In view of the limitations of classical, free, and modal logics to deal with fictional names, we develop in this paper a four-valued logical framework that we see as a promising strategy for modeling contexts of reasoning in which those names occur. Specifically, we propose to evaluate statements in terms of factual and fictional truth values in such a way that, say, declaring ‘Socrates is a man’ to be true does not come down to the same thing as declaring ‘Sherlock (...) Holmes is a man’ to be so. As a result, our framework is capable of representing reasoning involving fictional characters that avoids evaluating statements according to the same semantic standards. The framework encompasses two logics that differ according to alternative ways one may interpret the relationships among the factual and fictional truth values. (shrink)

Some find it plausible that a sufficiently long duration of torture is worse than any duration of mild headaches. Similarly, it has been claimed that a million humans living great lives is better than any number of worm-like creatures feeling a few seconds of pleasure each. Some have related bad things to good things along the same lines. For example, one may hold that a future in which a sufficient number of beings experience a lifetime of torture is bad, regardless (...) of what else that future contains, while minor bad things, such as slight unpleasantness, can always be counterbalanced by enough good things. Among the most common objections to such ideas are sequence arguments. But sequence arguments are usually formulated in classical logic. One might therefore wonder if they work if we instead adopt many-valued logic. I show that, in a common many-valued logical framework, the answer depends on which versions of transitivity are used as premises. We get valid sequence arguments if we grant any of several strong forms of transitivity of 'is at least as bad as' and a notion of completeness. Other, weaker forms of transitivity lead to invalid sequence arguments. The plausibility of the premises is largely set aside here, but I tentatively note that almost all of the forms of transitivity that lead to valid sequence arguments seem intuitively problematic. Still, a few moderately strong forms of transitivity that might be acceptable lead to valid sequence arguments, although weaker statements of the initial value claims avoid these arguments at least to some extent. (shrink)

In 2016 Beziau, introduce a more restricted concept of paraconsistency, namely the genuine paraconsistency. He calls genuine paraconsistent logic those logic rejecting φ, ¬φ |- ψ and |- ¬(φ ∧ ¬φ). In that paper the author analyzes, among the three-valued logics, which of these logics satisfy this property. If we consider multiple-conclusion consequence relations, the dual properties of those above mentioned are: |- φ, ¬φ, and ¬(ψ ∨ ¬ψ) |- . We call genuine paracomplete logics those rejecting the mentioned properties. (...) We present here an analysis of the three-valued genuine paracomplete logics. (shrink)

In this paper, I will defend a new compositional semantics for single-domain free logic. This semantics makes use of a distinction between the semantic value of a singular term and its semantic referent. The semantic value of a singular term is conceived of as a set that either contains the semantic referent or no element at all. The semantic referent is the object that the term designates. Before I will introduce this new semantics for single-domain predicate and an S5-type modal (...) logic in detail, I will present five related problems of compositionality of the standard semantics for these logical systems. After that I will show in detail how my new proposed alternative semantics can be used to solve nearly all of the outlined five problems. (shrink)

This paper discusses a dualization of Fitting's notion of a "cut-down" operation on a bilattice, rendering a "track-down" operation, later used to represent the idea that a consistent opinion cannot arise from a set including an inconsistent opinion. The logic of track-down operations on bilattices is proved equivalent to the logic d_Sfde, dual to Deutsch's system S_fde. Furthermore, track-down operations are employed to provide an epistemic interpretation for paraconsistent weak Kleene logic. Finally, two logics of sequential combinations of cut-and track-down (...) operations allow settling positively the question of whether bilattice-based semantics are available for subsystems of S_fde. (shrink)

