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The Doxastic Status of Delusion and the Limits of Folk Psychology

In Inês Hipólito, Jorge Gonçalves & João G. Pereira (eds.), Schizophrenia and Common Sense: Explaining the Relation Between Madness and Social Values. New York: Springer (2018)

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  1. Delusions, Illusions and Inference Under Uncertainty.Jakob Hohwy - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (1):57-71.
    Three challenges to a unified understanding of delusions emerge from Radden's On Delusion (2011). Here, I propose that in order to respond to these challenges, and to work towards a unifying framework for delusions, we should see delusions as arising in inference under uncertainty. This proposal is based on the observation that delusions in key respects are surprisingly like perceptual illusions, and it is developed further by focusing particularly on individual differences in uncertainty expectations.
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  • Delusion, Rationality, Empathy: Commentary on Martin Davies Et Al.Gregory Currie & Jon Jureidini - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2):159-162.
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  • Delusions, Acceptances, and Cognitive Feelings.Richard Dub - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):27-60.
    Psychopathological delusions have a number of features that are curiously difficult to explain. Delusions are resistant to counterevidence and impervious to counterargument. Delusions are theoretically, affectively, and behaviorally circumscribed: delusional individuals often do not act on their delusions and often do not update beliefs on the basis of their delusions. Delusional individuals are occasionally able to distinguish their delusions from other beliefs, sometimes speaking of their “delusional reality.” To explain these features, I offer a model according to which, contrary to (...)
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  • Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs.Lisa Bortolotti - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    Delusions are a common symptom of schizophrenia and dementia. Though most English dictionaries define a delusion as a false opinion or belief, there is currently a lively debate about whether delusions are really beliefs and indeed, whether they are even irrational. The book is an interdisciplinary exploration of the nature of delusions. It brings together the psychological literature on the aetiology and the behavioural manifestations of delusions, and the philosophical literature on belief ascription and rationality. The thesis of the book (...)
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  • Delusions as Doxastic States: Contexts, Compartments, and Commitments.Tim Bayne - 2010 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (4):329-336.
    Although delusions are typically regarded as beliefs of a certain kind, there have been worries about the doxastic conception of delusions since at least Bleuler’s time. ‘Anti-doxasticists,’ as we might call them, do not merely worry about the claim that delusions are beliefs, they reject it. Reimer’s paper weighs into the debate between ‘doxasticists’ and ‘anti-doxasticists’ by suggesting that one of the main arguments given against the doxastic conception of delusions—what we might call the functional role objection—is based on a (...)
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  • In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions.Timothy J. Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):163-88.
    In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that the traditional conception of (...)
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  • When Words Speak Louder Than Actions: Delusion, Belief, and the Power of Assertion.David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (4):1-18.
    People suffering from severe monothematic delusions, such as Capgras, Fregoli, or Cotard patients, regularly assert extraordinary and unlikely things. For example, some say that their loved ones have been replaced by impostors. A popular view in philosophy and cognitive science is that such monothematic delusions aren't beliefs because they don't guide behaviour and affect in the way that beliefs do. Or, if they are beliefs, they are somehow anomalous, atypical, or marginal beliefs. We present evidence from five studies that folk (...)
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  • Belief.Konrad Marc-Wogau & H. H. Price - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (2):246.
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  • Imagination, Delusion and Hallucinations.Gregory Currie - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (1):168-183.
    Chris Frith has argued that a loss of the sense of agency is central to schizophrenia. This suggests a connection between hallucinations and delusions on the one hand, and the misidentification of the subject’s imaginings as perceptions and beliefs on the other. In particular, understanding the mechanisms that underlie imagination may help us to explain the puzzling phenomena of thought insertion and withdrawal. Frith sometimes states his argument in terms of a loss of metarepresentational capacity in schizophrenia. I argue that (...)
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  • Ontological Anti-Realism.David J. Chalmers - 2009 - In David John Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press.
    The basic question of ontology is “What exists?”. The basic question of metaontology is: are there objective answers to the basic question of ontology? Here ontological realists say yes, and ontological anti-realists say no. (Compare: The basic question of ethics is “What is right?”. The basic question of metaethics is: are there objective answers to the basic question of ethics? Here moral realists say yes, and moral anti-realists say no.) For example, the ontologist may ask: Do numbers exist? The Platonist (...)
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  • McGinn on Delusion and Imagination. [REVIEW]Gregory Currie & Nicholas Jones - unknown
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  • In-Between Believing.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):76-82.
    For any proposition P, it may sometimes occur that a person is not quite accurately describable as believing that P, nor quite accurately describable as failing to believe that P. Such a person, I will say, is in an "in-between state of belief." This paper argues for the prevalence of in-between states of believing and asserts the need for an account of belief that allows us intelligibly to talk about in-between believing. It is suggested that Bayesian and representationalist approaches are (...)
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  • Imagination, Delusion, and Self-Deception.Andy Egan - 2008 - In Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernandez (eds.), Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation (Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science). Psychology Press.
