared to fictions in literature. This comparison may help with the understanding of similarity relations between models and real-world target systems. The ontological problems surrounding fictions in science may be particularly difficult, however. A comparison is also made to ontological problems that arise in the philosophy of mathematics.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   63 citations  
  • How Superduper Does a Physicalist Supervenience Need to Be?Jessica M. Wilson - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (194):33-52.
    Note: this is the first published presentation and defense of the 'proper subset strategy' for making sense of non-reductive physicalism or the associated notion of realization; this is sometimes, inaccurately, called "Shoemaker's subset strategy"; if people could either call it the 'subset strategy' or better yet, add my name to the mix I would appreciate it. Horgan claims that physicalism requires "superdupervenience" -- supervenience plus robust ontological explanation of the supervenient in terms of the base properties. I argue that Horgan's (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   86 citations  
  • Disentangling Dynamics, Computation, and Cognition.Tim van Gelder - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):654-661.
    The nature of the dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science (the DH) is further clarified in responding to various criticisms and objections raised in commentaries. Major topics addressed include the definitions of “dynamical system” and “digital computer;” the DH as Law of Qualitative Structure; the DH as an ontological claim; the multiple-realizability of dynamical models; the level at which the DH is pitched; the nature of dynamics; the role of representations in dynamical cognitive science; the falsifiability of the DH; the extent (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Evolution, Teleology, Intentionality.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):89-391.
    No response that was not as long and intricate as the two commentaries combined could do justice to their details, so what follows will satisfy nobody, myself included. I will concentrate on one issue discussed by both commentators: the relationship between evolution and teleological (or intentional) explanation. My response, in its brevity, may have just one virtue: it will confirm some of the hunches (or should I say suspicions) that these and other writers have entertained about my views. For more (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Span Operators.B. Brogaard - 2007 - Analysis 67 (1):72-79.
    I. Tensed Plural Quantifiers Presentists typically assent to a range of tensed statements, for instance, that there were dinosaurs, that there was a president named Lincoln, and that my future grandchildren will be on their way to school.1 Past- and future-tensed claims are dealt with by introducing primitive, intensional tense operators, for instance, it has been 12 years ago that, it was the case when I was born that, and it will be the case that (Prior 1968). For example, ‘there (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • The Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science.Tim van Gelder - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):615-28.
    The dynamical hypothesis is the claim that cognitive agents are dynamical systems. It stands opposed to the dominant computational hypothesis, the claim that cognitive agents are digital computers. This target article articulates the dynamical hypothesis and defends it as an open empirical alternative to the computational hypothesis. Carrying out these objectives requires extensive clarification of the conceptual terrain, with particular focus on the relation of dynamical systems to computers.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   125 citations  
  • Affective States and Epistemic Immediacy.Christopher Hookway - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):78-96.
    Ethics studies the evaluation of actions, agents and their mental states and characters from a distinctive viewpoint or employing a distinctive vocabulary. And epistemology examines the evaluation of actions (inquiries and assertions), agents (believers and inquirers), and their states (belief and attitudes) from a different viewpoint. Given this common concern with evaluation, we should surely expect there to be considerable similarities between the issues examined and the ideas employed in the two areas. However, when we examine most textbooks in ethics (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Is the Mind Conscious, Functional, or Both?Max Velmans - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):629-630.
    What, in essence, characterizes the mind? According to Searle, the potential to be conscious provides the only definitive criterion. Thus, conscious states are unquestionably "mental"; "shallow unconscious" states are also "mental" by virtue of their capacity to be conscious (at least in principle); but there are no "deep unconscious mental states" - i.e. those rules and procedures without access to consciousness, inferred by cognitive science to characterize the operations of the unconscious mind are not mental at all. Indeed, according to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   105 citations  
  • From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
    Frank Jackson champions the cause of conceptual analysis as central to philosophical inquiry. In recent years conceptual analysis has been undervalued and widely misunderstood, suggests Jackson. He argues that such analysis is mistakenly clouded in mystery, preventing a whole range of important questions from being productively addressed. He anchors his argument in discussions of specific philosophical issues, starting with the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism and moving on, via free will, meaning, personal identity, motion, and change, to ethics and the philosophy (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   468 citations  
  • Analyticity and Incorrigibility.Manuel Campos - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):689-708.
