- Discrimination and Self-Knowledge.Patrick Greenough - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. , US: Oxford University Press.details
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Williamson on Knowledge.Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.) - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts.Kent Bach & Robert M. Harnish - 1979 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.details
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(1 other version)The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays.Steven Luper (ed.) - 2003 - Ashgate Publishing.details
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Learning from words: testimony as a source of knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford [Eng.]: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)How to defeat opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:137-49.details
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Knowledge, luck and lotteries.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Aldershot, England and Burlington, VT, USA: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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(1 other version)Knowing and asserting.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489-523.details
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Anti-luck epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):277-297.details
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Testimonial knowledge and transmission.Jennifer Lackey - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):471-490.details
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Knowledge, assertion and lotteries.Keith DeRose - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):568–580.details
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Hawthorne’s Lottery Puzzle and the Nature of Belief.Christopher S. Hill & Joshua Schechter - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):120-122.details
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Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Norms of assertion.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 233--250.details
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Assertion and The Provision of Knowledge.Charlie Pelling - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (251):293-312.details
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Skepticism and Contextualism.Ernest Sosa - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s1):1-18.details
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Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.details
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(1 other version)Assertion, knowledge, and context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.details
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Knowledge and its Limits. [REVIEW]L. Horsten - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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(1 other version)Ignorance : a case for scepticism.Peter Unger - 1975 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 166 (3):371-372.details
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(1 other version)Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter Unger - 1975 - Philosophy 50 (194):489-490.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.details
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Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge. [REVIEW]Jennifer Lackey - 2012 - Philosophy Now 88:44-45.details
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Unsafe Knowledge.Juan Comesaña - 2005 - Synthese 146 (3):395-404.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2009 - In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 140--160.details
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Replies to critics.Timothy Williamson - 2009 - In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 279--384.details
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Luminosity and the safety of knowledge.Ram Neta & Guy Rohrbaugh - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):396–406.details
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Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:191-220.details
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(2 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.details
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Restorative Rigging and the Safe Indication Account.S. Luper - 2006 - Synthese 153 (1):161-170.details
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Assertion, Moore, and Bayes.Igor Douven - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):361-375.details
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Probability and Assertion.V. H. Dudman - 1992 - Analysis 52 (4):204 - 211.details
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Testimony, knowledge, and epistemic goals.Steven L. Reynolds - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (2):139 - 161.details
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(1 other version)How to Defeat Opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):141-153.details
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(1 other version)Indiscernability skepticism.Steven Luper - manuscriptdetails
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