This chapter, which examines what it meant to become a philosopher and work in the field of philosophy in Great Britain during the seventeenth century, analyzes the factors that influenced people to become philosophers and describes the circumstances in which they studied philosophy. It identifies a pattern by which the schools provided a preliminary framework for becoming a philosopher that later served as a creative foil for the pursuit of a philosophical career beyond the schools. The chapter also highlights the (...) key developments during this period, which include the increasing prominence of theistic philosophical apologetics and the emergence of experimental natural philosophy. (shrink)

Examines the nature and origins of Hobbes's Biblical criticism, concentrating on what has always seemed his most radical claim—the argument that the Pentateuch was written not by Moses but by a much later figure, Ezra the Scribe. It traces the origins of this theory, showing how some key elements of Hobbes's biblical criticism were already present in the mainstream tradition; but it argues that Hobbes's insistence on the grounding of the authority of the text in political authority did give a (...) radical new edge to his theory. Finally, it considers whether it is correct to describe Hobbes as having founded modern biblical criticism. (shrink)

Historians of fourteenth-century science have long recognized the extraordinary work at both Oxford and Paris in which natural philosophy was becoming highly mathematical. The movement to subject natural philosophy to a mathematical analysis and to quantify such qualities as heat, color, and of course speed surely stands as one of the most significant aspects of late medieval science. Yet as Edith Sylla has observed, because qualities and quantities pertain to different categories in Aristotelian theory, one might expect Aristotelian theorists to (...) avoid quantifying qualities. Even more serious still, the very task of quantifying physical qualities exposes a tension in the nature of science that was discussed first by Aristotle in his Posterior Analytics. (shrink)

In spite of vigorous opposition by a number of historians it has now become a commonplace that the rapid development of the ‘new philosophy’ sprang from the ideology of Puritanism. What began its career as the ‘Merton thesis’ has now been refined, developed, and so often repeated that it seems to be almost unassailable. However, the two foremost historians in the entrenchment of this new orthodoxy are willing, in principle, to concede that ‘in reality things were very mixed up’, and (...) that non-Puritan natural philosophers at the time were operating ‘in a precisely similar manner’ to their Puritan contemporaries. Indeed, it would be impossible not to concede this in the face of the many critiques launched against the Merton thesis. (shrink)