This essay is structured around the bifurcation between proofs and models: The first section discusses Proof Theory of relevant and substructural logics, and the second covers the Model Theory of these logics. This order is a natural one for a history of relevant and substructural logics, because much of the initial work — especially in the Anderson–Belnap tradition of relevant logics — started by developing proof theory. The model theory of relevant logic came some time later. As we will see, (...) Dunn’s algebraic models [76, 77] Urquhart’s operational semantics [267, 268] and Routley and Meyer’s relational semantics [239, 240, 241] arrived decades after the initial burst of activity from Alan Anderson and Nuel Belnap. The same goes for work on the Lambek calculus: although inspired by a very particular application in linguistic typing, it was developed first proof-theoretically, and only later did model theory come to the fore. Girard’s linear logic is a different story: it was discovered though considerations of the categorical models of coherence.. (shrink)

This paper contains some contributions to the study of Belnap's four-valued logic from an algebraic point of view. We introduce a finite Hilbert-style axiomatization of this logic, along with its well-known semantical presentation, and a Gentzen calculus that slightly differs from the usual one in that it is closer to Anderson and Belnap's formalization of their “logic of first-degree entailments”. We prove several Completeness Theorems and reduce every formula to an equivalent normal form. The Hilbert-style presentation allows us to characterize (...) the Leibniz congruence of the matrix models of the logic, and to find that the class of algebraic reducts of its reduced matrices is strictly smaller than the variety of De Morgan lattices. This means that the links between the logic and this class of algebras cannot be fully explained in terms of matrices, as in more classical logics. It is through the use of abstract logics as models that we are able to confirm that De Morgan lattices are indeed the algebraic counterpart of Belnap's logic, in the sense of Font and Jansana's recent theory of full models for sentential logics. Among other characterizations, we prove that its full models are those abstract logics that are finitary, do not have theorems, and satisfy the metalogical properties of Conjunction, Disjunction, Double Negation, and Weak Contraposition. As a consequence, we find that the Gentzen calculus presented at the beginning is strongly adequate for Belnap's logic and is algebraizable in the sense of Rebagliato and Verdú, having the variety of De Morgan lattices as its equivalent algebraic semantics. (shrink)