According to a common presentation, Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics is the view according to which the entities with which mathematics is concerned, numbers, are abstract objects which exist independently of the mind. The latter feature, in particular, is alleged to secure the “realist” component of mathematical Platonism. Surprisingly enough, however, this characterization of Platonism is not normally paired with a philosophical explanation of the implicated notion of mind-dependent existence. Since there seems to be more than one metaphysically relevant (...) sense in which an entity may be said to depend on the mind, this is not a minor lack; for not every such sense seems to be relevant to the realism issue. This paper is aimed to fill this gap, and to provide the Platonist with a conceptual analysis of the realism-relevant sense in which her claim that numbers exist mind-independently should be understood. Result of this analysis will also be the conclusion that Non-Gödelian Platonism, a view recently proposed by J. Divers and A. Miller, should not be really regarded as a form of Platonism. (shrink)

This highly acclaimed book is a major contribution to the philosophy of language as well as a systematic interpretation of Frege, indisputably the father of ...

Mathematicians tend to think of themselves as scientists investigating the features of real mathematical things, and the wildly successful application of mathematics in the physical sciences reinforces this picture of mathematics as an objective study. For philosophers, however, this realism about mathematics raises serious questions: What are mathematical things? Where are they? How do we know about them? Offering a scrupulously fair treatment of both mathematical and philosophical concerns, Penelope Maddy here delineates and defends a novel version of mathematical realism. (...) She answers the traditional questions and poses a challenging new one, refocusing philosophical attention on the pressing foundational issues of contemporary mathematics. (shrink)

Since Edmund L. Gettier reminded us recently of a certain important inadequacy of the traditional analysis of "S knows that p," several attempts have been made to correct that analysis. In this paper I shall offer still another analysis (or a sketch of an analysis) of "S knows that p," one which will avert Gettier's problem. My concern will be with knowledge of empirical propositions only, since I think that the traditional analysis is adequate for knowledge of nonempirical truths.

This essay distinguishes between metaphysical and epistemological conceptions of analyticity. The former is the idea of a sentence that is ‘true purely in virtue of its meaning’ while the latter is the idea of a sentence that ‘can be justifiably believed merely on the basis of understanding its meaning’. It further argues that, while Quine may have been right to reject the metaphysical notion, the epistemological notion can be defended from his critique and put to work explaining a priori justification. (...) Along the way, a number of further distinctions relevant to the theory of analyticity and the theory of apriority are made and their significance is explained. (shrink)

Schlick glaubt, daß 'S ist analytisch' gleichermaßen erläutert werden kann durch die Bestimmungen (1) 'S ist tautologisch', (2) 'S ist formal wahr' und (3) 'S wüd von jedem sogleich als wahr anerkannt, der S versteht'. Gemessen an Schlicks eigenen Intentionen scheitert jeder dieser Erläuterungsversuche. Aber vielleicht kann Bestimmung (3), deren Vorgeschichte bei Thomas, Locke und Frege skizziert wird, als Basis für eine Verteidigung der Distinktion analytisch/synthetisch dienen. Eine Explikation des Begriffs 'trivialanalytisch' (t-a) wird vorgeschlagen, welche die folgende These plausibel machen (...) soll: S ist analytisch genau dann, wenn S t-a ist oder aus t-a Sätzen in t-a Schritten bewiesen werden kann. (shrink)

These essays by a major epistemologist reconfigure philosophical projects across a wide spectrum, from mind to metaphysics, from epistemology to social power. Several of Goldman's classic essays are included along with many newer writings. Together these trace and continue the development of the author's unique blend of naturalism and reliabilism. Part I defends the simulation approach to mentalistic ascription and explores the psychological mechanisms of ontological individuation. Part II shows why epistemology needs help from cognitive science - not only to (...) evaluate cognitive agents but also to illuminate the practices of epistemic evaluators. Parts III and IV explain how philosophical projects can be reshaped through interchange with social science. An epistemological study of scientific activity exploits the economic paradigm, and philosophical tools are applied to analyze power in society. (shrink)