    The traditional point of view on analyticity implies that truth in virtue only of meaning entails a priori acceptability and vice versa. The argument for this claim is based on the idea that meaning as it concerns truth and meaning as it concerns competence are one and the same thing. In this paper I argue that the extensions of these notions do not coincide. I hold that truth in virtue of meaning— truth for semantic reasons—doesn't imply a priori acceptability, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Motivating Reductionism About Sets.Alexander Paseau - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):295 – 307.
    The paper raises some difficulties for the typical motivations behind set reductionism, the view that sets are reducible to entities identified independently of set theory.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Metaphysics of Quantity.Brent Mundy - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (1):29 - 54.
    A formal theory of quantity T Q is presented which is realist, Platonist, and syntactically second-order (while logically elementary), in contrast with the existing formal theories of quantity developed within the theory of measurement, which are empiricist, nominalist, and syntactically first-order (while logically non-elementary). T Q is shown to be formally and empirically adequate as a theory of quantity, and is argued to be scientifically superior to the existing first-order theories of quantity in that it does not depend upon empirically (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  • The Metaphysical Equivalence Of Three And Four Dimensionalism.Kristie Miller - 2004 - Erkenntnis 62 (1):91-117.
    I argue that two competing accounts of persistence, three and four dimensionalism, are in fact metaphysically equivalent. I begin by clearly defining three and four dimensionalism, and then I show that the two theories are intertranslatable and equally simple. Through consideration of a number of different cases where intuitions about persistence are contradictory, I then go on to show that both theories describe these cases in the same manner. Further consideration of some empirical issues arising from the theory of special (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • From Geometry to Conceptual Relativity.Thomas William Barrett & Hans Halvorson - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (5):1043-1063.
    The purported fact that geometric theories formulated in terms of points and geometric theories formulated in terms of lines are “equally correct” is often invoked in arguments for conceptual relativity, in particular by Putnam and Goodman. We discuss a few notions of equivalence between first-order theories, and we then demonstrate a precise sense in which this purported fact is true. We argue, however, that this fact does not undermine metaphysical realism.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Pragmatics and Intensional Logic.Richard Montague - 1970 - Synthese 22 (1-2):68--94.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   56 citations  
  • The Same Name.Mark Sainsbury - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (S2):195-214.
    When are two tokens of a name tokens of the same name? According to this paper, the answer is a matter of the historical connections between the tokens. For each name, there is a unique originating event, and subsequent tokens are tokens of that name only if they derive in an appropriate way from that originating event. The conditions for a token being a token of a given name are distinct from the conditions for preservation of the reference of a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Saving Mental Fictionalism From Cognitive Collapse.Meg Wallace - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (2):405-424.
    Mental fictionalism maintains that: folk psychology is a false theory, but we should nonetheless keep using it, because it is useful, convenient, or otherwise beneficial to do so. We should treat folk psychology as a useful fiction—false, but valuable. Yet some argue that mental fictionalism is incoherent: if a mental fictionalist rejects folk psychology then she cannot appeal to fictions in an effort to keep folk psychological discourse around, because fictions presuppose the legitimacy of folk psychology. Call this the Argument (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology.J. A. Fodor - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):63-73.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   578 citations  
  • Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.
    How come we can represent Bigfoot even though Bigfoot does not exist, given that representing something involves bearing a relation to it and we cannot bear relations to what does not exist?This is the problem of intentional inexistence. This paper develops a two-step solution to this problem, involving an adverbial account of conscious representation, or phenomenal inten- tionality, and the thesis that all representation derives from conscious representation. The solution is correspondingly two-part: we can consciously represent Bigfoot because consciously representing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  • Proof-Theoretic Reconstruction of Generalized Quantifiers.Nissim Francez & Gilad Ben-Avi - 2015 - Journal of Semantics 32 (3):313-371.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Explication Defended.Patrick Maher - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):331-341.