    Subjects with delusions profess to believe some extremely peculiar things. Patients with Capgras delusion sincerely assert that, for example, their spouses have been replaced by impostors. Patients with Cotard’s delusion sincerely assert that they are dead. Many philosophers and psychologists are hesitant to say that delusional subjects genuinely believe the contents of their delusions.2 One way to reinterpret delusional subjects is to say that we’ve misidentified the content of the problematic belief. So for example, rather than believing that his wife (...)
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  • Wondrous Strange: The Neuropsychology of Abnormal Beliefs.Andrew W. Young - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (1):47–73.
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  • Normativity and Rationality in Delusional Psychiatric Disorders.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2001 - Mind and Language 16 (5):457-493.
    Psychiatric treatment and diagnosis rests upon a richer conception of normativity than, for example, cognitive neuropsychology. This paper explores the role that considerations of rationality can play in defining this richer conception of normativity. It distinguishes two types of rationality and considers how each type can break down in different ways in delusional psychiatric disorders.
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  • Mad Belief?Eric Schwitzgebel - 2012 - Neuroethics 5 (1):13-17.
    “Mad belief” (in analogy with Lewisian “mad pain”) would be a belief state with none of the causal role characteristic of belief—a state not caused or apt to have been caused by any of the sorts of events that usually cause belief and involving no disposition toward the usual behavioral or other manifestations of belief. On token-functionalist views of belief, mad belief in this sense is conceptually impossible. Cases of delusion—or at least some cases of delusion—might be cases of belief (...)
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  • Delusions.A. W. Young - 1999 - The Monist 82 (4):571-589.
    Although a common clinical phenomenon, delusions are difficult to explain and have a problematic conceptual status. Advances in understanding delusions have come from studies which involve detailed investigation of particular types of delusion. Some of this work is summarised, with the Capgras and Cotard delusions as specific examples. These are used to high-highlight questions for which there is the potential for fruitful dialogue with philosophers. Such questions include the criteria for deciding that a statement represents a belief, the extent to (...)
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  • Introduction: Pathologies of Belief.Martin Davies & Max Coltheart - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (1):1–46.
    who are unrecognizable because they are in disguise. ¼ The person I see in the mirror is not really me. ¼ A person I knew who died is nevertheless in the hospital ward today. ¼ This arm [the speaker’s left arm] is not mine it is yours; you have..
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  • Do Animals Have Beliefs?Stephen P. Stich - 1979 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):15-28.
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  • Delusions as Performance Failures.Philip Gerrans - 2001 - Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 6 (3).
    Delusions are explanations of anomalous experiences. A theory of delusion requires an explanation of both the anomalous experience _and _the apparently irrational explanation generated by the delusional subject. Hence, we require a model of rational belief formation against which the belief formation of delusional subjects can be evaluated. _Method. _I first describe such a model, distinguishing procedural from pragmatic rationality. Procedural rationality is the use of rules or procedures, deductive or inductive, that produce an inferentially coherent set of propositions. Pragmatic (...)
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  • The Measure of Madness: Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Neuroscience and Delusional Thought.P. Gerrans - 2014 - MIT Press.
    Drawing on the latest work in cognitive neuroscience, a philosopher proposes that delusions are narrative models that accommodate anomalous experiences.
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  • Rationality, Meaning, and the Analysis of Delusion.J. Campbell - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):89-100.
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  • Against the Belief Model of Delusion.Andy Hamilton - 2006 - In Man Cheung Chung, Bill Fulford & George Graham (eds.), Reconceiving Schizophrenia. Oxford University Press.
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  • Recreative Minds.Gregory Currie & Ian Ravenscroft - 2004 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62 (4):406-407.
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  • The Paradoxes of Delusion Wittgenstein, Schreber, and the Schizophrenic Mind.Louis Arnorsson Sass - 1994
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  • Psychiatry in the Scientific Image.Dominic Murphy - 2005 - MIT Press.
    In _ Psychiatry in the Scientific Image, _Dominic Murphy looks at psychiatry from the viewpoint of analytic philosophy of science, considering three issues: how we should conceive of, classify, and explain mental illness. If someone is said to have a mental illness, what about it is mental? What makes it an illness? How might we explain and classify it? A system of psychiatric classification settles these questions by distinguishing the mental illnesses and showing how they stand in relation to one (...)
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  • The History of Mental Symptoms: Descriptive Psychopathology Since the Nineteenth Century.G. E. Berrios - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
    Since psychiatry remains a descriptive discipline, it is essential for its practitioners to understand how the language of psychiatry came to be formed. This important book, written by a psychiatrist-historian, traces the genesis of the descriptive categories of psychopathology and examines their interaction with the psychological and philosophical context within which they arose. The author explores particularly the language and ideas that have characterised descriptive psychopathology from the mid-nineteenth century to the present day. He presents a masterful survey of the (...)
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  • Reconceiving Delusions.G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham - 2004 - International Review of Psychiatry 16:236-241.
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  • Delusions as 'Wrong Beliefs': A Conceptual History.G. Berrios - 1991 - British Journal of Psychiatry 159:6-13.
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