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What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450.details
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Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science.Andy Clark - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):181-204.details
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The Measurement Problem of Consciousness.Heather Browning & Walter Veit - 2020 - Philosophical Topics 48 (1):85-108.details
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Quantity of experience: brain-duplication and degrees of consciousness. [REVIEW]Nick Bostrom - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (2):185-200.details
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Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.details
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From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0.Masafumi Oizumi, Larissa Albantakis & Giulio Tononi - 2014 - PLOS Computational Biology 10 (5):e1003588.details
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One self: The logic of experience.Arnold Zuboff - 1990 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):39-68.details
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Attentional Structure and Phenomenal Unity.Wanja Wiese - 2022 - Open Philosophy 5 (1):254-264.details
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Structural Representations and the Brain.Oron Shagrir - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):519-545.details
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The content of Marr’s information-processing framework.J. Brendan Ritchie - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (7):1078-1099.details
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Modeling Working Memory to Identify Computational Correlates of Consciousness.James A. Reggia, Garrett E. Katz & Gregory P. Davis - 2019 - Open Philosophy 2 (1):252-269.details
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Philosophical thought experiments as heuristics for theory discovery.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Sara Kier Praëm - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2827-2842.details
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Functionalism, Computationalism, & Mental States.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 35 (4):811-833.details
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Functionalism, computationalism, and mental contents.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):375-410.details
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Towards a true neural stance on consciousness.Victor A. F. Lamme - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (11):494-501.details
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Why induction is no cure for baldness.Yuval Dolev - 2004 - Philosophical Investigations 27 (4):328–344.details
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The unfolding argument: Why IIT and other causal structure theories cannot explain consciousness.Adrien Doerig, Aaron Schurger, Kathryn Hess & Michael H. Herzog - 2019 - Consciousness and Cognition 72:49-59.details
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A computational foundation for the study of cognition.David Chalmers - 2011 - Journal of Cognitive Science 12 (4):323-357.details
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Integrated Information Theory: From Consciousness to Its Physical Substrate.Giulio Tononi, Melanie Boly, Marcello Massimini & Christof Koch - 2016 - Nature Reviews Neuroscience 17 (7):450--461.details
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The myth of the Turing machine: The failings of functionalism and related theses.Chris Eliasmith - 2002 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 14 (1):1-8.details
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The Phi Measure of Integrated Information is not Well-Defined for General Phsyical Systems.A. B. Barrett & P. A. M. Mediano - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (1-2):11-20.details
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Consciousness: Here, There and Everywhere?Giulio Tononi & Christof Koch - 2015 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 370 (1668):20140167.details
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The CEMI Field Theory Closing the Loop.Johnjoe McFadden - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (1-2):1-2.details
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