Psychological research on people’s understanding of natural language connectives has traditionally used truth table tasks, in which participants evaluate the truth or falsity of a compound sentence given the truth or falsity of its components in the framework of propositional logic. One perplexing result concerned the indicative conditional if A then C which was often evaluated as true when A and C are true, false when A is true and C is false but irrelevant“ (devoid of value) when A is (...) false (whatever the value of C). This was called the “psychological defective table of the conditional.” Here we show that far from being anomalous the “defective” table pattern reveals a coherent semantics for the basic connectives of natural language in a trivalent framework. This was done by establishing participants’ truth tables for negation, conjunction, disjunction, conditional, and biconditional, when they were presented with statements that could be certainly true, certainly false, or neither. We review systems of three-valued tables from logic, linguistics, foundations of quantum mechanics, philosophical logic, and artificial intelligence, to see whether one of these systems adequately describes people’s interpretations of natural language connectives. We find that de Finetti’s (1936/1995) three-valued system is the best approximation to participants’ truth tables. (shrink)

There is a growing interest in the foundations as well as the application of imprecise probability in contemporary epistemology. This dissertation is concerned with the application. In particular, the research presented concerns ways in which imprecise probability, i.e. sets of probability measures, may helpfully address certain philosophical problems pertaining to rational belief. The issues I consider are disagreement among epistemic peers, complete ignorance, and inductive reasoning with imprecise priors. For each of these topics, it is assumed that belief can be (...) modeled with imprecise probability, and thus there is a non-classical solution to be given to each problem. I argue that this is the case for peer disagreement and complete ignorance. However, I discovered that the approach has its shortcomings, too, specifically in regard to inductive reasoning with imprecise priors. Nevertheless, the dissertation ultimately illustrates that imprecise probability as a model of rational belief has a lot of promise, but one should be aware of its limitations also. (shrink)

In this paper we show how ideas coming from two areas of research in logic can reinforce each other. The first such line of inquiry concerns the "dynamic turn" in logic and especially the formalisms inspired by Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL); while the second line concerns research into the logical foundations of Quantum Physics, and in particular the area known as Operational Quantum Logic, as developed by Jauch and Piron (Helve Phys Acta 42: 842-848, 1969), Pirón (Foundations of Quantum Physics, (...) 1976). By bringing these areas together we explain the basic ingredients of Dynamic Quantum Logic, a new direction of research in the logical foundations of physics. (shrink)

A curious feature of Belnap’s “useful four-valued logic”, also known as first-degree entailment (FDE), is that the overdetermined value B (both true and false) is treated as a designated value. Although there are good theoretical reasons for this, it seems prima facie more plausible to have only one of the four values designated, namely T (exactly true). This paper follows this route and investigates the resulting logic, which we call Exactly True Logic.

ukasiewicz''s four-valued modal logic is surveyed and analyzed, together with ukasiewicz''s motivations to develop it. A faithful interpretation of it in classical (non-modal) two-valued logic is presented, and some consequences are drawn concerning its classification and its algebraic behaviour. Some counter-intuitive aspects of this logic are discussed in the light of the presented results, ukasiewicz''s own texts, and related literature.

I highlight the importance of the notion of falsity for a semantical consideration of intuitionistic logic. One can find two principal (and non-equivalent) versions of such a notion in the literature, namely, falsity as non-truth and falsity as truth of a negative proposition. I argue in favor of the first version as the genuine intuitionistic notion of falsity.

Tagmemic theory as a semiotic theory can be used to analyze multiple systems of logic and to assess their strengths and weaknesses. This analysis constitutes an application of semiotics and also a contribution to understanding of the nature of logic within the context of human meaning. Each system of logic is best adapted to represent one portion of human rationality. Acknowledging this correlation between systems and their targets helps explain the usefulness of more than one system. Among these systems, the (...) two-valued system of classical logic takes its place. All the systems of logic can be incorporated into a complex mathematical model that has a place for each system and that represents a larger whole in human reasoning. The model can represent why tight formal systems of logic can be applied in some contexts with great success, but in other contexts are not directly applicable. The result suggests that human reasoning is innately richer than any one formal system of logic. (shrink)