    How can formal methods be applied to philosophical problems that involve informal concepts of ordinary language? Carnap answered this question by describing a methodology that he called “explication." Strawson objected that explication changes the subject and does not address the original philosophical problem; this paper shows that Carnap’s response to that objection was inadequate and offers a better response. More recent criticisms of explication by Boniolo and Eagle are shown to rest on misunderstandings of the nature of explication. It is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • The Constituents of an Explication.Moritz Cordes - forthcoming - Synthese.
    The method of explication has been somewhat of a hot topic in the last ten years. Despite the multifaceted research that has been directed at the issue, one may perceive a lack of step-by-step procedural or structural accounts of explication. This paper aims at providing a structural account of the method of explication in continuation of the works of Geo Siegwart. It is enhanced with a detailed terminology for the assessment and comparison of explications. The aim is to provide means (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Contrapositivism; or, The Only Evidence Worth Paying for is Contained in the Negatives.David Miller - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):256-257.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Transparent Quantification Into Hyperintensional Objectual Attitudes.Bjørn Jespersen & Marie Duží - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):635-677.
    We demonstrate how to validly quantify into hyperintensional contexts involving non-propositional attitudes like seeking, solving, calculating, worshipping, and wanting to become. We describe and apply a typed extensional logic of hyperintensions that preserves compositionality of meaning, referential transparency and substitutivity of identicals also in hyperintensional attitude contexts. We specify and prove rules for quantifying into hyperintensional contexts. These rules presuppose a rigorous method for substituting variables into hyperintensional contexts, and the method will be described. We prove the following. First, it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Inscriptionalism and Intensionality.David Parsons - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (2):567-585.
    Intensional contexts are typically characterised by an apparent failure of either (A) the principle of the inter-substitution of co-referring terms salva veritate, or (B) existential generalisation. The difficulties which are seen to occur do so in contexts involving either modality or the propositional attitudes. In this paper attempts are made to determine whether or not Scheffler’s inscriptional analysis can provide a viable means of accounting for the problems which are thought to occur in intensional contexts. Somewhat unexpectedly, little effort has (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • What is Metaphysical Equivalence?Kristie Miller - 2005 - Philosophical Papers 34 (1):45-74.
    Abstract Theories are metaphysically equivalent just if there is no fact of the matter that could render one theory true and the other false. In this paper I argue that if we are judiciously to resolve disputes about whether theories are equivalent or not, we need to develop testable criteria that will give us epistemic access to the obtaining of the relation of metaphysical equivalence holding between those theories. I develop such ?diagnostic? criteria. I argue that correctly inter-translatable theories are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Plato and the Norms of Thought.R. Woolf - 2013 - Mind 122 (485):171-216.
    This paper argues for the presence in Plato’s work of a conception of thinking central to which is what I call the Transparency View. According to this view, in order for a subject to think of a given object, the subject must represent that object just as it is, without inaccuracy or distortion. I examine the ways in which this conception influences Plato’s epistemology and metaphysics and explore some ramifications for contemporary views about mental content.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Cornucopia of Formal-Ontological Relations.Barry Smith & Pierre Grenon - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (3):279–296.
    The paper presents a new method for generating typologies of formal-ontological relations. The guiding idea is that formal relations are those sorts of relations which hold between entities which are constituents of distinct ontologies. We provide examples of ontologies (in the spirit of Zemach’s classic “Four Ontologies” of 1970), and show how these can be used to give a rich typology of formal relations in a way which also throws light on the opposition between threeand four-dimensionalism.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • A Theorical Point of View of Reality, Perception, and Language.Josué Antonio Nescolarde-Selva, Josep-Lluis Usó-Doménech & Hugh Gash - 2014 - Complexity 20 (1):27-37.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • On Simple Facts.M. Oreste Fiocco - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (3):287-313.
    It is plausible that every true representation is made true by something in the world beyond itself. I believe that a simple fact is the truthmaker of each true proposition. Simple facts are not familiar entities. This lack of familiarity might lead many to regard them with suspicion, to think that including them in one’s ontology is an ad hoc maneuver. Although such suspicion is warranted initially, it is, I believe, ultimately unfounded. In this paper, I first present what I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation